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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents practice-based research on redesigning decision support 
within the area of prostate cancer screening. More fundamentally, this 
research is specifically interested in a politics and practice of supporting 
exploratory interactivity in healthcare decision-making by non-experts. The 
motivation for this research stems partly from insights gained from my own 
empirical research into algorithmic web-search results personalisation as well 
as issues underlying the biopolitical logic of cancer screening practices, the 
individualisation of risk and the profound uncertainties inherent in evidence-
based medicine which are largely underarticulated in the design of decision-
support tools for individuals. Taking these conditions as the driver for this 
research, the first and theoretical part of the thesis analyses models of 
interactivity and the politics of statistically-derived medical knowledge in 
evidence-based medicine as well as problematising dominant but narrow 
conceptions of human decision-making. Following such analysis are the 
insights that the statistical nature of epidemiological risk information is of 
limited applicability for individual decision-making and, thus, patient 
preferences matter to guide decision-making under uncertainty. By introducing 
cognition understood as socially distributed and extended into and performed 
through the environment, this research proposes to rethink how to design for 
exploratory information interaction in medical decision support. Following a 
research-through-design method and developing a minimal reserved design 
approach, a number of prototypes were developed to investigate the potentials 
hypothesised in the theoretical part of the thesis. The prototypes assumed a 
probing function in shedding further light on the thinking and practices of 
medical professionals, which leads me to suggest repositioning them as 
probotypes, occupying a middle ground between prototypes and cultural 
probes. Ultimately, the contribution of this research lies in critically and 
practically exploring conceptual and methodological potentials for redesigning 
exploratory interactions in shared medical decision-making processes. 
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is interested in the politics and practice of health information 
interaction. This focus has partly originated from my earlier empirical research 
on online search interaction and the ways in which statistical methods are 
employed in filtering and providing individually relevant search results (Feuz et 
al. 2011). While in some circumstances, such as for example when trying to re-
find a previously visited website, such filtering may indeed be very helpful, 
using online search engines for health search queries, a knowledge domain 
often unfamiliar to those undertaking the search, seems very problematic. This 
is because the ways in which such filtering occurs is obscured and not 
available for further inspection or sense-making. In turn, the person cannot 
assess the relevance of the search results she is being presented with and the 
kinds of assumptions based on which relevancy is supposed. I speculate that 
such an approach is not supportive of making sense of health information 
within the context of health search interactions, in particular since it has come 
to light that for the majority of people health information found online affects 
their decision-making (Zickuhr 2010, 3). Furthermore, the model underlying the 
design of such interactions seems unfit to support a more exploratory type of 
interaction and provide the relevant means to do so. Given these problems, I 
have chosen to approach them with an encompassing review of literatures 
identified as relevant for medical decision support with the goal to uncover 
connected, specific and significant aspects of such processes to be 
conceptually rethought and redesigned.   
 
From exploring and analysing the history and more recent issues with medical 
epistemology as well as contemporary approaches towards decision support, I 
have chosen to focus on developing tools for the navigation of probabilistic risk 
information around prostate cancer screening as a topic for this thesis and 
practice-based research project. This focus is relevant as an interesting and 
productive case study for this research project for the following reasons:  
 Firstly, for the past four decades, evidence-based medicine (EBM) has 
slowly but increasingly become dominant as a knowledge paradigm and 
clinical practice approach in western medicine. EBM is the “use of 
mathematical estimates of the risk of benefit and harm, derived from high-
quality research on population samples, to inform clinical decision-making in 
the diagnosis, investigation or management of individual patients” (Greenhalg 
2010, 1). While, on the one hand, EBM has certainly contributed to making the 
medical evidence base more robust, on the other hand, it has also fallen victim 
to issues such as selective reporting and reporting bias which distort the 
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evidence base significantly (Goldacre 2012; Ioannidis 2005).    
 Secondly, and independently of the issues identified concerning the 
reliability of EBM, the applicability of epidemiologically-derived cancer risk 
factors for deciding on cancer screening at the level of an individual person is 
questionable. This is because framing epidemiological risk factor information 
and thus probabilities derived from a sample population as relevant for 
individual decision-making, rather than public health management only, 
obscures the significant levels of uncertainty inherent in such information. This 
is despite the inability to know any one individual’s health outcome (Esposito 
2007; Politi et al. 2007, 683). Unfortunately, the probabilistic nature of 
epidemiologically-derived risk information is not well understood by decision 
making patients (Gigerenzer 2002, 4; Gigerenzer and Gray 2011, 3). 
Furthermore, the uncertainties underlying such medical risk information and 
subsequent decision-making are seldom made transparent by medical 
professionals (Politi et al. 2007, 690).  
 Thirdly, shared decision-making has been suggested as a relevant 
means to engage with preference-sensitive care situations. These are 
healthcare situations, such as prostate cancer screening, in which several 
treatment options are considered to have equivalent health outcomes when 
measured in terms of health economics indices, such as life expectancy and 
quality of life months. Treatments, however, affect patients differently due to 
their side-effects. Thus, as Mulley et al. argue (2012), patient preferences 
matter in such situations. Unfortunately, medical professionals do not appear 
to be very good at diagnosing patient preferences (ibid.), which brings me to 
the last point. 
 Decision aids often come in the form of videos or pamphlets and are 
developed to support people in making an informed and unbiased decision in 
a medical situation. This is thought possible by providing a balanced view of 
benefits and harms of treatment options according to the current evidence 
base. The use of decision aids as part of shared decision-making processes 
has been successful in some ways (Cochrane Collaboration 2009). As meta-
analysis by the Cochrane Collaboration indicates, when compared to common 
care interventions, decision aids performed favourably by improving people’s 
knowledge about options available and continue to dampen “enthusiasm for 
major elective surgery […] in favour of more conservative options,” as well as 
accounting for a decreased preference for prostate specific antigen (PSA) 
testing (ibid., 43). A PSA test is a blood test widely applied in prostate cancer 
screening to identify potential risk of cancer. The test is highly controversial 
(Ablin 2010). The review results, however, also point out that decision aids do 
not perform better than conventional care practices (that is consultations 
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without the support of decision aids) when it comes to satisfaction with 
decision-making and anxiety.  
 I argue that the above key finding may be due, among other aspects, to 
the fact that the interactional model underlying the design of decision aids 
assumes that patient preferences and values are pre-established and only 
need to be retrieved by decision-makers when confronted with a decision to 
be made about screening. Instead, Epstein and Peters (2009, 195) argue that 
in medical situations characterised by substantial uncertainties and potential 
“outcomes that have previously not been considered or cannot be imagined,” 
preferences are constructed rather than simply elicited. Unfortunately, the 
preference construction process is not very well supported as part of shared 
decision-making processes today. Furthermore, the uncertainty underlying the 
probabilistic nature of cancer risk information in decision aids is exclusively 
presented as natural frequencies. While natural frequencies may improve 
readability and avoid certain biases, I argue that such an approach 
simultaneously further obscures the fundamental uncertainties underlying the 
generation and applicability of such information, in particular at the level of the 
decision-making individual. 
The critical review and analysis of relevant literatures in chapters 1 to 4 has 
been conducted in order to elicit a multiperspectival framing of the problem. 
This includes online health information search and digital culture studies, 
social and cultural studies of evidence-based medicine, theories of cognition 
and design research. In the practice-based research, I will work on the 
problem of decision-support from these perspectives and how they provide 
different facets to the problem. To this end, the insights gathered from the 
critical analysis operate as a set of connected problems and thus thinking 
resources which my practice-based research attends to. Thus, this research 
draws inspiration, both from the phenomena of actual health information 
practice but equally from theoretical reflections such a health information 
practice is constituted and affected by. 
Following from these considerations, the question of how to design for an 
understanding of unpredictability and uncertainty within the context of prostate 
cancer screening decision-making is an interesting one. The central 
hypothesis for this research is that shared medical decision-making within the 
selected context could be productively supported by an exploratory model of 
interaction. I will argue that such a model of interaction is better suited to 
circumstances of sense-making and decision-making under uncertainty and, 
thus, to the aspirations of a patient-centred care seeking to deeply respect 
patients as unique living beings and care for them on their own terms (Epstein 
and Street 2011). The contribution of this research lies in critically and 
11 !
practically exploring conceptual and methodological potentials for redesigning 
exploratory interactions in shared medical decision-making processes. More 
specifically, this research project has identified and problematised the role of 
risk and uncertainty in cancer screening decision-making, its potential grave 
implications for patients as well as starting to redesign and evaluate prototypes 
with medical professionals in this regard. The particular contributions are as 
follows.  
 
Firstly, through the critical analysis of relevant literature, a set of problematic 
aspects in contemporary health information interaction was identified. These 
contribute relevant facets from which the problem of redesigning for an 
understanding of risk and uncertainty in cancer screening decision-making 
could be engaged. In turn, this provides helpful orientation on how to 
reconceptualise decision-support.  
Secondly, these facets helped defining a set of design requirements informing 
the design research. These include a reconsideration of what constitutes a 
useful and necessary scope and time frame relevant for facilitating the 
decision-making process in its entirety and complexity. Furthermore, the 
desirability to convey a differentiated understanding between an 
epidemiological and individual perspective of risk as regards uncertainty 
involved in such risk information and decision-making. This also includes, the 
particular ways in which risk and uncertainty are articulated (natural 
frequencies) and visually represented (magnitudes of risk). Lastly, the need for 
supporting personal preference construction and, thus, reconsider patient 
autonomy beyond the idealised decision-making individual was identified. 
Thirdly, two prototypes were developed to address these design requirements. 
The first one is an interactive Venn diagram helping to understand false-
positive and false-negative test results by providing a means for exploring the 
meaning of quantitative PSA test results. The second prototype consists of a 
set of reflection cards, which aim to facilitate the personal preference 
construction process.  
The prototypes were evaluated with medical professionals with regards to their 
topical relevance, clarity, productivity and meaningfulness in addressing 
decisional problems as identified in the critical analysis. The medical 
professionals found the prototypes useful in many ways. They thought them 
well designed and declared an interest to evaluate them, including actual 
patients. They also highlighted potential limitations in that the reflection cards 
may not appeal to some patients, not are such cards able to unbias doctors 
with a set opinion regarding the merit of prostate cancer-screening.  
Fourthly, unexpectedly and importantly, my prototypes came to function as 
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probes for diagnosing the underlying and practiced understanding of and 
dynamics between medical professionals and their roles. This leads me to 
suggest repositioning them as probotypes, occupying a middle ground 
between prototypes and cultural probes.  
 
Overview of the thesis 
 Chapter one starts with key observations on how online search 
engines have come to be used for finding health information online and the 
scale and scope at which this occurs. In light of the massive growth of online 
content over the last two decades, a brief historical development of search 
engines will provide some explanation for their dominant operative 
mechanisms such as the algorithmic filtering of supposedly relevant results as 
well as the interaction paradigm that has developed. I argue that algorithmic 
filtering is particularly problematic for exploratory search interactions where the 
search goal may not always be very clear from the beginning. I introduce and 
discuss exploratory search and interaction as opposed to an information-
retrieval model of interaction. In the remainder of the chapter I consider other 
conceptions of interface and interactivity, which will serve as further inspiration 
and set the orientation for this research on exploratory health interaction more 
broadly.   
 Chapter two is concerned with better understanding the body of 
knowledge for which exploratory interaction aims to be productive. 
Specifically, I will analyse and discuss western medical epistemology and the 
development of evidence-based medicine, including issues such as reporting 
bias and selective reporting that have recently surfaced. Epidemiology and 
thus statistics are among the key underlying modes in which such knowledge 
is generated, hence my discussion in more detail of their historical 
development as well as their contemporary application via cancer screening. 
Whilst epidemiologically-derived risk information may be said to be beneficial 
for public health management, they simultaneously introduce a significant 
dilemma for individual decision-making. Furthermore, I will consider biopolitical 
concerns around evidence-based medicine (EBM), such as the changing 
possibilities and responsibilities projected onto people in sustaining and 
promoting their health. The chapter will end with a reflection on notions of 
normalcy and pathology, which seem particularly strained in the context of the 
probabilistic means by which epidemiological thresholds for normalcy and 
pathology are determined and applied for purposes of cancer screening. This 
specific topic will set the focus for considering approaches to decision support 
in chapter three.  
 In chapter three, I build upon the concerns discussed in the previous 
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chapter by considering the assumptions underlying the design of decision aids 
as a tool for promoting shared decision-making (SDM) for cancer screening. 
Decision aids (DA), in this context, aim to help people in making an informed 
and unbiased decision by providing a balanced view of benefits and harms of 
treatment options according to the best current medical evidence base. The 
chapter will define SDM, consider its genealogy and discuss the principles 
based on which decision aids are designed and evaluated. This renders more 
transparent the underlying assumptions and design decisions materialising in 
the design of contemporary DA’s. In particular, I will analyse the specific ways 
in which risk information is presented and the implications this has on 
individuals’ sense- and decision-making. Risk visualisations typically privilege 
the display of magnitudes of risk at the cost of the unpredictability of risk 
factors. I argue that, from the perspective of an individual person, this seems 
partly a questionable design decision. This is because communicating and 
understanding unpredictability is at least as important as it suggests preparing 
for a variety of possible health outcomes. This relates to the second part of the 
chapter dealing with the role patient preferences and values play in shared 
decision-making for cancer screening. Some suggest that medical 
practitioners should focus on helping patients cope with uncertainty rather than 
just understanding it (Politi et al. 2007, 690). One way in which this could be 
achieved is by supporting the preference construction process. 
 Chapter four and five will consolidate the critical review of the 
literature in chapters one to three and prospectively reflect on the issues 
identified from the perspective of and potential for redesigning decision 
support. I will argue that the contemporary design approach to decision 
support is largely based on an information-retrieval model of interaction which 
tends to obscure fundamental issues concerning personal preferences 
underlying the decisional problem in preventive cancer screening. Instead, I 
hypothesise that an exploratory model of interaction is better suited to 
circumstances of sense-making and decision-making under uncertainty and 
thus to the aspirations for patient-centred care (Epstein and Street 2011). In 
the second part of the chapter I will introduce the extended mind thesis and 
concepts of distributed cognition, guided by which I will investigate the 
productive potential of an exploratory model of interaction to support shared 
decision-making. In chapter f ive, I discuss the selection of issues from the 
critical analysis which will be addressed and operationalized in the practice-
based research.  
 In chapter six, I document and discuss the iterative design process. 
Research through design (RTD) (Gaver 2012, 940), the method used in this 
research, is a method which privileges the exploration of a research question 
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through the articulation and evaluation of designs. I discuss the successive 
development of two final prototypes. The first prototype is focused on 
supporting an understanding of false-positive and false-negative prostate 
specific antigen (PSA) test results. This derives from the critical analysis in 
chapters 1 to 4 regarding the limitations of using epidemiological risk 
information in decision-support at the individual level as well as from the 
finding that risk information visualisations often represent magnitudes of risk 
rather than the actual random distribution of risk at the individual level (see 
chapter 3). In aiming to develop epistemic interactivity for an understanding of 
false-positive and false-negative test results, this design research aims to 
render more intelligible and meaningful both the specific meaning of 
probabilistically derived risk information as well as its limited predictive ability 
at the individual level. 
The second prototype is concerned with supporting the personal preference 
construction processes in preference sensitive medical care situations, such 
as in cancer screening. As discussed in the critical analysis, this is relevant 
because decision-support based on epidemiological risk factor information 
alone does not help prepare for coping with the uncertainties inherent in the 
screening process and the ways in which its implications affect individuals in 
their personal and social lives. As a consequence, preferences and values 
matter when making decisions about cancer screening. The design process is 
inspired by Mol and Law’s (2004) suggestion to privilege action over 
knowledge. Without negating knowledge, their perspective is interested in the 
implications of medicine for the lived practice of being a patient and what we 
might learn from this for medical practice. The prototype consists of a set of 
reflection cards containing scenarios a person might encounter when 
conducting prostate cancer screening. The scenarios are crafted in such a 
way that they embed the experience and potential implications of screening in 
everydaylife settings, be that in relation to family life, relationships, work 
environments or leisure activities. The reflection cards aim to support reflection 
on how people engaged in cancer screening would react in the described 
scenarios and who they would turn to for advice and help. As identified in the 
critical analysis, this reconceptualises patient autonomy beyond the individual 
decision-making person and builds on distributed processes of meaning-
making.   
To this end, the design research approach followed is carried out by offering a 
set of prototypes that address problems identified in the literature review. In 
chapter seven I discuss the evaluation process with medical professionals, 
and in chapter eight I evaluate the research findings. Together, the design 
research contributes to the critical analysis in the following ways. Firstly, it has 
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identified aspects that matter when designing for an understanding of 
uncertainty of PSA test results as opposed to probabilistically-determined risk, 
which is the focus of contemporary decision aids. The design research has 
also been productive in discovering ways in which shared decision making 
could be furthered by more actively involving the participating patient through 
epistemic interaction in the sense-making process, and how the design may 
best support this. Furthermore, the design research has brought to light that 
the actual screening path contains much more friction due to the need of 
undertaking multiple biopsies so as to avoid false-positive and false-negative 
PSA test results. Some patients find it hard to accept negative biopsy results 
and thus the absence of cancer when a PSA test result has previously 
indicated the contrary. This is an important aspect that the literature review has 
not brought to light. It matters significantly in light of this research, which aims 
to foreground potential psychological and sociocultural implications the cancer 
screening experience may have for people. Lastly and most importantly, the 
design research contributes to the critical analysis in that it has unearthed an 
understanding of the professional roles and expectations among the medical 
professionals. This is relevant as in some cases it might affect the role 
decision-support interventions such as those I have designed might come to 
play in actual clinical decision-making practice.  
Finally, a number of productive lines of inquiry are shown indicating strong 
potential for developing this work in useful and relevant ways. 
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Chapter 1  
The problem with health web-search interaction 
 
Introduction and research context 
 
According to the Pew Research Center, searching for health information online 
had become the third most common activity among internet users aged 18 and 
above in the USA by 2010 (Zickuhr 2010, 3). For many, health information 
found online affects their medical decision-making in terms of how to treat an 
illness or ask doctors new questions (ibid., 4). However, there are significant 
issues with understanding and carefully assessing such health information. 
Among the issues identified are, for example, difficulties in making sense of 
statistical information (Gigerenzer 2002, 4; Gigerenzer and Gray 2011, 3), 
lacking a capacity to critically assess the quality of medical information (Kukla 
2007, 33) and a variety of suggested biases which can have negative 
implications for sense- and decision-making (see chapter three). Furthermore, 
in the context of cancer screening, significant levels of overdiagnosis and 
overtreatment have been identified, that is the “diagnosis of a ‘cancer’ that 
would otherwise not go on to cause symptoms or death” and which may 
nevertheless be treated preventively (Welch and Black 2010). Prostate and 
breast cancer screening programmes and corresponding diagnostic tests 
have recently been critically reappraised and, as a consequence, are no 
longer recommended in some countries.1  
 Within the context of prostate cancer, which is the focus of this research 
project, given the unknown effects of early detection with a PSA test in terms of 
promoting longevity and reducing morbidity as well as the risk of serious side-
effects (BMJ Group), the decision of whether or not to screen is a difficult one. 
It requires understanding relevant medical risk information and preventive 
treatment options, possible implications following such courses of action as 
well as considering personal values and preferences. Unfortunately, the 
probabilistic nature of epidemiologically-derived risk information is not well 
understood by decision makers (Gigerenzer 2002, 4; Gigerenzer and Gray 
2011, 3). Furthermore, the uncertainties underlying such medical risk 
information and subsequent decision-making are seldom made transparent by 
medical professionals (Politi et al. 2007, 690). 
 Due to the novelty of the situation, values and preferences have typically 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Screening for Prostate Cancer, UK National Screening Committee, 2010. Stellenwert des 
PSA-Wertes bei der Früherkennung des Prostatakarzinoms, Swiss Medical Board, 2011. 
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not been previously deliberated and, thus, may not be available to guide 
medical decisions (Epstein and Peters 2009, 195). Instead, as Epstein and 
Peters (ibid.) suggest, they need to be constructed first. This involves 
understanding the potential benefits and harms of treatment options and, more 
importantly, the ways in which this affects a person’s life beyond bodily 
functions. The preference-construction and deliberation process may be 
supported by physicians or influenced by family and friends. Such preference-
construction processes, however, are not well supported by shared medical 
decision-making processes (Epstein and Street 2011, 102), which seem chiefly 
focused on the provision of best medical evidence in a balanced manner by 
way of decision aids. The aim of this research is to critically reflect on the 
limitations and implications of evidence-based medicine in relation to decision 
support for prostate cancer screening decisions. Such reflection will inform the 
redesign of decision support in the practice-based part of this research, which 
will also include the preference-construction process.  
 In summary then, making an informed decision on prostate cancer 
screening is characterised by multifarious complexities bearing on the 
information environment, the doctor-patient relationship, and potential 
decisional conflict in the absence of guidance by personal values and 
preferences. These complexities are what renders this an interesting and 
relevant case study. This introductory chapter begins to explore some of these 
complexities by considering the ways in which health search interactions with 
contemporary web search engines are supported. This is relevant to consider 
because search engines affect health decision making (Zickuhr 2010, 4), 
operate as mediators as discussed in this chapter, and, in that regard, act 
similarly to decision aids within the context of shared decision-making for 
prostate cancer screening, as will be discussed below and in further detail in 
chapter three. I argue that both of them take an active and mediating role as 
part of the interaction with them. As Fuller (2012, 134) argues with regard to 
decision-support systems more broadly 
 
the interest of the decision support system lies less in the quality of 
the advice it provides than in its redistributive function, in the way 
that it can help displace and redefine expertise, valid knowledge, 
the landscape of choice and the rationalisation one makes of it. 
 
 A brief analysis of the historic development of web search engines allows 
for an understanding of the dominant interaction model of search interactions, 
the operative mechanisms underlying and supporting such a model, as well as 
the implications this might have for information needs and decision tasks within 
the context of health information search. As I analyse and argue in chapter 
three, the interactional model underlying both search engines and decision 
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aids in shared decision-making is largely based on an information-retrieval 
understanding of interaction and, thus, less suitable within the context of 
cancer screening. In contrast, in this research project I argue for and design 
towards exploratory ways of interacting with health information. Such 
exploratory interactions are hypothesised as relevant for supporting an 
understanding of the limitations of the probabilistic nature of epidemiologically-
derived health risk information as well as supporting people in exploring and 
constructing preferences and values for guiding their decision-making. Before 
analysing the issues concerning the relevance of epidemiological risk 
information for individual decision-making in chapter two as well as the 
relevancy of personal preferences within the context of cancer screening in 
chapter three, a short history of search engines will be discussed. This will 
help understand how the dominant interaction paradigm with search engines 
has developed, and, in turn, allow to draw parallels with the contemporary 
design of decision aids in shared health decision-making as discussed in 
chapter three.  
 
 
A short history of search engines 
 
Search engines have played a vital role in the development of the World Wide 
Web (web). This is mainly due to the fact that the web lacks an inherent 
indexing and categorising mechanism. From early on Yahoo and other 
commercial operators offered a directory to the web, which was compiled by 
human experts in a fashion similar to a library catalogue. While this format was 
helpful in accessing information on the web, it simply could not cope with the 
rapid growth of the web. Subsequent search engine providers started to build 
automated indexing and ranking mechanisms. Indexing is the part of a search 
engine where search crawlers continuously update the search engine’s index 
by scanning the web for new websites and for new content on those indexed 
websites. Ranking, on the other hand, is concerned with the matching of a 
user’s search query with the index and, based on a set of rules, presents the 
user with a set of search results. At the core of ranking lies the trade-off 
between precision and recall. Precision, on the one hand, is concerned with 
the accuracy of the match between search query and retrieved search results. 
Recall, on the other hand, is concerned with number of relevant search results 
produced. When increasing precision of the match between search query and 
results, recall is reduced and vice versa. 
 While better suited to cope with the enormous growth of the web, early 
automated search engines suffered from a number of problems. Key among 
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these was that their ranking mechanism chiefly relied on a relatively crude 
statistical keyword-matching process between search query and indexed 
webpages. Thus, with the growth of content on the web, this produced an 
enormous amount of search results. More often than not, it would require a 
strenuous effort to find useful search results. This was particularly true for 
exploratory search behaviour, where the search goal is not always very clear 
and emerges as part of the search process. This is a type of search which will 
be at the core of my focus and which will be considered in more detail shortly.  
        A further problem search engines have faced from early on up to this day 
is bias in search results by advertisers. With the introduction of e-business and 
the advent of a potentially global marketplace, it became particularly 
opportune to be listed as a relevant vendor in the top rankings of search 
engine results. Thus, a new industry was born: Search Engine Optimisation 
(SEO). Service providers in this industry basically help businesses to improve 
their listing position. This ranges from ensuring that a business Website is 
properly indexed with the relevant keywords to manipulating their ranking 
position by applying various methods inflating their relevancy. The former 
practices work along the methods suggested and approved by search 
engines for organic listing, while the latter aim to influence the search rankings 
beyond the methods approved by search engines.  
 Characteristics of search engine results such as comprehensiveness, 
scalability, relevancy, objectivity and spam emerged as the core challenges 
search engine operators had to deal with, and remain so today. Larry Page 
and Sergey Brin aimed to address these problems when they introduced the 
Google search engine (1998). As they explained in their paper (1998) the 
system architecture of Google was from the outset planned to scale along the 
growth of the Web. Their paper suggested that this could be achieved by 
focusing on fast crawling technology, efficient use of indices storage, a 
capacity of the index system to compute large data sizes as well as scaling at 
the user end by handling search queries quickly.  
 The key differentiator, though, was their proposal for “bringing order to 
the Web” (ibid.) with the introduction of the PageRank algorithm based on link 
analysis. The link analysis concept was born out of structural similarities 
between the hyperlinked structure of the Web and bibliometrics, that is the 
study of the importance of a piece of academic writing for its field on the basis 
of citation structures. Given the Web’s hyper-linking structure and its 
resemblance to academic writing, the concept seemed equally well-suited. 
Link Analysis or PageRank, as Google’s founding fathers Page and Brin came 
to name it, applies this concept to the Web. PageRank is a method based on 
algorithms that measure the importance of a Webpage by considering the 
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number of in-links to this Webpage from other Webpages and, more 
importantly, the importance of the inlinking Webpages. The importance of 
these Webpages was again determined by their own PageRank. In other 
words, importance is determined by means of popularity within a chain of 
linked Webpages. This approach appears to be democratic in nature, as 
Google points out in their description of PageRank below:  
 
PageRank relies on the uniquely democratic nature of the Web by 
using its vast link structure as an indicator of an individual page's 
value. In essence, Google interprets a link from page A to page B as 
a vote, by page A, for the importance of page B. But Google looks at 
considerably more than the sheer volume of votes or links a page 
receives; for example, it also analyses the page that casts the vote. 
Votes cast by pages that are themselves ‘important’ weigh more 
heavily and help to make other pages ‘important.’ Using these and 
other factors, Google provides its views on pages' relative 
importance.  
      (Google Technology Page 2005)2 
  
 
 Interesting, however, is the fact that some pages are in “themselves 
important” and weigh more (ibid.). While it may be argued that some hierarchy 
seems in place, there appear to be no transparent means available to 
understand what is of a priori importance and what is not. At best, an a priori 
unimportant Website can gain importance over time through popularity. 
Compared to existing search engines at the time, Google soon managed to 
gain significant market share because their search engine produced much 
quicker results which seemed more relevant, up-to-date and less advertising-
biased.  
 The interface has not changed very much since the early days: the almost 
empty page with a search box and the mostly ten blue links has become a 
quasi-standard. However, while the front-end does not seem to have changed 
much, the back-end has changed in a number of ways, in some areas 
substantially so. Search results for a given search query are nowadays 
automatically filtered by a number of variables that remain hidden in the 
immediate user interaction. The goal of this is to further increase the relevancy 
of search results. Among others, search results are typically filtered based on 
the search user’s geo-location as derived from her IP (Internet Protocol) 
address. Thus, if a search user uses Google and enters “restaurant” as a 
search query, the search engine assumes that the user is looking for a 
restaurant within the city she currently accesses the Internet from. This may 
obviously be useful in some cases, but largely depends on context.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2!https://web.archive.org/web/20050315015924/http://www.google.com/technology/ (accessed 
March 20, 2014).!
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 However, a more substantial and difficult to identify change to the ranking 
mechanism is that some time ago Google started to personalise users’ search 
results, promising to deliver more relevant results to the user whose query is 
now being considered in the context of her search history and other data 
previously compiled into a personal profile (data shadow). In order to produce 
this context, vast amounts of personal information need to be collected, 
organised and made actionable. Within the fast receding limitations of storage 
space and computing power, profiles can never be too comprehensive, too 
detailed, or too up-to-date. Google is compiling personal profiles in three 
dimensions: the knowledge person (what an individual is interested in, based 
on search and click-stream histories), the social person (whom an individual is 
connected to, via e-mail, social networks and other communication tools) and 
the embodied person (where an individual is located in physical space, and 
the states of the body) (Stalder and Mayer 2009). Together, these three profiles 
promise to provide a detailed, comprehensive and up-to-date context for each 
search query, with the potential to deliver precise results that reflect not just 
the information ‘out–there’ but also the unique interest a user has at any given 
moment.  
 Personalised search does not simply aim at providing a view onto existing 
reality (Introna and Nissenbaum 2000). Rather, it promises an ‘augmented 
reality’ in which machine intelligence interprets the user’s individual 
relationship to reality and then selects what is ‘good.’ As a result, it has 
become unlikely that two users see the same search results for a particular 
search query even when accessing from the same IP address (Feuz et al. 
2011). Search engines, thus, often act as black-boxed mediators, both on the 
level of mere functionality as well as on the data set, without articulating such 
mediation as part of the interface. Unfortunately, the use-context in these 
cases is determined denotatively and without consent from the user. Such 
practices are deeply problematic as these interactions are pre-emptied and 
operate on an unknown operational model of the world (Holmes 2007; Stalder 
and Meyer 2009). Unfortunately, many search engine users do not seem to be 
aware of this (Pan et al. 2007). This seems hardly surprising given that they are 
not made aware of these mechanisms operating in the background as the 
search interface and search results do not indicate any of these operations. 
But to fully understand its implications it is necessary to adopt a more nuanced 
focus and reflect on it in light of different types of search interaction behaviour 
and today’s typical search engine interface. 
 Broder (2002) suggests differentiation between three different types of 
search behaviour, which is a useful taxonomy for the purposes of the present 
discussion. Firstly, navigational search queries, where users want to find the 
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URL for a specific website. Secondly, transactional search queries, such as 
checking flight prices, which can be performed on a number of different yet 
specific websites. Thirdly, informational search queries to find information that 
may be present on multiple websites and where the search goal may not 
always be clear at the beginning but only emerges through the search process 
itself. From this perspective it becomes clearer that search results 
personalisation is especially problematic regarding informational search 
queries. Thus, the analysis and argument I develop will mainly focus on this 
search behaviour.  
 
 
Exploratory search interaction 
 
Recently, the notion of informational search behaviour has been developed 
further and characterised as ‘exploratory search’ (White et al. 2007), which is 
the name I will use from now on. Exploratory search interactions are 
characterised by a number of typical features. To start with, very often there is 
a complex informational problem at hand and a desire to learn about it. Also, 
people engaging in exploratory search may be unfamiliar with the knowledge 
domain their search goal relates to. This may include a lack of understanding 
of dominant and peripheral actors within that domain as well as of useful 
search approaches. Furthermore, people may not have good knowledge of 
keywords, concepts and information sources which may be relevant to 
formulate search queries and evaluate search results. Lastly, it is possible that 
exploratory searchers may not have a specific search goal in mind when they 
set out. The goal may only evolve through a process of learning about the 
specific knowledge domain, its concepts and actors within it. Given these 
characteristics, the exploratory search process typically develops over the 
course of multiple sessions, which may last days, weeks or months.  
 White and Roth (2009, 6) mentions people “grappling with chronic illness, 
work teams creating complex solutions or products, learners studying complex 
material over time, families making long-term plans, scientists investigating 
complex phenomena, and hobbyists tracking developments over a life-time” 
as people with an exploratory search interest. It is hardly difficult to imagine 
and extend this list to include conspiracy theorists, journalists, engaged 
citizens, young parents determined to be knowledgeable and responsible 
about their child's development, activists, teachers, relatives of people with a 
health condition, immigrants to a country organising their lives, 
environmentalists, politicians and many more. In short, there may be a 
multitude of reasons why search engine users may well be interested in going 
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beyond the top ten ‘most relevant’ search results, be it for personal 
development, curiosity and learning, deciding on intricate social or 
environmental issues or making better-informed decisions within the context of 
prostate cancer screening, which is the focus of this research project.  
 Having explicated the characteristics of exploratory search interaction, I 
will now reflect on today’s search engine interfaces and the practice of 
personalisation in light of exploratory search interactions. This is relevant for 
better understanding the mediating role of search engines within the context of 
exploratory health search interaction. Instead of supporting exploration and 
critical appraisal of the information found online, the hierarchical top-listing of 
search results authors their supposed high relevancy (Pan et al. 2007; Rogers 
2009). Many search engine interfaces typically build on a commonly accepted 
set of action grammars and handles suggested by the Human Computer 
Interaction (HCI) domain. The action grammar applied more often than not 
aims at describing a context-free metasyntax and, thereby, suggesting 
universal applicability and usability. In the case of universal search engines, 
such as Google or Bing, as mentioned previously, the interface is typically 
made of a single search box with a search button on an otherwise almost 
empty page. A user enters her search query, clicks on the search button and 
is then presented with the ‘ten most relevant search results’ for that search 
query. Typically, the user then has a few very general refinement options 
available to further narrow the search. What remains hidden are the 
aforementioned numerous assumptions at work that lead to the ranking and 
filtering of those ten most relevant search results.  
 This approach arguably works well for simple navigational tasks in web 
search. However, with exploratory search tasks, this dominant search 
interaction model poses a number of problems. As highlighted in the 
introduction of exploratory search behaviour above, the process involves a 
number of steps which require a much more symbiotic form of interaction with 
the search engine. The process involves information seeking, filtering, reading 
and learning as well as sense-making. In exploratory search, the search goal is 
typically unclear at the beginning, thus highly precise search results for a 
potentially not yet well formulated search query may be less useful than a 
broader coverage of a topic. As an exploratory searcher sets out on a search 
task, becoming familiar with a novel knowledge domain is important and 
involves learning about concepts and actors in that space. Considering 
today’s search results pages, hardly any support is available to familiarise 
oneself with a domain. Typically, the search results page indicating the millions 
of relevant search results found presents the top ten of them and allows 
inspecting related search keywords. While there are a number of other filters 
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offered, such as document type filters, time-range and reading level, it seems 
questionable how these should provide much help in coming to better 
understand a knowledge domain. Furthermore, today’s search interaction does 
not support well search processes that may last multiple sessions and involve 
collaboration with others. This is particularly problematic with regard to the 
personalisation of search results. The possibility that everyone gets different 
search results for the same search query makes it more difficult to explain and 
relate to others how one has found a specific piece of information or why one 
has not found it.  
 
 
Interaction models 
 
Today’s search engine interfaces can be described as relying on a few core 
assumptions that resonate with an information-processing model of the mind. 
Broder’s (2002) standard model of the search process illustrates this well.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Standard model of search process 
 
The model presents a highly abstracted and de-contextualised view of 
interaction. Cognitive processes here may be said to be represented as purely 
mental processes consisting of “identifying an information need, followed by 
the activities of query specification, examination of retrieval results, and, if 
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needed, reformulation of the query, repeating the cycle until a satisfactory 
result set is found” (Hearst 2009). Alternate models of the search process such 
as Bates’ berrypicking have made very useful contributions to a more 
interactive style of search by suggesting more iterative processes of 
searching, learning and the shifting of focus and goals.  
 While the model itself seems rather formal, Bates (2002) recently clarified 
her perspective by suggesting a need to include biological and 
anthropological aspects for a fuller understanding of information seeking. In his 
keynote at the 2008 European Conference on Information Retrieval, Nicholas 
Belkin, a distinguished Professor and long time researcher on Information 
Retrieval, suggested with great concern to move “beyond the limited, 
inherently non-iterative models of IR that we have been concerned with, to the 
development of models of IR which incorporate the user as an active 
participant in the IR system” (Belkin 2008). Among the challenges ahead in 
developing the field further, he argues that “understanding and supporting 
information behaviours other than specified search” is of great importance but 
little so far is known about it. Furthermore, he continues with criticising 
mainstream IR research for its prime concern with efficiency and effectiveness 
and its subsequent neglect of the role of affect, in particular since Kuhlthau 
has demonstrated as early as 1991 its relevance. He concludes his keynote by 
proposing that this may require “to give up the idea of strictly formal models of 
IR in favour of realistic and useful models of IR. This, in my opinion, may not be 
a bad trade off” (Belkin 2008). 
 Unfortunately, even in the more recently developed research area of 
exploratory search, most work is based on such understandings, as the review 
of the evaluation methods considered by White suggests (2009). However, 
given the specific characteristics of the exploratory search process described 
earlier, I argue that a different model of interaction as well as cognition may 
better support and inform the design of such interactions. Thus, in summary, 
both the typical highly black-boxed character of search engine interactions as 
well as the more recent shift towards personalisation of search results are 
generally problematic, particularly concerning exploratory search queries, 
where the capacity to gauge the relevancy and sources of search results may 
be more limited if not absent. As we will see in chapter three with regards to 
the role and productivity of health decision aids, I argue that the absence of 
supporting exploratory ways of interacting with health information is detrimental 
to shared health decision-making and, thus, patient autonomy.  
 Given the narrow commitments to an understanding of what makes up 
interaction and the relevant environment, it seems useful to consider another 
body of work reflecting on the ways of interacting. This will serve as inspiration 
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for this research on exploratory types of interaction as well as informing and 
orienting the practice-based study as conceptualised and set-out in chapters 
five and six.  
 
 
Interface and Interactivity reconsidered 
 
The role of software interfaces has also been analysed within the realm of 
software studies. Fuller (2003) discussed the explanatory power of metaphors 
applied in software interfaces and transferred from other knowledge domains. 
In so doing he identified that, while initially suitable to overcome bootstrapping 
problems, they tend to lose their explanatory power as software is functionally 
upgraded and, thus, outgrows such literal comparison. This merely symbolic 
representation of computational events further obfuscates computational 
processes and maintains a clear demarcation as to possibilities for users to 
interact with the system in unanticipated but nevertheless useful ways. Fuller 
demonstrates this through the analysis of Sennett’s example of a (re-)visited 
Chicago bakery, which has been equipped with a ‘user-friendly’ interfaced 
baking system. The system allows the mostly temporary workers to bake all 
sorts of bread by the simple touch of a button. Unfortunately, “much of the 
product is wasted when the actual temperature, the rising of the loaves, or 
some other factor fails to match the representation on screen. There is a skip 
outside full of burnt loaves, victims of automated friendly fire” (Fuller 2003, 
106). One has to assume that, according to the designers of the baking 
systems, “workers controlling the process via the interface have no need for an 
understanding of how to bake bread. The process is illegible to them” (ibid.). 
Similarly and earlier, Suchman (1987) has articulated the shortcomings of 
those narrowly-conceived models of working processes and the ways in which 
these are mapped onto interfaces, privileging certain work processes while 
ignoring the possibility to adapt these depending on situational need.  
 Dourish (2004) has also argued for reconsidering the model of interaction 
based on which much of HCI work has developed. He follows a 
phenomenological approach based on Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
as well as considering the work of Suchman on situated action. I will discuss 
aspects of his arguments relevant to the exploratory search interaction 
process. One important aspect of Heidegger’s phenomenology was the notion 
of Dasein, which he has introduced to overcome Husserl’s earlier mentalistic 
understanding of intentionality.3 For him Dasein, or being-in-the-world, was the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Broadly speaking, ‘intentionality’ refers to “directedness” of meaning, that is how a meaningful 
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essence of how we encounter the world and make sense of it; intentionality, 
thus, is inseparable from being and doing.  
 Dourish illustrates his concept with the example of the hammer. We 
sometimes act through technology (ready-to-hand) and sometimes are 
conscious of the tool (present-to-hand) when we need to adjust a tool. For him 
the tool comes into being through the transition of ready-to-hand to present-to-
hand, thus appreciating a process of meaning-making as practical and 
purposeful. For Dourish (2004, 138), “intentionality sets up a relationship 
between embodied action and meaning.” What we make of a tool in terms of 
meaningfulness seems intricately linked to action and context. In order to make 
intentional references effective, Dourish stresses the role of coupling, by which 
he means how the intentional reference can be maintained and managed. For 
example, coupling is at work when a blind person uses a cane through which 
she establishes and manages a sense of orientation. While the intentionality is 
on sensing the environment, this is made effective through the blind cane 
which operates as an extended sensory prosthesis and, according to 
Heidegger, withdraws from being present-at-hand to being ready-to-hand 
when coupling is effective.  
 In the case of web search, the ‘search’ button as the tool is not much 
available for adjustments to coupling. Typically, a search user evaluates the 
search results and, if need be, reformulates the search terms in an iterative 
process of search as highlighted in the formal models of web search 
information retrieval above. In fact, the identified user behaviour of ‘thrashing’4 
seems to be indicating some ‘breakdowns’ in tool-use, particularly since the 
tool, i.e. the search engine and its interface, does not render itself transparent 
in how it works and, thus, for the coupling to be available for adjustments.  
 Dourish (2004) builds on the work of Suchman (1987) to detail how 
meaning is not only inseparable from action but also often situated in a task 
and social context. Suchman demonstrated how technology is embedded in 
communities of practice that operate with and through distinct, ad-hoc and 
situated organisations according to task context. Rather than developing 
interactive technology according to pre-formulated and generic plans, she 
suggested to consider what earlier ethnomethodologists Garfinkel and Sacks 
(1970) have named accountability, or the observable and reportable character 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
relationship between two entities is set up. Earlier philosophers such as Brentano and Husserl 
conceived intentionality as the purely mental phenomena, and, thus, different from the physical 
action in the world (Dourish 2004, 136).!
4 Thrashing occurs when users continuously search with mostly similar keywords, thus 
exhibiting an anchoring bias. As a consequence, typically search results will not change much 
and, thus, leave users unsatisfied (Morville and Callender 2010).!
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of practiced rationality (Suchman 1987). For Dourish (2004) this allowed her to 
demonstrate how “problems with interactive technology lay in the imbalance 
between the situated organization of practical action and the regimented 
models that systems embody.”  
 Much of the work on situated action and accountability has focused on 
work environments such as the computer-supported cooperative work area. 
Little work exists on search interactions analysing their exploratory and socially 
situated nature. However, this seems of vital importance as web search 
engines clearly have become a vital social infrastructure. Thus, how one 
makes sense of and accounts for the web search results found seems 
important to allow for multiple subjectivities. Recent research on the use of and 
reliance on highly-ranked search results (Pan et al. 2007) has highlighted that 
search users tend to trust artificially higher-ranked search results more than 
those ranked lower on the search results page, despite the fact that their 
abstracts seemed less relevant to the task. Thus, accountability for web search 
results, in the absence of specific domain knowledge, seems mostly to rely on 
the status authoring role through those search engines (Rogers 2009). 
Considering such experimental evidence in light of personalisation algorithms 
and exploratory health information search processes indicates an urgent need 
to research and design alternate and differently engaging means of searching 
and making sense of the results provided. As will be discussed further in the 
conclusion as well as developed in more detail in chapter two, being able to 
find the most ‘relevant’ health information online (this chapter) or robust 
medical evidence (chapter two) is certainly important. Nevertheless, the ways 
in which this is or is not applicable, useful or meaningful for individual decision-
making (chapter three) constitutes a significant and relevant element of 
exploratory health information interaction. As I argue in chapter two and three, 
current approaches fail to account for this. The ways in which this can be 
better supported will be explored theoretically and practically in this research 
project. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
To summarise, while online health information interaction is very popular and, 
according to some research (Fox 2006), leads to mostly positive experiences, I 
argue that the model underlying web search interactions is not always suitable 
to the task of online health information search. This is because the dominant 
model presumes that a person knows exactly what she is searching for as well 
as having well-developed skills to assess relevant health information found. As 
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research indicates, the search result position itself modulates trust and 
relevancy, despite seeming semantically less relevant (Pan et al. 2007). The 
exploratory search process is further obscured by algorithmic filtering 
mechanisms, targeting search result relevancy based on a user’s prior search 
and click history (data shadow). Within the context of a novel medical 
diagnosis, such data shadows may seem to be of little relevance if not 
potentially misleading.  
 Within the context of prostate cancer screening decision-making, as I 
analyse and argue in chapter three, the model underlying interaction with 
search engines and decision aids in shared decision-making is largely based 
on an information-retrieval understanding of interaction. In contrast, due to the 
nature of some health information search and decision tasks described above 
and discussed further in chapter three, I suggest that an exploratory 
interaction model would be more suitable and supportive. More specifically, 
exploratory interactions are hypothesised as productive in supporting an 
understanding of the limitations of the probabilistic nature of epidemiologically-
derived health risk information for decision-making by individuals in cancer 
screening (chapter two) as well as supporting people in exploring and 
constructing preferences and values for guiding their decision-making 
(chapter three).  
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Chapter 2  
Medical epistemology - the history of statistics and its role in 
medical evidence 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has looked at interaction with search engines and 
models of search interactivity in particular. By doing so it aimed at shedding 
light on the assumptions underlying the specific conceptualisations of search 
interactivity and their implications. This chapter is devoted to the medical 
knowledge domain and, more specifically, the area of medical knowledge 
production and distribution. The recent proliferation of novel data-driven 
approaches towards medicine is believed to have vital implications for what 
constitutes medical data and the methods by which such data is then used in 
generating medical knowledge (O’Reilly Media 2012). This chapter, thus, 
seeks to a) generate a deeper understanding of the different kind of 
knowledge that novel data approaches such as Big Data might be said to 
produce, and b) assess the implications of medical decisions based on them.  
 In order to develop such an assessment, this chapter will first examine 
contemporary mechanisms of production of knowledge in evidence-based 
medicine (EBM) and distribution via surveillance-medicine (Armstrong 1995). 
As will become evident, much of contemporary western EBM is based on 
probabilistic statistical methods. Unfortunately, as it becomes increasingly 
apparent, there are deep systematic flaws in the existing medical evidence 
base as a consequence of various incentive structures in academia and 
commerce that engender selective reporting and publication bias (Goldacre 
2012; Ioannidis 2005). Furthermore, whilst probabilistic methods may be said 
to be beneficial for public health management – which, as the genealogical 
section will demonstrate, is also where they originated – they simultaneously 
introduce a significant dilemma for individual sense- and decision-making 
regarding normal and pathological states of health.  
 Thus, before being able to understand and assess the kinds of ways in 
which novel data-driven approaches conceptualise and define normalcy and 
pathology, my genealogical analysis will unravel the biopolitical (Foucault 
1973) aspects of western evidence-based methods of production and 
distribution of medical knowledge. This analysis will be further substantiated by 
examining the relevant historical development of key statistical methods used 
in medical knowledge production, such as randomisation and statistical 
significance tests. In addition, this chapter will demonstrate that the current 
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data explosion is not the first one in the history of medicine and, in light of 
developments in the life sciences and bioengineering, it seems unlikely to be 
the last one. I will consider, map and analyse relevant historical developments 
to compare them to current data paradigms and evaluate them. Thereby, I will 
discuss the application of the probabilistic approach to ever finer degrees of 
risk factor-based diagnosis of anticipated, near and actual pathological 
conditions as well as the problematic implications this has for self-surveilling, 
decision-making individuals. As the genealogical section identifies, 
epidemiological risk factor and quantitatively-determined pre-pathological 
diagnosis are based on the assumption of normalcy and pathology neatly 
sitting on a linear gradient, which renders them measurable and convincing at 
least across populations. In turn, such an assumption provides the necessary 
condition to allow for anticipatory regimes of pre-pathology to be 
probabilistically argued in the first place. I will challenge this assumption on 
the basis of an updated version of Canguilhem’s posited concept of normalcy 
and pathology that involves a much longer-term consideration informed by 
evolutionary theory (Canguilhem 1994).    
 In light of the identified implications of the biopolitics of contemporary 
medical knowledge production, I will analyse the mechanisms of Google Flu 
Trends that represent a Big Data-driven approach to medical knowledge 
production. I will argue that, from an epistemological perspective, Big Data 
should be seen as an intensification of existing probabilistic methodologies, 
such as those of epidemiology discussed below, rather than a categorical 
shift. To this end, it will further the focus on statistically significant patterns and, 
as a consequence, render individual discrepancies and the individual less 
important and desirable to attend to. Historically, the applicability of averages 
in medicine was seen as immoral, as successful treatment of some individuals 
based on such averages comes at the cost of death for those unaccounted for 
therein (Porter 1988, 157). At the level of the decision-making individual, 
whether as doctor or patient, such statistical modulations, rather than mere 
informational backdrop for rational examination, become performative as 
active mediators. My aim is to cast light on the ways in which such 
performativity is facilitated through the presentation and distribution of 
probabilistic risk information. 
 Lastly, as described and argued in the preceding chapter, the current 
paradigms of search interaction are defined by a dominant understanding of 
human cognition following an information-processing model of mind. This 
chapter starts establishing a link between the ways in which search 
interactions are conceptualised, the presumed autonomy and self-explanatory 
capacity of data discussed in this chapter and the design of decision-making 
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structures and systems discussed in the next chapter.  
 In the following chapter, I will specifically consider the underlying 
cognitive assumptions regarding the decision-support technologies in the area 
of shared medical decision-making processes. Underlying conceptions of 
search interactivity, evidence-based medical knowledge production and 
decision-support technologies are based, I argue, on a specific and 
constrained conception and understanding of human cognition. In contrast, as 
I will set out in chapter 4, it is promising to make such a link explicit and 
consider alternate processes of cognition as a productive force. This is 
hypothesised to be particularly fruitful in the context of redesigning exploratory 
healthcare information interactions. The view I will propose is one of socially 
distributed and environmentally extended processes of cognition and mind. 
Such a perspective, I hypothesise, generates a productive environment based 
on which to sketch and evaluate inventive and proliferating means for 
supporting healthcare decision-making processes. 
 
Evidence-based medicine 
As will be discussed throughout this chapter, western medicine today is 
increasingly practiced via the evidence-based medicine (EBM) approach. The 
following section will define, outline and examine its characteristic knowledge 
production and distribution mechanisms. It will highlight the way in which data 
and statistical methods have become its fundamental underpinning principles 
and illustrate how they operate. Furthermore, I will identify on the basis of 
recent examples various problematic implications of EBM and discuss how 
they affect practitioners and patients alike. I will argue that the issues identified 
can be mapped against a set of underlying assumptions in statistical thinking 
and epidemiology whose genealogical becoming I will attempt to trace. As I 
will emphasise, early developments in statistical thinking and political attitudes 
of the medical profession at the time had impacted significantly on medical 
epistemologies. In significant parts this took place through the forces 
discussed below that have led to the development of EBM and the ways in 
which EBM as an approach to the health of people has also influenced 
contemporary advances in the life sciences, e.g. in genetics and 
neuroscience. In this sense, medical history will be examined here not as a 
trajectory of gradual, linear development. Rather, and in the spirit of Foucault 
(1976), an attempt will be made to  
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Diagnose the conditions based on which the linkages between 
medicine and contemporary reality were formed [and] trace out the 
diverse connections and liaisons that brought it into existence and 
gave it its salience and characteristics.  
(Rose, in Jones and Porter 2001, 50) 
 
Following such an approach will be useful in uncovering the assemblage of 
assumptions underlying the various fields, such as medical epistemology, 
statistics, medical ethics, decision research and cognitive science, that 
interweave in shaping shared decision-making processes. 
For the past four decades, evidence-based medicine (EBM) has slowly but 
increasingly become dominant as a knowledge paradigm and clinical practice 
approach in western medicine. This is evident in the forms of new institutions, 
such as the Cochrane Collaboration and in the UK the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE),5 new journals, recurring editorials in leading 
medical journals as well as the adoption of EBM-methods, such as randomised 
controlled trials in mainstream medical research (Timmermans and Berg 
2003). Archie Cochrane was an epidemiologist pioneering the field in the 
1970’s and founder of the Cochrane Collaboration that defines EBM as  
 
Evidence-based health care is the conscientious use of current best 
evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients 
or the delivery of health services. Current best evidence is up-to-
date information from relevant, valid research about the effects of 
different forms of health care, the potential for harm from exposure 
to particular agents, the accuracy of diagnostic tests, and the 
predictive power of prognostic factors. 
                                                                   
                                                           (Cochrane Collaboration 2014) 
 
 
Trisha Greenhalgh (2010,1), a Professor of primary health care and researcher 
interested in sociology and medicine, more recently added to the above the 
“use of mathematical estimates of the risk of benefit and harm, derived from 
high-quality research on population samples, to inform clinical decision-
making in the diagnosis, investigation or management of individual patients.” 
Evidence-based clinical practice is a sub-discipline that constitutes how EBM 
is practiced with patients. Muir Gray (1997, 20), another early pioneer in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The National Institute for Clinical Excellence is a UK-government funded body with the goal to 
reduce variation in the availability and quality of NHS treatments and care 
(http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/whoweare/who_we_are.jsp; ac. 07.03.2013).!
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EMB field, defines this as “an approach to decision-making in which the 
clinician uses the best evidence available, in consultation with the patient, to 
decide upon the option which suits that patient best.”  
         These definitions are useful as a starting point as they set out the goals 
and central means of production and distribution of the evidence-based 
medicine approach as well as the attitudes towards patients. The next sections 
will take up and discuss the following important notions in the above 
definitions: ‘predictive power of prognostic factors;’ ‘mathematical estimates of 
the risk of benefit and harm;’ ‘population samples’ and ‘best evidence in 
consultation with patient to decide which option suits patient best.’ 
 
  
Figure 2.1: Diagrammatic overview of position of evidence-based medicine 
Firstly, as highlighted in the definitions above and illustrated in Figure 3, EBM 
builds on existing evidence which is generated by clinical research in 
observational studies and clinical trials. The findings from known studies and 
trials on a topic are then aggregated and systematically reviewed. The goal of 
a systematic review is to collate and consolidate relevant and high-quality 
research on a specific research question and minimise bias by employing 
statistical methodological rigour, such as controlling for various potential 
biases (for example selection bias6 and study effect sizes7), to ensure internal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Selection bias is a consequence of non-random sampling errors, which may lead to certain 
members of a population to be over-emphasised (Jadad and Enkin 2007).!
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statistical validity and clinical significance of findings. Such evidence is then 
used by clinicians to assess the risks and benefits of various treatments.  
 
A short history of evidence-based medicine 
In order to better understand how and why evidence-based medicine exists as 
it does today it is useful to consider its brief history. Until about 40 years ago, 
physicians in clinical practice, it was thought, would make medical decisions 
regarding their patients based on ‘clinical judgment.’ This meant they would 
“synthesise all of the important information about the patient, relevant research, 
and experiences with previous patients to determine the best course of action” 
(Eddy 2005, 10). However, in the early 1970’s Wennberg, a medical care 
epidemiologist, identified stark geographical discrepancies in clinical practice 
for what was considered essentially identical medical problems (Chassin et al. 
1986; Wennberg 1973, 1982).  
In order to better understand and explain such discrepancies, these 
observations were examined more closely from a working hypothesis of clinical 
judgment under uncertainty. The assumption here was that physicians 
cognitively struggle to assemble and assess all the relevant information when 
consulting a patient (Eddy 1982, 249). When investigating how physicians 
diagnosed diseases in patients as well as making sense of evidence based on 
laboratory equipment, such as x-rays under controlled conditions, wide 
variations were identified, including cases when doctors re-examined the same 
material on two separate occasions.8 Interestingly, some have argued that the 
variation in clinical practice was partly due to uncertainty arising in the minds 
of doctors as a consequence of the expansion of medical technology and the 
difficulty in interpreting test results of such machinery (Eddy 1984, 76). Issues 
of judgment and decision-making are important for this research and will be 
looked at in more detail in the following chapter. The implications of such 
significant variation in clinical practice were to be found in quality of treatment 
which, in some cases, may have been inappropriate or even unnecessary, 
hence costly in terms of risk, pain, distress and money (Chassin et al. 1986; 
Dartmouth Atlas 2007; Wennberg 1982).   
While part of the early interpretations for the disconcerting variations in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Effect size is measuring the strength of the relationship between two variables in a statistic 
(Jadad and Enkin 2007).!
8!There is a growing body of literature inter- and intra-observer ‘variation’ which can be easily 
identified when conducting relevant literature research online.!
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clinical practice focused on uncertainty in the judgment and decision-making 
process of medical practitioners, such uncertainty did not only arise from 
limitations in practitioners’ capacity to cognitively synthesise relevant 
information and exercise proper judgment. In addition, and more importantly 
for an understanding of medical evidence, a second line of argument identified 
a lack of systematisation and rigorous verification in existing processes of 
generating and applying medical knowledge as potentially implicated in 
variations in clinical practice. Such shortcomings could explain why 
uncertainty and variation in the individual decision-making process on the part 
of practitioners occurred in the first place.  
In his highly cited short book Effectiveness and Efficiency: Random 
Reflections on Health Services, Cochrane (1972) identified a number of issues 
characterising the state of medical evidence and practice. Firstly, medical 
evidence from clinical research was not systematically tested, collated and 
consolidated.9 By that Cochrane referred, for example, to the introduction and 
routine clinical adoption of cervical smear tests for preventing carcinoma of the 
cervix before rigorous testing via RCT. Conducting a RCT after widespread 
clinical adoption was considered unethical, as it would have necessitated that 
a control group would only receive a placebo. Secondly, pre-established 
standard therapies and tests created ethical dilemmas, as applying a 
randomised controlled trial (RCT) to test their efficacy would involve denying 
treatment to half of the patients (ibid., 23). Lastly, with regards to diagnosis, he 
observed a lack of standardisation of procedures in diagnostic laboratory tests 
as well as disinterest by clinicians in such precise results (ibid., 38). Others 
have added that clinical guidelines were based on individual authors’ opinion 
rather than collated research (Eddy 1990; 2005, 11).  
As becomes rapidly obvious from the above discussion, at the core of 
both EBM and the observed variations in clinical practice lies the more 
detailed question of what are considered normal and pathological states of a 
patient as well as what is considered good evidence to diagnose such states. 
Thus, EBM must also be seen as an attempt to standardise such definitions. 
The following section will discuss the ways in which EBM approaches the issue 
of evidence. As medical evidence becomes operative in defining and 
delineating normal from pathological states, this chapter more broadly then 
provides genealogical insights in order to understand the various 
developments of concepts of evidence with regards to normalcy and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9!For Cochrane (1972, 27), this led, for example, to the introduction of cervical smears testing 
procedures hoping to prevent cervix carcinoma into clinical practice that was previously not 
rigorously RCT-tested. !
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pathology. This will set the stage for evaluating more novel data-driven 
approaches in such a context at the end of this chapter.  
 
Mechanisms of western medical knowledge production 
To understand the body of knowledge EBM aims to assess by systematic 
reviews, it is necessary to examine the key mechanisms of knowledge 
production in clinical medical research. This includes assessing the safety and 
effectiveness of medications, treatments as well as medical equipment. 
Importantly, clinical research studies follow a population studies approach 
and, thus, rely on statistical techniques, such as randomisation, significance 
and hypothesis testing. Randomisation as a scientific method was proposed 
by 19th century Belgian astronomer Quetelet (1842) and will be explained 
further below in relation to randomised controlled trials and discussed in more 
detail in the genealogical section on data and statistics. Significance and 
hypothesis testing methods were developed in psychology in the work of 
mathematician and pragmatist philosopher C.S. Peirce and further elaborated 
and promoted by R. A. Fisher as well as J. Neyman and E. Pearson.  
Fisher was a British statistician and evolutionary biologist with a keen 
interest in genetics as well as eugenics. His early work, though, was 
concerned with field experiments in agriculture and led to the development of 
the statistical techniques mentioned which he laid out in his book Statistical 
Methods for Research Workers (1925). A significance test is a statistical 
method for assessing the likelihood of experimental results being due to 
chance occurrence. Fisher proposed it as an informal index to be used as part 
of the non-quantifiable process of drawing conclusions from observations 
(Goodman 1999a). It calculates the probability of obtaining the experiment 
results under the assumption that the item tested, for example a new treatment, 
has no effect. Results within the arbitrary but now widely standard 5% cut-off 
rate are typically considered as statistically significant and open the doors for 
academic publication (Dwan et al. 2008; Sterling 1995). In fact, reviews found 
that more than 95% of articles in psychology journals claim statistical 
significance (Sterling 1959; 1995). Such publication behaviour is deemed 
statistically improbable10 and, as a systematic review confirms (Dwan et al. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10!Based on the assumption that research findings are statistically normally distributed, the fact 
that 95% of published articles claim to have found statistically significant findings is a sign of 
publishing bias. This is the practice of not publishing negative or insignificant results. Publishing 
insignificant findings based on retesting experiments would have a corrective effect on the 
previously published significant findings. See also Ioannidis (2005).!
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2008), generates significant levels of false-positive findings, i.e. the claim that 
a new treatment or therapy works when in fact it does not. Ironically, this is 
exactly what the significance test aimed to prevent (Fisher 1925). 
Significance tests are often combined with hypothesis testing as 
developed by statisticians J. Neyman and E. Pearson. In hypothesis testing, a 
researcher makes two assumptions about an experiment. The null hypothesis 
is that there is no effect, while the alternative hypothesis is often the opposite. 
The method also includes the study of effect sizes, which is the measurement 
of the strength of a relationship of measured variables. In this way, the method 
aims to be more rigorous and explicit about the outcomes of a statistical test 
than simple significance testing. Although Neyman and Pearson originally 
suggested their method as an alternative to Fisher’s significance test, over time 
the two methods have merged to become the infamous ‘Null Ritual’ or null 
hypothesis significance testing (Berkson 1942).  
Step one in the ritual is to define the null and alternative hypothesis 
without specifying what is expected to happen based on a researcher’s 
contextual understanding of the research material. The second step is to apply 
the 5% cut-off rate for rejecting the null hypothesis and inferring statistical 
significance. If the experiment is statistically significant the researcher 
proceeds by accepting his research hypothesis. This procedure becomes 
ritualised by repeated application independent of context (Gigerenzer et al. 
2004). This has led to intense debates (Cohen 1994; Goodman 1999a), where 
some have argued for discontinuing the teaching and application of 
significance tests (Schmidt 1996; Schmidt and Hunter 1997).  
One of the key problems in the debate is the argument that the null ritual 
has led to a ‘behaviour’ rather than actual and contextually judicious, inferential 
statistical thinking (Goodman, 1999a). This refers to the sheer universal 
application of the conventional 5% cut-off rate as a signifier of seemingly 
actual and not just statistical relevance, but also the approach adopted by 
some journals (Gigerenzer et al. 2004) whereby papers not conducting such 
tests and finding statistically significant outcomes are not accepted for 
publication. Considering Neyman and Pearson’s original motivation for 
proposing their method, that is to limit the number of mistakes made over many 
experiments, current practices of non-publication of insignificant findings or 
selective reporting can have very detrimental effects on the quality of actual 
evidence (Goodman 1999a) as we will see when considering such effects as 
identified from an EBM meta-analytic perspective. 
Clinical research evidence is also generated in the form of observational 
studies and randomised controlled trials. There are various methodological 
differences between the two methods. Of particular relevance for the present 
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discussion are concerns over the level of control an investigator can exercise 
when conducting a study, potential bias that can arise due to a lack of such 
control and the implications this then has for drawing generalisable inferences. 
In a RCT, study subjects are allocated in a controlled randomised way to a 
study group and receive either the drug to be tested or, typically, a placebo. 
Once allocated, study subjects in both groups are treated in the exact same 
manner. Such controlled randomised treatment supposedly allows one to infer 
that any noticeable effect on the health of a study subject can be linked to the 
treatment itself.11 This is thought possible because effective randomisation 
minimises selection and allocation bias, the former being differential treatment 
of study subjects when an investigator knows to which group they belong, 
while the latter means that any observable or unobservable causal effects will 
be equally distributed among the two study groups and, thus, minimise 
confounding.  
To minimise these effects, where possible and ethical RCTs are 
performed as double-blind trials where neither investigator nor study subject 
are aware of which group the latter is allocated to. In their most encompassing 
versions, clinical trials are performed with up to 20,000 participants (Topol 
2012). Such procedure is followed to ensure causal conclusions can be 
inferred, hence establishing the internal validity of the study. In contrast, 
external validity is concerned with whether the findings of a RCT are 
generalisable to a larger population of prospective patients. Sampling aims to 
ensure that the sample distribution is representative of the overall population 
and, thus, ensure external validity. However, as it transpires through the 
growing body of systematic reviews, this second line of EBM enquiry into the 
scientific robustness of medical evidence increasingly reveals some of the 
problematic foundations and processes whereby medical knowledge has been 
and still is generated and distributed.  
 
Critical review of medical evidence  
 
Ben Goldacre, a physician and EBM researcher, has framed these issues as 
the “broken information architecture of Medicine” (O’Reilly Media 2012). By 
that he specifically refers to his analysis which exposes the fact that there is a 
fundamental gap in the publishing of negative trial results (Goldacre 2012). Put 
differently, the structural bias towards publishing mostly positive trial results 
leads to an overstatement of the benefits of treatments (ibid.). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11!While RCT’s prevent allocation and selection bias, they remain prone to other types of bias. 
For an overview and discussion see Jadad and Enkin (2007, 30).!
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To understand why this happens, it is useful to consider recent research 
by Ioannidis (2005), a leading meta-analytic medical researcher with an 
interest in the quality of medical research. In his study ‘Contradicted and 
initially stronger effects in highly cited clinical research,’ Ioannidis (2005) 
analysed actual medical publication patterns and how initial research findings 
were slowly corrected over time. For this, he analysed 49 of the most important 
published research findings12 that were influential in developing  
 
popularity for treatments such as the use of hormone-replacement 
therapy for menopausal women, vitamin E to reduce the risk of heart 
disease, coronary stents to ward off heart attacks, and daily low-
dose aspirin to control blood pressure and prevent heart attacks 
and strokes […] Of the 49 articles, 45 claimed to have uncovered 
effective interventions. 34 of these claims had been retested, and 14 
of these, or 41 percent, had been convincingly shown to be wrong 
or significantly exaggerated. If between a third and a half of the 
most acclaimed research in medicine was proving untrustworthy, 
the scope and impact of the problem were undeniable.  
                                                                                                         
(Freedman 2010) 
 
This problem may be explained to a large extent by selective reporting 
of research results and publication bias, as mentioned earlier. The former is 
the choice of data that scientists document, whereas the latter is the “tendency 
of scientists and scientific journals to prefer positive data over null results” 
(Lehrer 2010). A further problem is that trial samples seem to be overly ideal 
and, thus, for reasons such as young age and perfect single diagnosis, not 
representative of the larger population (Goldacre 2012, 177; Rothwell 2005). 
While in some cases this merely means an ineffective treatment for some 
patients, in others it has grave consequences by actually increasing morbidity 
(Pratt and Moyé 1995). Unfortunately, this does not prevent the healthcare 
system prescribing such treatments to the larger population. 
Furthermore, when such a US Federal Drug Administration (FDA)-
approved drug gets exposed via direct-to-consumer advertisement, rarer and 
potentially fatal side-effects may only then show up. Unfortunately, due to poor 
post-marketing surveillance mechanisms, it may take a long time before clear 
cause-and-effect relations between the drug and side-effects may be fully 
identified and proven (Topol 2012, 36).13 Because of how such evidence is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12! This selection was based on the importance of journals and the numbers of citations 
(Ioannidis 2005).!
13!This may be argued to be an effect of the sometimes non-representative character of sample 
selection with overly health participants in RCTs as well as the lack of systematic post-
marketing surveillance mechanisms via doctors. See Goldacre (2012, 177) and Rothwell (2005). 
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generated in clinical trials via the evidence-based medicine approach, Topol, 
a physician, names it population-based medicine, while others have dubbed it 
‘mass medicalisation’ (LeFanu 2011), though I agree with Rose that not much 
is gained from naming phenomena in such ways (Rose 2007).14 The key 
characteristic of population-based medicine can be further illustrated by 
looking at how the findings of a recent trial for a cholesterol-lowering drug have 
been presented (Topol 2012; Goldacre 2012) and applied. The outcome was a 
reduction of events from 4% in the placebo group to 2% in the actual drug-
taking group. Typically, such an outcome is deemed clinically significant, as it 
reduces the relative likelihood of the probable pathological event by 50%, 
which is also how the effectiveness of the novel drug is marketed. The 
problem, however, remains that it is impossible to clearly identify which two 
patients out of the 100 treated will benefit, thus leaving 98 drug-taking patients 
out of 100 without such benefits while having to take the prescription (Topol 
2012).  
 
 
Surveillance-medicine 
 
The logic of population-based medicine is not only underlying actual treatment 
of patients with diseases but also the area of prevention or surveillance 
medicine as some have named it (Armstrong 1995). A contemporary example 
to illustrate the operative mechanisms of surveillance medicine is cancer 
screening. In the USA, men over fifty are screened for prostate cancer (Ablin 
2010). The screening is typically performed with a PSA test that measures the 
levels of prostate specific antigens in the blood.15 Unfortunately, the test results 
in a relatively high number of false-positive findings, leaving 250,000 men per 
year having one or multiple biopsies before they find out that the initial 
screening was not an accurate indicator of actual prostate cancer (Topol 
2012). Despite the fact that over 15% of men going through screening are 
diagnosed with prostate cancer, only 3% die from it, which indicates that, to a 
very significant degree, prostate cancer is in fact nonaggressive in its 
prevalence. Nevertheless, all those diagnosed with prostate cancer typically 
undergo surgery followed by radiation treatment. Men, in these cases, suffer 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 This is because the term ‘medicalisation’ obscures the intricate details in which changes in 
medical epistemology and clinical practice affect different people with different health and 
pathological states in different regions and, thus, may be said to be oversimplifying. 
15 PSA is a protein produced by the prostate gland 
(http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/detection/PSA- ac. 02.08.2014).!
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overdiagnosis and, in undergoing standard treatment, also experience and 
suffer various kinds of unnecessary pain and debilitating side-effects.  
In fact, the inventor of the PSA-test, which has become the standard 
method for screening male populations and assessing the likelihood of 
prostate cancer, has recently declared it ‘The Great Prostate Mistake’ in an 
open letter to The New York Times (Ablin 2010). In the letter, he explains the 
scale and problem of the misuse of the test as well as its original intention. 
Instead, he argues for a specific and case-by-case application. The UK 
National Screening Committee, a government body assessing evidence for 
screening programmes and making policy recommendations, has recently 
voted against a screening programme based on the PSA test16 mainly because 
of the risk of overdiagnosis and poor effectiveness in preventing death from 
prostate cancer (Sandblom et al. 2010).  
To some degree, then, it appears that the argument about variations in 
clinical practice stemming from physician uncertainty due to what was 
essentially seen as information overload may, at best, have only been part of 
the explanation. More importantly, it seems to have obscured much larger 
distortions in the underlying processes of medical knowledge production and 
distribution. The cases of cancer screening seem to provide some evidence as 
to the degree of imprecision in clinical testing and the resulting space for 
expert medical assessment and, thus, variation by physicians. In contrast, 
medical evidence following an EBM methodological approach builds on a set 
of seemingly axiomatic stratagems which aim to establish more reliable, better 
controllable and, as we will see, ever finer diagnostic mechanisms for 
identifying, forecasting, delineating and explaining various degrees of actual 
and anticipatory pathological states in bodies or parts thereof.  
Following the medico-statistical mechanisms analysed in more detail in 
the sections to follow, notions of normalcy and pathology in EBM have 
internalised a logic resembling the calculative, flat rationality of game theory 
approaches.17 Thereby, and as materialised in the form of decision-aids, they 
map out a territory of preferable action, non-action and probable and 
potentially grave bodily consequences. When following the evidence 
generated, the above is aimed at panning out at population levels of some 
kind. Simultaneously, however, due to its probabilistic nature it leaves 
significant actual variation in individual health outcomes. Among further 
aspects, of key concern for this research is the amalgam of probabilistically-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 “Experts scrap prostate screening proposal,” BBC News Health, December 6, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-11930979; ac. 01.03. 2013.!
17!For the shortcomings of Decision Analysis see Bursztajn et al. (1990).!
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determined pathological states inferred from population samples-based 
medico-statistics, specifically when used for individual decision-making. 
 
 
Data and statistics  
 
The history of data and statistics is witness to the sources of interest driving the 
collection of data, the underlying theories based on which the statistical 
insights were viewed and argued about as well as claims of authority over the 
epistemological and interpretative frame and action on them. Each of these will 
be explored in the following sections. 
 Early motivations for data collection and statistics revolved around issues 
of interest to the state and the affirmation of its power. Census techniques were 
applied for example in 1548 by the Spanish to take stock of Peru.18 William 
Petty, an early influential British figure in statistics, for example, had directed 
the stock taking of Ireland’s territory, buildings, people and livestock, which 
then also facilitated its exploitation by the English in 1679 (Hacking 1990, 17). 
Ideas for the institutionalisation of census techniques were debated in the late 
17th century when Leibniz, among others, suggested that, for the establishment 
of a Prussian state, a central statistical office should be set-up in order to know 
a state’s “true measure of power,” i.e. the size of its population (ibid., 18). This 
measure was to be achieved based on his proposed 56 categories for 
evaluation, including “number of people by sex, number of able-bodied men 
who might bear weapons, number of marriageable women, child mortality, life 
expectancy, distribution of diseases and causes of death (ibid.,19).  
 Apart from state interests, early statistics was driven by commercial 
interests and the pricing of annuities, the then common way to raise capital for 
states and cities. In principal, the challenge was to accurately estimate life 
expectancies so as to balance in-payments and future out-payments. This 
undertaking was severely challenged by the lack of sound mortality statistics. 
The unreliability of existing mortality statistics can be partly explained by the 
curiosities of the mechanisms for collecting such data. For example, before 
1830 parish churches of England were responsible for recording baptisms, 
marriages and burials, which were the source for generating life tables and 
calculating mortality rates. Due to the inherently religious perspective, the 
records noted baptisms rather than births, and burials rather than deaths. 
Thus, dissenters, who were prevalent at the time, the religiously indifferent and 
in some cases even poor Anglicans may not have been reflected in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 There are also various earlier examples as documented by Harold Innis (1948).!
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records (Eyler 1979, 37). Customs in early 19th century England demanded 
some kind of celebration at baptism and registering a baptism incurred a fee, 
both of which may have discouraged complete registration. Nevertheless, 
parish records played an important role as they were held as evidence for 
tracing ancestry and assuring inheritance. This deficiency was eventually 
corrected by the introduction of the Registration Act in 1836 and the General 
Register Office (GRO) which was responsible for civil registrations of births, 
marriages and deaths. The GRO today is part of the Office for National 
Statistics. As we will see further down in the case of trials of novel 
pharmaceutical products, somewhat similar problems with data persist as a 
consequence of incentive structures, albeit in the case of clinical research in 
more refined ways and due to issues such as selective reporting and 
publication bias. 
 Much of the early developments were driven by a fascination with 
statistics’ seeming ability to bring order and regularity to complex events, such 
as the duration of human life, crime and suicide rates. In this regard, in 1832 
Charles Babbage, a British mathematician and philosopher, proposed a broad 
plan to measure “the constant qualities belonging to our solar system” 
(Hacking 1990, 57). In his letter to the Scottish physician Brewster, he 
proposed, among other things, to measure the quantity of air consumed per 
hour, the proportion of sickness among the working classes and the power of 
steam engines in Cornwall (ibid., 58). Constants for him were “[A]ll those facts 
which can be expressed by numbers in the various sciences and arts” (ibid., 
55). Thus, according to Hacking, constants for Babbage were more akin to 
rules or regularities, rather than fundamental laws such as those in physics as 
we know them today. In the spirit of that time, many laws were unsurprisingly 
identified and even more attempts to find them were almost obsessively 
undertaken, including whether one’s “ability to cultivate flowers or sing cheerful 
songs were useful indices of respectability and morality” (ibid., 29).  
 Concerning claims to authority, a relevant example to consider is the 
case of suicide statistics. In France, philosopher Marquis de Condorcet was an 
early eminent figure in statistics. For him, moral sciences were to be 
understood as “all those sciences that have as their object either the human 
mind itself or the relations of men one to another” (ibid., 38). Most early 
statistical data was confined to vital statistics (births, marriages and deaths) 
which were less interesting to him as they did not relate to individual 
behaviour. Nevertheless, there was a connection between the original census-
driven developments of statistics and those of interest to Condorcet and his 
contemporaries. That was an interest in ‘deviant’ behaviour, particularly in 
subgroups, such as suicidal French men, who did not contribute to the growth 
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of France.  
 Importantly, such early behavioural data was approached with a firm 
belief that laws of society exist in the same way that laws or ‘constants’ of 
nature exist. It is important to note that statistical data did not operate in a void 
but was and still is closely intertwined with existing theories of what such data 
should mean and how it fits in existing classification schemes, for example in 
medical nosology19 and criminal behaviour. Esquirol, a French medical 
researcher, became a leading figure in the argument that suicide is a medical 
issue rather than a moral one. He essentially argued that treatment of madness 
is the responsibility of medicine and suicide is a kind of madness, hence within 
the realm of physicians rather than the moral sciences (ibid., 65).  
 Furthermore, according to the organic theory of disease popular at the 
time, all diseases have their origins in defective tissue or organs. For the 
French this naturally led to the need to dissect bodies of suicide deaths. 
However, they were not able to identify substantial differences between 
suicidal and non-suicidal brains (ibid., 70). From the perspective of this 
research and following the logic of this example, it is useful to note that such 
questions of disciplinary responsibility and control over the epistemological 
and interpretative frame also dictated potential actions following the collection 
of such data. As will be discussed in the context of anticipatory surveillance 
medicine practices, this logic had a central role in determining the meaning of 
normalcy and pathology.   
 Another concept that has come to play a key role in the success story of 
statistics to this day is that of the ‘average man.’ The Belgian astronomer and 
advocate of statistical thinking and practice, Adolphe Quetelet, was not 
satisfied with detecting mere regularities in deviant behaviour and crime rates. 
He was interested in finding the distinct laws that govern people’s behaviour 
like those known in astronomy. In 1844 he announced that many human 
characteristics and behaviours are normally distributed among the population 
(ibid., 105).20 This is the same well-known distribution as when one tosses a 
coin many times. The arithmetical average of a population, such as for 
example the average family having 2.3 children, could not necessarily be 
considered a meaningful quantity in itself. However, Quetelet framed the 
attributes of a statistically ‘average man’ within the boundaries of a racial type. 
That is, instead of describing populations with reference to extrinsic 
characteristics, such as language, their geographic locality or their ruler, which 
was custom at the time, Quetelet established an account of a race by means of 
their objectively measurable physical and moral, thus ‘intrinsic,’ characteristics, 
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19 The classification of diseases in medical science.!
20 This is also known as ‘the bell-shape distribution.’!
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such as men’s height but also ‘knowable’ moral traits (ibid., 107). 
Retrospectively and significantly, what happened at that moment, according to 
Hacking (ibid., 108), was the introduction of a “new kind of information about 
populations and a new conception of how to control them,” as, for example, via 
the introduction of social policies to retain or, more perversely, alter the 
measurable average qualities of a population of race. As history sadly 
witnessed, eugenics, the idea to improve the human race by controlled 
breeding of desirable and heritable characteristics, was not long to follow.  
 Indeed, this was also very much the attitude of the highly active reformer 
William Farr, a qualified doctor who became the first compiler of scientific 
abstracts at the newly formed General Register Office for England and Wales. 
He was a fervent proponent of statistics and coupled it with his background in 
medicine by producing an ever-growing body of statistics for sickness and 
corresponding laws of sickness. As indicated above, Farr was specifically 
convinced of the deterministic power of statistical laws with regards to human 
populations. He did not subscribe to statistical fatalism, that is to say the 
doctrine that, if a statistical law applies to a group of people, it will necessarily 
constrain the freedom of individuals in that group. Unsurprisingly, though, 
given the utilitarian spirit of Farr’s time, he “maintained a strict social 
determinism: The members of the governed class remained bound by 
statistical law, albeit one that was chosen by a well-meaning bureaucracy” 
(ibid., 118).   
 Before continuing the discussion of Quetelet’s statistical ‘average man’ 
and its repercussions, it is worthwhile briefly exploring a bit further the 
deterministic understanding of statistical regularities at the time. How were 
such regularities accounted for? The conundrum Quetelet, Farr and their 
contemporaries struggled with was that, if statistical laws were to hold, then 
individuals were not free to choose. This was problematic, particularly for a 
western liberal mentality, as it was difficult to imagine that an individual should 
not be free to choose whether or not to commit suicide. In Paris in 1813, the 
243 drownings in the Seine (ibid., 66) during that year were perceived to be 
mainly of a voluntary nature. To resolve this conundrum, a theory at the time 
was that, while individuals were free to choose, such choices were thought of 
as minuscule causes which cancel each other out in a large number of 
individuals and allow statistical laws to surface. As Quetelet had it: “The larger 
the number of individuals, the more the individual fades out and allows the 
series of general facts to predominate, the facts which depend on general 
causes and in virtue of which society exists and is conserved” (Quetelet [1832, 
81] quoted in Hacking 1990, 123).  
 In fact, Quetelet’s conception was unintentionally substantiated by 
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Poisson’s mathematical proof of the law of large numbers, which states that, 
over a large number of trials, the mean of the trial results will stabilise. Even 
though Poisson suggested it as a mathematical theorem, it became accepted 
as an a priori law of social behaviour and other phenomena (Hacking 1990). 
But the stability of statistical findings over time and, thus, their usefulness as a 
source of information for political economy aiming to regulate medium- to long-
term social and economic conduct was questioned (Porter 1988, 153).  
 Arguments were voiced on either side, yet with little data to sustain them 
for long. Firstly, Jevons, an economist critical of mechanistic deterministic laws 
or pure chance, pointed out early on that slight changes in initial conditions 
and applications of the same ‘laws’ could yield very different effects (ibid., 
177).21 In this light, for Jevons statistical ‘laws’ were not universal but, rather, 
context-dependent. Secondly, statistics, with its focus on averages at the time, 
was essentially also seen as a strategy for ignoring individuals and their 
perturbations, simply averaging them out (ibid., 152). Such a procedure was 
deemed uninformative from a scientific perspective, as no new knowledge 
could be gained from it. According to d’Amador, a Spanish physician and 
early proponent of homeopathy, “to resort to probability is to appeal to chance 
and to give up the possibility of certitude” (ibid., 159). Lastly, for Bernard, a 
French physician, positivist and ardent researcher of physiology, the numerical 
methods of statistics and mathematics were not the problem; rather, the 
complexity of vital phenomena remained ill-understood and, thus, was no 
fertile ground for inferring useful information following such numerical methods. 
Bernard proposed experimental physiology to counter these shortcomings 
rather than averaging out errors (ibid., 160). The applicability of averages in 
medicine was seen as immoral, as successful treatment of some based on 
such averages comes at the cost of death for those unaccounted for therein 
(ibid., 157). From the perspective of this research, these critiques are 
significant and remain relevant concerning the role of probabilistic evidence as 
a useful source for decision-making by individuals within the context of cancer 
screening. 
 Despite these critical voices, the law of large numbers was the dominant 
understanding around the nature and power of statistical laws at the time. 
Significantly, this was coupled with a strong conceptual interpretative 
perspective, both in the case of medical knowledge about the human body 
and the causes of diseases as well as social processes and society more 
broadly. Broussais, a French doctor and outspoken promoter of the organic 
theory of disease, also introduced and championed a novel conception of 
healthy and pathological states of the body. Before him, those states were 
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21 This is now known as ‘the butterfly effect’ in chaos theory.!
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considered separate in nature, so that knowledge about one could not be 
applied to the other or indeed effect a transgression towards the other. 
Broussais, however, argued, that “phenomena of disease are the same in kind 
as those of health, from which they differed only in intensity” (Comte [1851,1] 
quoted in Hacking 1990, 160).  
 As we will see further below, this logic became the principle upon which 
epidemiology and evidence-based medicine operate and, thus, carries major 
implications for the ways in which a normal state of health and deviations from 
it are considered today, both in medicine and society at large. Broussais 
argued that diseases are nothing else but a local irritation due to a change in 
intensity of excitation of tissues. Physiological medicine was, thus, responsible 
to establish how “excitation can deviate from the normal state and constitute 
an abnormal or diseased state” (Broussais [1828, 63] quoted in Hacking 1990, 
82). His understanding that such deviations from a healthy state were of a 
continuous character inversely meant that appropriate treatment would 
smoothly regulate the irritated tissue back to a normal, hence healthy, state.  
 It was precisely the combination of a conceptual characterisation of a 
‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ state in combination with Quetelet’s notion of the 
‘average man’ which was appealing to Comte, the French philosopher and 
founder of sociology. Importantly, Comte wholeheartedly subscribed to 
Broussais’ conceptualisation of the pathological as a deviation from the normal 
state and extended it to the study of society. The normal state for Comte was 
what we should strive for (Hacking 1990, 168) and its widespread adoption 
and use by statisticians has stayed with us. This can easily be demonstrated, 
for example, when quickly browsing the ‘Health Survey for England 2011’ as 
commented on by The Guardian newspaper datablog.22 The article starts with 
the assertion that “[T]he average adult in England is overweight, as measured 
by mean body mass index (BMI),23 and obesity rose among England’s children 
in 2011” (Burn-Murdoch 2012). The three characteristics outlined above all 
manifest in this quote. A sample of a population was taken and the mean of an 
intrinsic characteristic calculated. Based on the continuous scale of the BMI, 
the mean deviates from what is considered ‘normal’ and is, thus, postulated as 
pathological, in this case overweight and obese.  
 Ironically, the BMI was invented by Quetelet himself in 1832 and 
published as part of his seminal work A Treatise on Man and the Development 
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22 Burn-Murdoch, J. 2012. “Health Survey for England: the key data on obesity,” The Guardian, 
December 20, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2012/dec/20/health-survey-
england-obesity-trends-data; ac 13.01. 2013.!
23 The BMI does not measure actual body fat but is a heuristic proxy for estimating body fat 
based on an individual’s height and weight.!
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of His Faculties (1832), formerly known as the Quetelet index and renamed as 
the body-mass index by Keys et al. (1972). The cut-off rates24 are calculated 
with reference to increasing risks of diabetes and cardiovascular diseases. 
However, when Keys suggested its superiority compared to other 
weight/height ratios, he meant it to be used for population studies only 
because, due to its heuristic character, it is an unsuitable measure for 
individual diagnosis (ibid.). As evidence has indicated in the meantime, cut-off 
rates do not work universally across different populations (WHO 2004) and the 
BMI itself performs poorly in predicting cancer (Romero-Corral et al. 2006). 
The problem of average values following population studies and the temptation 
to meaningfully use them for supporting decision-making by individuals 
constitutes a key focus for this research.  
 To summarise then, the history of data and statistics exhibits a number of 
key developments which may help us understand the potential implications it 
has on the production of medical knowledge as well as critically assessing 
more recent data-based approaches to medicine. The key developments for 
our purposes are that early statistics was motivated to manage populations 
and risk, and that data collection and analysis is always informed by an 
interpretational framework (theory) that dictates what such data means and 
how it should be classified.25 Furthermore, statistical laws were heralded as 
biologically and socially inclining if not deterministically understood, while the 
introduction of the law of large numbers further substantiated their reliability. 
The notion of the ‘average man’ was introduced as archetypal of a racial 
population and, thus, meaningful information. Lastly, the ‘normal’ and the 
‘pathological’ were defined as different medical states on a continuum, their 
difference being one of intensity and not quality.  
 
History of the probabilistic approach in evidence-based medicine and the 
notion of the ‘normal’ 
 
In this section, I will attempt to trace a genealogical thread of the specific role 
quantification of physiological parameters and the subsequent calculation of 
their statistical probable distribution among populations have come to play in 
the production and application of medical knowledge. I will discuss historical 
struggles for more encompassing etiological conceptions relevant for medical 
knowledge and the specific capacity that statistical analysis and insights 
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24 Cut-off rates for what is considered normal weight, overweight and obese are set by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO).!
25 Of course, there is the potential that data and theory may be informing each other over time.!
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should have furnished. I will argue that, while quantification and statistical 
analysis were eventually embraced more broadly in medical research with the 
introduction of the notion of ‘risk factors,’ this led to subsequent changes in the 
conceptual understanding and definition of the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological.’  
 The spectrum of probabilistic risk factors has specifically proven to be 
influential when, through the promotion of health and preventive medicine, 
responsibilities for one’s health slowly extended surveillance modes by 
government to self-surveilling individuals. As I will argue, an intricate and 
problematic link has been established between how probabilities of being 
affected by a disease are conceptualised by the healthcare industry and an 
individual’s assumed role in reducing risk factors to prevent illness and retain 
health. This critical analysis will generate the necessary ground on which I will 
reflect on the potential and problems of Big Data in relation to medical 
knowledge in this chapter as well as exploratory search and individual 
decision-making in the next chapter.  
 As discussed above, one of the early proponents of compiling and using 
vital statistics in the context of government policy was William Farr. At his time, 
and as a result of the consequences of the industrial revolution, the living and 
working conditions for the urban working population were terrible as evidenced 
in high urban mortality rates (Hammond and Hammond 1917). These 
circumstances also gave rise to concerns about social unrest and the threat of 
revolution, which the governing class felt the urge to do something about 
(Susser 2009).  
 This was a topic of interest to Farr throughout his long and active career 
in promoting vital statistics and specifically mortality rates as a gauge of quality 
of life. Among his early work is a paper entitled “On a Method of Determining 
the Danger and the Duration of Diseases at Every Period of Their Progress” 
(1837). In his first letter for the Annual Report of the Registrar General in 1839, 
he argued that, while advances in medical knowledge remain important, much 
greater influence on public health can be achieved by registering causes of 
deaths (Farr [25] cited in Eyler 1979, 110). He claimed that it is less difficult to 
prevent diseases than cure them and, for this reason, it is necessary to 
understand what causes them. The role he saw for himself at the G.R.O was to 
 
show the agency of these causes by numerical facts, and measure 
the intensity of their influence. In exhibiting the high mortality, the 
diseases by which it is occasioned, and the exciting causes of 
disease, the abstract of the registers will prove, that […] a 
considerable proportion of the sickness and deaths may be 
suppressed by the general adoption of hygienic measures, which 
are in actual but partial operation.  
        
      (Farr [26] quoted in Eyler 1979, 124) 
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 With this, Farr was proposing the use of statistical methods not only to 
count the dead categorised by cause of death, but also, and more importantly, 
on this basis to be able to calculate and project the probable influences of the 
causes of a disease. As indicated earlier, Farr saw himself not merely as a 
compiler of statistical facts, but equally as a reformer. In this sense, his 
proposal can also be read as a much broader definition of medicine which 
should include epidemiological methods and operate as preventive medicine. 
His proposal for such a preventive medicine, however, only included 
suggestions for housing and sanitary reform, including street cleaning, better 
ventilation by widening streets as well as vaccination and individual hygiene 
(ibid., 127).  
 Furthermore, it is important to highlight his influence in creating 
nosologies, which came to be used by the G.R.O and beyond. Diseases in 
medical science are classified in a nosology. There are different nosologies 
and diseases can be classified according to their cause (etiology), the 
mechanisms by which diseases are caused (pathogenesis) or the symptoms a 
patient experiences. The nosology Farr developed was important because this 
categorisation consolidated the medical theories of death and, thereby, 
dictated the way in which deaths were counted nationally. By way of the 
magnitude of the numbers counted, his nosology affected the understanding 
and interpretation of causes of mortality at a national level.  
 Nevertheless, his nosology was not without its critics, primarily public 
health officers with a deeper medical interest and a belief that the identified 
variations in local mortality rates were not well explained by Farr’s zymotic 
disease category comprising the epidemic, endemic and contagious 
diseases.26 It was felt that the zymotic class contained diseases too diverse in 
character and that, by using more fine-grained disease categories, greater 
insight could be gained. A more detailed examination indicated that major 
causes for variations in local mortality were particularly due to pulmonary 
diseases as well as dysentery, diarrhoea and cholera. Under John Simon, the 
successor of Edwin Chadwick as the public health administrator in office at the 
time, this led to the monitoring of variations and investigation of rapid changes 
in local mortality rates due to such causes. 
 This is a very relevant moment of transition in the use of health statistics. 
Whereas previously it was customary to asses the health of the population 
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26 Such as smallpox, cholera, typhus, plague and influenza as well as other diseases, such as 
cow pox, glanders, hydrophobia, syphilis, erysipelas, puerperal fever, measles, scarlet fever, 
whooping cough, dysentery and diarrhoea (Eyler 1979, 82).!
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relatively broadly by way of general mortality statistics, under Simon the same 
methods were employed to identify, analyse and explain specific disease 
developments. While from a narrow physiological-medical perspective Farr’s 
zymotic disease can be viewed too broad a category for precise medico-
pathological counting, it could equally be seen as the cumulative casualties 
resulting from the deplorable living and working conditions of the working 
class. That seemed to be his intention, as he explained in his first letter to the 
A.R.R.G in 1839 by relating to this class of diseases as the “index of salubrity” 
which in his opinion could be controlled and prevented (Farr [26], quoted in 
Eyler 1979).  
 Similarly, a group of advocates struggled for the development of a social 
medicine in Germany. Virchow, a German physician and politician, published 
in cooperation with a group of like-minded peers the journal Die Medicinische 
Reform where they argued for a reconsideration of the field of medicine as a 
social science and the urgent need for medical reform. The principles upon 
which they based their proposition for reform were that the health of people is 
a matter of direct social concern, that social and economic conditions have an 
important effect on health and disease, and that these relations must be 
subjected to scientific investigation. As a logical consequence steps must be 
taken to promote health and to combat disease, and that the measures 
involved in such action must be social as well as medical (Rosen 1974, 67). 
Their proposal was submitted as a draft for a Public Health Law in 1849, but 
was unsuccessful and the hopes for a health reformation died with it.  
 Nevertheless, the significant statistical differences in life expectancy 
between workers and the upper classes derived from those statistical studies 
by Farr and others27 provided strong arguments for improvements via reform. It 
is interesting to note here, though, that the reform measures suggested and 
implemented were mostly infrastructural and did not include aspects 
concerning social and economic conditions of labouring people at the time. 
Some of these concerns were only later taken up as issues of ‘occupational 
health’ as a result of labour movements in the second half of the 19th century. 
The broader social concerns in relation to health which were identified by 
Villermé, Virchow and Wakley, however, were of little wider political interest for 
a long time.  
 In England, and during Chadwick’s time as commissioner of the General 
Board of Health,28 sanitary reform was based on indices, such as mean age or 
general mortality rates, and focused on infrastructural and environmental 
improvements, such as sewage systems and access to fresh and clean 
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27 Such as Villermé, a reformist French physician (Hacking 1990, 74).!
28 The General Board of Health was abolished in 1854 (Hacking 1990).!
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drinking water. In contrast, Simon, in his capacity as Chief Medical Officer, 
initiated a policy of preventive medicine which was based on death rates from 
specific causes (Eyler 1979, 137). With the presentation of his Sanitary Papers 
report in June 1858, he aimed to initiate a second phase of sanitary 
government. For him, a novel approach was required to advance public health, 
which differed from previous efforts by Chadwick that he saw as based on 
crude generalisations and preoccupied with engineering. Instead, the novel 
approach should become focused on preventive measures and based on 
scientific knowledge (Lambert 1963, 267). Influential in the development of 
epidemiological orientation was germ theory. More specifically, the publication 
by R.E. Koch, a German physician and founding figure of microbiology, on the 
tubercle bacillus29 in 1882 demonstrated the ability of the approach to identify 
a microorganism responsible for causing tuberculosis. Epidemiological 
orientation, thus, shifted from environmental causes, popular during sanitary 
reform, towards bacteriological aspects and transmission patterns of 
diseases.30 
 Early cases where quantitative measurements and simple statistical 
analysis were deployed in the context of medical treatments were the 
vaccination for small pox31 and bloodletting.32 Bloodletting as a therapy to cure 
or prevent illnesses has been practiced since antiquity and was based on the 
medical concept that, broadly speaking, health depends on the balance of 
bodily fluids. It is a therapy which was also vigorously applied by some French 
doctors, among them Broussais. This is unsurprising, given his novel 
conception of normal and pathological states as different states of the same 
kind. Bloodletting, thus, must have seemed to him as logically adequate to 
rebalance a patient’s pathological state towards a healthy state (1832).  
 Louis, another French physician, collated 100 cases of pneumonia 
treated with bloodletting and compared them to a control group. This 
evidence, he asserted, proved the uncertain effectiveness of the therapy. 
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29 A small lesion in the lungs, characteristic of tuberculosis (Pschyrembel 2010).!
30 It was not until the 1980’s, however, that social epidemiology re-pronounced the importance 
of considering the implications of the social environment onto the health of individuals and 
society (Honjo 2004; Krieger 2001).!
31 in 1721, Rev Cotton Mather together with Dr. Boylston compared mortality statistics for small 
pox based on natural causes with those vaccinated, finding that, in the former case‚ one out of 
six proved fatal, while only one in ninety-one of the inoculated cases were fatal (Shryock 1961).!
32 It has to be noted that there is a long history of earlier more or less successful such trials to 
quantify, dating back to the time of Hippocrates counting days of critical points of fevers as well 
as the now extinct area of iatrophysics which, roughly from 1600 to 1750, aimed prematurely at 
quantifying medicine (Shryock 1961).!
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While some found the evidence credible, others were critical of it and pointed 
to two important shortcomings. Firstly, Louis left unclear what level of 
quantitative evidence would qualify as a significant finding and, thus, rule out 
significant influence of confounding effects. Secondly, while statistical 
averages were interesting, such knowledge would not be applicable for 
effective therapy of individuals. As a result, the concept of “l’homme moyen 
would lead to indiscriminate, routine treatments” (Shryock 1961, 19). As we 
now know, it was not until 1925 with the introduction of Fisher’s statistical 
significance test that statistical rigour was strengthened. ‘Indiscriminate routine 
treatments’ however, is precisely what seems now to be everyday clinical 
practice as highlighted earlier with regards to population-based medicine.  
 
 
Risk-factor epidemiology 
 
Apart from this early example above, quantification of medicine had an uneasy 
reception early in the 19th century. This was exemplified by critical voices being 
raised by influential medical professionals. Auber, a French physician, 
published his Traité de Philosophie Médicale in 1839 where he argued that 
“many physiologic and pathologic phenomena were unmeasurable, since the 
process could give numbers but not the qualities of things” (Shryock 1961, 
224). This is an important criticism, which is also reflected in the earlier 
discussion of the difficulties in applying BMI cut-off rates across diverse 
populations. The problem at the heart of this seems to be that, while 
measurements of certain aspects, such as glucose-levels in a person’s urine or 
blood in the case of diabetes or PSA-levels in relation to prostate cancer, are 
given as cardinal numbers on a continuum, they cannot in themselves 
necessarily speak of the qualitative pathological changes occurring in a 
person. While this general observation is hardly surprising, it does warrant 
additional attention, particularly in relation to the setting of thresholds to 
demarcate clinical normalcy from pathology, to which I will turn now.  
 It was not until after the Second World War that Archibald Cochrane, 
among others, proposed to frame the epidemiological focus on integrating 
environmental, social and microbiological aspects in order to understand and 
identify causal factors for diseases. Prevalent at the time were significant 
increases in chronic and non-communicable diseases, such as cancer and 
cardiovascular diseases. Thus, from a medical perspective, the focus of 
epidemiology became more specific again, but likewise changed its 
underlying etiological paradigm. Rather than a single spreading causal agent, 
as in the case of miasma- and germ-theories, chronic disease epidemiology 
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followed a ‘risk factor’ and ‘web of causation’ paradigm. According to Susser 
and Stein 
 
Under this paradigm, the logical approach for epidemiologists is to 
seek to identify risk factors - exposures or characteristics that confer 
increased risk - for disease, rather than to look for a one-to-one 
relationship between cause and disease. The logical approach for 
public health intervention is to alter the risk profile of individuals 
within the population.  
       (Susser and Stein 2009, 12) 
                                
 
 Risk-factor epidemiology operates with observational studies, such as 
case-control and (prospective) cohort-studies. In contrast to RCTs discussed 
earlier, sample selection is performed in relation to hypothesised causal 
attributes and exposure to these causal attributes rather than being perfectly 
randomised. The goal lies in the isolation of these causal attributes and risk 
factors. Evidence from the method is deemed less reliable due to the various 
possibilities of bias which are accounted for with RCTs as previously 
discussed. Also, observational studies are less interested in providing insights 
as to the distribution of phenomena in demographic terms, that is to say 
whether all who exhibit a certain risk factor are necessarily also at risk of the 
related disease.  
 Once smaller observational studies provide indications for specific risk 
factors, such evidence can then be followed up with larger-scale studies to 
provide stronger, statistically-significant evidence. This was, for example, the 
case in the much-cited research which related smoking to lung cancer (Doll 
and Hill 1950, 1954) as well as the Framingham Heart studies. The 
Framingham Heart studies are ongoing longitudinal prospective cohort studies 
concerned with understanding risk factors in relation to the development of 
heart diseases. It is set up as the study of residents of the town Framingham in 
the USA and cited for having ‘established’ evidence relating smoking, elevated 
levels of cholesterol and obesity with increased risk of heart diseases (ibid.). 
Participants undergo a detailed medical examination at regular intervals. The 
research study thereby allows the tracking of the emergence of pathological 
incidences over time and statistical determination and prediction of the 
correlation between physiologically measured parameters (such as blood 
pressure, cholesterol and level of obesity) and future illnesses, establishing in 
this way the former as risk factors to potentially prevent. 
 The case of diagnosing various forms and particular stages of diabetes, a 
metabolic disorder identified for about 3500 years (Greene 2007, 84), reveals 
the issues with quantifying physiological parameters and the definition of 
thresholds of normal and pathological states in more detail. Before the 
56 !
discovery of insulin as an effective treatment of the disease in the 1920’s, 
clinical focus in the case of diabetes, as well as more broadly in medicine, was 
on treatment of patients with symptoms. The introduction of insulin to 
therapeutic practice had significant positive effects on the life expectancy of 
patients with diabetes, particularly children.  
 However, as people with diabetes lived longer, a number of hitherto 
unknown diabetic conditions, such as diabetic eye disease that might result in 
severe vision loss or blindness, and other conditions surfaced.33 Subsequent 
medical and pharmacological research focused on developing diagnostic 
tools to support identification of diabetic patients unaware of their pathological 
state as well as an oral and more convenient form of therapy than was 
available with the hypodermic needle for injecting insulin. Diagnostic urine test 
kits were developed and increasingly spread via GP practices, gymnasia, 
summer camps (ibid., 98), thereby starting establishing a surveillance 
infrastructure in the USA. This helped to identify what at the time was 
popularised as ‘the million hidden diabetics,’ that is to say people with mild 
forms of diabetes very often treated with diet and exercise.  
 Nonetheless, urine-based testing had a number of disadvantages 
compared to blood-glucose level testing. The most important of them was that 
it would only indicate sugar levels above a relatively high threshold34 and 
provide only relatively rough indications of sugar levels, which may not 
necessarily be indicative of blood-sugar levels. Thus, it would not allow for 
more fine-grained distinctions of various intensities of diabetes and 
corresponding therapy. The increasing use of blood glucose level based 
screening and diagnostic methods changed this by providing a continuous 
and increasingly sensitive scale of blood glucose levels in tested people.  
 Simultaneously, it led to rising numbers of people with ‘borderline test 
results,’ that is to say results near the set level for diagnosing overt diabetes. In 
relation to family histories with diabetes occurring, these borderline cases were 
subsequently considered as at risk for diabetes. While the terminology for 
classifying this risk group varied from protodiabetic, chemical diabetic, latent 
diabetic, stress diabetic and pre-diabetic, they shared a common 
characteristic, namely the lack of symptoms. After some debate, these various 
typifications were consolidated and reclassified for clinical diagnosis as 
chemical, mild or early diabetics in the early 1960’s (Greene 2007, 100, 106). 
Consequently, numerous people previously considered healthy were now 
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33 Such as the “susceptibility to infections, poor wound healing and vascular diseases,” not to 
mention social stigma (Greene 2007, 87).!
34 The renal threshold of urine-sugar level is regulated by the kidney and varies from person to 
person.!
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thought to be ill and, thus, treated. In turn, the category of pre-diabetes was 
reconceptualised as people who develop symptomatic diabetes only under 
bodily stress, such as during pregnancy. Although it was found that such 
symptomatic diabetes typically recedes after pregnancy, other studies 
suggested significant statistical correlation with overt diabetes in later stages 
of life as compared to non-pregnant women. Such pre-diabetes “was recast as 
an early warning sign of an underlying, incipient diabetes” (ibid., 106). 
 To summarise, there was a shift from seeing specific diseases as 
incurable towards reframing them as chronic diseases which could and, from a 
public health perspective, should be predicted, surveilled and continuously 
treated. Surveillance was performed by the regular measurement of 
physiological parameters considered indicative of future pathology. What 
remained unchanged from earlier epidemiological approaches, however, was 
the methodology for calculating the influence of risk factors or treatments in 
relation to broad sociodemographic and increasingly specific genetic factors 
(Rose 2006). This methodology, termed ‘population thinking’ in epidemiological 
jargon, has become one of the foundations of clinical research, clinical 
epidemiology and, thus, evidence-based medicine to this day.  
 The conception of a set of risk factors responsible for causing a disease 
is also reflected in the transition of larger medical paradigms from what has 
been termed ‘hospital medicine,’ dominant in the 19th century, towards a 
preventive and surveillance medicine in the early 20th century. Hospital 
medicine had as its object of study the gross anatomical structures of organs 
and tissues that are visible to the eye. Distancing themselves from the ill man, 
medical investigators reduced symptoms to secondary indicators rather than 
defining features of disease. Diagnosis, in turn, was established through 
physical examination of observable structures. Pathological anatomy was 
technically supported by the invention of a number of ‘scopes,’ such as the 
stethoscope. Importantly, whereas abdominal pain, for example, was 
previously seen as the illness itself, in hospital medicine this was merely 
considered to be a symptom which, through examination by an experienced 
physician, might have been linked to a sign, such as abdominal tenderness. 
Based on the prevailing pathology, both symptom and sign would then be 
used to infer a hidden pathological lesion. As Armstrong (1995, 402) succinctly 
sums it up, whereas “pathology in hospital medicine had been a concrete 
lesion, in surveillance medicine illness it is in perpetual becoming.”  
 Risk-factor epidemiology can, thus, be said to have fully established the 
mechanisms for population-based and surveillance medicine, thereby closing 
the circle by embracing Broussais’ much earlier conception of health and 
pathology as being merely different states on a linear and measurable 
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gradient. In surveillance medicine, the notion of a risk factor came to 
problematise the ‘normal’ and “encompasses any state or event from which the 
probability of illness can be calculated” (ibid., 401). It is, indeed, the early 
identification of probable risk factors which appears increasingly and 
specifically problematic. As Greene (2007, 112), a historian of science and 
doctor of medicine, aptly comments in relation to the interpretation of pre-
diabetic test results, “[By] equating the linear gradient of physiological 
parameters with the temporal progression of disease, the concept of pre-
diabetes invested borderline test results with a sense of pathophysiological 
urgency.”  
 
 
Reflections on concepts of normality and pathology 
 
For Georges Canguilhem, French philosopher and historian of science, the 
question of what constitutes normal and pathological states is at the heart of 
the conceptual and operative understanding of medicine (1994). I will very 
briefly summarise the different conceptions and developments of normal and 
pathological states that have been discussed above and provide diagrams to 
visualise the changes observed. Loosely, three phases will be differentiated: 
the pre-Broussais phase, the Broussais phase and the risk factor phase. Such 
a diagrammatic understanding will be useful when evaluating more recent 
data-driven approaches to healthcare and assessing the kinds of contributions 
they might be able to make. 
 
 
Pre-Broussais phase 
 
During this phase it was held that physiology and pathology were two distinct 
domains of phenomena and knowledge. Consequently, it was thought that 
having knowledge about one of them could not inform knowledge of the other. 
Signs and symptoms were indicators of pathology.  
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Figure 2.2: Relation of health and illness in pre-Broussais phase 
  
Broussais phase 
 
Broussais conceptualised the normal and pathological as different states on a 
gradient of the same kind. The difference between the two states, according to 
Broussais, can be explained by changes in levels of intensity. Pathology, thus, 
was seen as an intensification of normal states. 
 
Figure 2.3: Relation of health and illness in Broussais phase 
Risk factor phase  
 
While under Broussais’ conceptualisation the pathological link is direct and 
causal, under the risk factor paradigm it is probabilistic and its etiology only 
partially understood. Pre-pathological states are symptomless and exhibit mild 
levels of risk factors. In pathological states, quantitatively measurable risk 
factors are always probabilistically pathological. The logic of health seems to 
morally implicate a reduction of risk factors.  
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Figure 2.4: Relation of health and illness in risk factor phase 
 
 The notion of the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’ has seen dramatic shifts 
over the past two centuries of medical knowledge production. What is 
conceived of as normality has increasingly been encroached by a growing 
body of evidence linking quantitatively measurable physiological parameters to 
pathological outcomes. Such evidence was established on the conditions of 
probabilistic eventualities distributed across populations and over time. The 
polysemic nature of language also means that the semantics of normality are 
politically determined and distributed. Normality within the quantified-self 
movement,35 for example, is something to be optimised and is somewhat 
uncomfortably reminiscent of earlier ‘movements,’ such as eugenics. Normality 
dictated by governmental regimes, such as public health and surveillance 
medicine, is more akin to something that needs to be retained and prevented 
from deteriorating. Health has been infused with normative status, produced 
through the promotion of health and self-surveillance as something that must 
be actively maintained by the preventive management and possible reduction 
of risk factors. Nevertheless, the introduction of risk factors rendered the 
maintenance of normality highly problematic. One could be symptomless and 
healthy and at the same time constantly at risk. Risk-factor epidemiology 
established the uncomfortable and probabilistically fragile, yet statistically 
significant, continuous link between health and pathology, over time and 
across statistical populations.  
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 People using a variety of sensor technologies to capture data about aspects of their daily life, 
such as sleep, food consumption, blood oxygen, typically with the aim of improving their 
‘performance’ in relation to the average in the reference group (http://quantifiedself.com; ac. 18. 
03. 2012).!
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Canguilhem’s perspective on pathology and normality 
 
An alternative conception of normality has been proposed by Canguilhem 
(1994). As previously discussed, risk factors are, however fragile, statistically 
pre-pathological. Canguilhem takes a broader perspective on understanding 
the supposed issue of deviations from the ‘normal’ and resorts to evolutionary 
theory based on “mutationist explanations” (ibid., 352). According to this 
dynamic view, biological normality is an outcome of the interactions between 
an entity and its environment over time. The normal is achieved when the entity 
exhibits an attempt to maintain, multiply and diversify itself and develops the 
capacities to adapt to environmental changes and, thus, achieve viability. In 
turn, the pathological is determined as inability to tolerate change (ibid.). In 
what follows, four different states of pathology are reconsidered from this 
mutationist adaptation perspective. 
 
Symptomless risk factors state 
Normality plus ability to creatively adapt to changes in environment = authentic 
normal as normative (e.g. non-aggressive prostate cancer). 
 
Risk factors with mild symptoms state 
Normality with signs of potential inability to adapt to changes in environment. 
 
Pathological state 
Normality minus the ability to creatively adapt to changes in environment = 
pathological normal (e.g. aggressive prostate cancer). 
  
Unmapped space of risk factors 
Not yet statistically or biologically evidenced as potential or actual risk factor. 
 
62 !
 
Figure 2.5: Canguilhem’s perspective on health and normality 
 
 Such a view is liberating in the sense that it allows us to conceptualise 
symptomless risk factors as not necessarily and inherently linked to pathology, 
but also as long-term variation. Reflecting on the different levels of BMI and 
blood pressure considered normal among different national populations, such 
an adaptive mutationist evolutionary perspective allows us to understand 
physiological deviations beyond a normatively defined pathological state in 
need of preventive medical attention and intervention.  
 As a consequence of scientific advancement, some aspects of 
Canguilhem’s concept might be due for a little revision. As indicated by recent 
genetic research (Kelley and Rinn 2012, 13), it is not so much the “structures 
and behaviours” of the human species itself that generate and in some cases 
succeed in mutational adaptation in evolutionary terms, but the environment 
itself. This seems to come in the form of retroviral molecular processes which 
act through the human and then, in some cases, become part of it. Integrating 
such molecular species-environment interactions allows us to retain 
Canguilhem’s notion of the normal and the pathological; it also requires 
accepting the implication that, in some cases of deviations from the normal, 
identifying pathology can only be determined retrospectively over longer time-
ranges, lending, thus, the preventive risk-factor-reduction logic an air of a 
somewhat myopic and human control-oriented strategy for long-term species 
survival. 
 It has been my intention to lay out and problematise the shifting notions of 
the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’ as they also constitute critical elements in 
assessing and making sense of medical knowledge. Whether and how these 
notions will yet shift again in the near future when medical research is 
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augmented by the developments of genetic-screening and 
pharmacogenomics as well as other data-driven approaches remains to be 
seen. The former two will not be addressed further within the scope of this 
work. In the following section, however, I will reflect and speculate on the 
potential role of the data-driven approaches in relation to conceptions of the 
normal and the pathological.  
 
 
Data-driven medicine: Big Data 
 
Big Data is a phenomenon operating in the realms of large scientific research 
projects in physics and astronomy36 as well as big corporations. The first 
academic reference to the term ‘Big Data’ is by Weiss and Indurkhya (1998). In 
their book on predictive data-mining they note that  
 
very large collections of data […] are now being compiled into 
centralised data warehouses, allowing analysts to make use of 
powerful methods to examine data more comprehensively. In theory, 
‘Big Data’ can lead to much stronger conclusions for data-mining 
applications, but in practice many difficulties arise.  
 
                       (ibid., xi) 
 
Their book is mostly an applied discussion of methods for statistical evaluation 
of Big Data and preparing and handling Big Data volumes for such evaluation 
accordingly. Unfortunately, it does not refer or discuss the phenomenon of Big 
Data in any substantial way that would be relevant for our purposes here.    
 In his statistics and econometrics paper, Diebold (2012) similarly refers 
to an explosive data growth early on. By that he means the “explosion in the 
quantity (and sometimes, quality) of available and potentially relevant data, 
largely the result of recent and unprecedented advancements in data-
recording and storage technology” (ibid., 13). In his discussion of two papers 
on novel economic Dynamic Factor Models being based on Big Data, he 
identifies that these novel models also operate with much larger numbers of 
indicators for regression analysis. Nevertheless, his discussion remains a 
technical one dedicated to the operative intricacies of his field. Following 
Diebold’s argument, one would have to think that the development of Big Data 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 See for example: http://home.web.cern.ch/about/computing and 
http://openlab.web.cern.ch/publications/presentations/cern-big-science-meets-big-data (ac. 15. 
02. 2013).!
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came about as a natural consequence of Moore’s law,37 thus completely 
ignoring and obscuring other agendas that facilitated this development in the 
specific ways we have it today.  
Other authors have further defined the term by adding descriptors such as 
“Volume, Variety and Velocity” (Laney 2003, quoted in Diebold 2012, 4) which, 
while certainly describing the phenomenon more accurately, still does not help 
better understand why it occurs. A paper by a group of leading computer 
science researchers from the USA representing the National Science 
Foundation and the Computing Research Association in their collaboration as 
the Computing Community Consortium only refers to “[A]dvances in digital 
sensors, communications, computation, and storage” that miraculously seem 
to “have created huge collections of data, capturing information of value to 
business, science, government, and society” (Bryant et al. 2008, 1), without 
any detailed discussion of what this value should be and under what 
conditions it can be generated. Before describing in further detail what Big 
Data is and why it occurs, it is useful to now turn to an example of Big Data 
analytics. This will help illustrate and understand the scale, operational 
mechanics and, importantly, some of its anticipated usefulness for 
contemporary society.   
 
 
Big Data applied 
 
Making use of large data sets are companies such as Google and 
supermarkets. Extensive customer profiles are assembled, containing socio-
demographic, geographic and behavioural data as well as social graph 
information (Holmes 2007; Stalder and Mayer 2009). This, in turn, allows one to 
identify patterns among individuals or groups, which can provide the basis for 
more fine-tuned commercial or other38 targeting of customer segments, or to 
drive and decide on product and service innovation (Tang et al. 2010). Big 
Data appears too broad a term when one does not consider the specifics of 
application contexts. Some of the generally hoped-for promises and likely 
implications of Big Data’s seemingly attractive characteristics in relation to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 The observation that the number of transistors in integrated circuits and processors doubles 
approximately every two years (Moore 1965).!
38 The US army applies predictive analytics to anticipate the outbreak and specific development 
of Guerrilla types of warfare, see project SCARE (Spatio-Cultural Abductive Reasoning Engine), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21553006; ac. 15. 04. 2012.!
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healthcare can best be demonstrated by considering the Google Flu Trends 
(GFT) case.   
 For GFT, Google computes billions of search queries based on an 
automated method to identify early signs of potential influenza-related search 
activity in a region. Based on their model, this is then used to make predictions 
of actual flu trends in a region or country. Such early detection, the authors 
(Ginsberg et al. 2009) argue, is crucial for public health officials in order to 
prevent pandemic spread by resorting to relevant medical measures in a 
timely fashion and “may enable public health officials to mount a more effective 
early response [and] in turn reduce the impact of both seasonal and pandemic 
influenza.” This appears to be a valuable contribution, particularly when it 
comes to saving lives.  
 While the authors acknowledge that “panic and concern among healthy 
individuals may cause a surge in the Influenza-Like-Illness39 (ILI)-related query 
fraction and exaggerated estimates,” they nevertheless suggest that “notable 
increases in ILI-related search activity may indicate a need for public health 
inquiry to identify the pathogen or pathogens involved” (ibid.). However, upon 
closer inspection of the methods applied, a number of questions and concerns 
arise, both in theory and practice. In order to unpack the implications such Big 
Data analysis may have, it is useful to highlight the key elements of the GFT 
model on the basis of which its relevance and trustworthiness are purportedly 
established. This will also allow for situating some of the issues with Big Data 
analytics in a wider context. 
As the Google team describes the GFT model in their published article 
(ibid.), they built an automated system to identify influenza-related search 
queries, assuming no prior knowledge of Influenza-Like-Illness (ILI). The goal 
is to build a more comprehensive model for influenza surveillance than prior 
attempts (ibid.). To do so, they analysed hundreds of billions of individual 
searches submitted between 2003 and 2008. The model essentially builds on 
a line-of-best-fit (regression analysis) between most popular search queries in 
a specific week and US region and the probability that a GP visit during the 
same time and in the same region is ILI-related. The latter data is based on the 
existing flu surveillance system managed by the US Centre for Disease Control 
(CDC), which typically reports these figures with a time lag of 1-2 weeks. The 
GFT model ‘rewards’ queries which exhibit similar regional variances like those 
of the CDC data set. Based on this high correlation and real-time-ness of 
search query data as compared to time lag for CDC-data, early-warning signal 
quality is assumed.  
The underlying assumption seems to be that most people initiate a search 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Influenza-Like-Illness is a flu-like syndrome, indicating the possibility of influenza.!
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query when they experience symptoms and check whether they are ILI-
symptoms. It seems equally easy to imagine a scenario where some people 
initiating ILI-related search queries may have seen an ILI-related advert 
(assumed to be highly seasonal as well) or media article and preventively 
wanted to update their ability to spot symptoms of the specific seasonal flue in 
other people at work, on the street or in the family. Such seemed to be the 
case in the Bird Flu pandemic (H1N1) when the GFT model was indeed unable 
to correlate with pandemic-ILI data and needed to be adjusted for unexpected 
effects through extensive media coverage (Butler 2013; Cook et al. 2010).    
From our perspective there seems to be, at least in theory, a significant 
potential difference between the intentionality of somebody making the effort to 
visit a physician for ILI-related purposes and the various reasons why someone 
might initiate ILI-related search queries for themselves or others, not to speak 
of the increasing numbers of people in the USA who cannot afford a visit to the 
GP.40 Thus, while GFT seems able to crystallise general correlations between 
ILI-relevant GP visits and searches on temporal and geographic measurable 
vectors, it remains difficult to explain spikes in such search volume and why 
they differ significantly from actual CDC-ILI data as well as laboratory-
confirmed influenza (Ortiz et al. 2011). This may be seen as a major drawback 
of this analysis method, as it does not offer sensible ways to further explore 
and make sense of findings and differences.   
As highlighted by Ortiz et al. (ibid.), ILI itself is only an umbrella term for a 
“nonspecific syndrome that is not necessarily caused by influenza virus 
infection, but used for decades as an indicator of the burden of outpatient 
influenza illness.” While some see a practical use for GFT real-time detection 
data in calling in more staff or opening an empty hospital wing to allow more 
patients (Dugas et al. 2012), it remains to be confirmed that such decisions 
and even those more wide-scale ones by public health officials and 
epidemiologists in potential cases of pandemics and epidemics are indeed 
made and accounted for using GFT data.41  
GFT as a case of Big Data analytics is exemplary for a number of specific 
ways in which Big Data is thought to provide its magic. For one thing, the sheer 
volume of data - billions of individual search queries - seems to cast questions 
of representativeness less relevant (Boyd and Crawford 2011). The GFT 
authors acknowledge this only insofar as statistical methodology requires them 
to state that “the correlations we observe are only meaningful across large 
populations” (Ginsberg et al. 2008). While such early indications may 
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40 See http://www.healthcare.gov/news/factsheets/2010/07/health-care-providers.html; ac. 15. 
02. 2012.!
41 Personal communication with J. Ortiz, 20.3.2012.!
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nevertheless be valuable for rapid-response epidemiology, unfortunately, the 
authors highlight, and in contrast to traditional surveillance methods, no 
demographic data can be obtained from search queries (ibid.). Furthermore, 
the strength of correlation in light of such data volumes renders data outliers 
statistically less significant and, thus, less visible in the GFT interface.42 
Consequently, the Big Data analyst can analyse at the comfort of a 30,000 feet 
perspective, hence deriving meaning not from decoding individual queries in 
context, as, for example, with ethnographic thick descriptions, but based on 
the emergence of patterns out of millions of data points. Furthermore, the 
question of whether, despite its historic existence, ILI is in fact a useful metric 
to compare with as indicated by the research by Ortiz et al. (2011) above 
remains to be answered.   
Analysing at that ‘altitude’ or distance is further justified by relating Big Data 
to the ‘real’ through correlating it with grounded events,43 the actual ILI-rated 
GP visits in a given time and geographic area. While such analysis may turn 
out significant correlations, as is the case in GFT, it obscures the question of 
their actual meaningfulness and relevance (ibid.) while assuming an 
unproblematic universal applicability (Goel et al. 2010). GFT has so far been 
applied to 29 countries with varying degrees of success (Cook et al. 2010); 
thus, while being an interesting approach, it may best be taken with some 
care.   
Lastly, the insights generated are presented - at least to the public - as an 
end rather than as a means. By this I mean that data is not presented in a way 
that would allow one to make further context-specific sense beyond the 
findings churned out by GFT.44 From a perspective of search as exploratory, 
situated and, thus, open-ended, this seems unnecessarily narrow and vexing.  
 
 
A brief history of Big Data and why it occurs 
 
While the massive growth of storage and processing capacities in digital 
computing are important contributing elements which have laid and continue 
to expand the necessary technological infrastructure underlying Big Data, they 
remain insufficient in fully explaining the emergence of such phenomena as 
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42 Personal communication with Richard Lewis, Computing Department Goldsmiths (19.3.2012).!
43 As Miller and Slater (2001, 1) argue, “[T]he internet as a meaningful phenomenon only exists 
in particular places” which then serve as “the only firm basis for building up the bigger 
generalisations and abstractions […]”!
44 See http://www.google.org/flutrends/se/data.txt; ac. 15. 04. 2012.!
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GFT, and even less helpful for shedding light on what may be more 
fundamental driving forces for the rise of Big Data. Identifying such forces will 
help us start developing a more comprehensive understanding and definition 
of the term. This, in turn, allows us to identify and discuss the ways in which 
Big Data knowing may also be said to differ from the other data-based 
knowledges mentioned earlier. 
 A useful starting point is the larger shift from an industrial society to what 
has been variously named ‘post-industrial society’ (Touraine 1974), ‘information 
society’ (Machlup 1962) or ‘network society’ (Castells 1996). Even though there 
are important distinctions between these grand social theories, they all broadly 
describe the phenomena whereby substantial parts of contemporary 
economic, social and cultural activity manifests in and through the production, 
distribution and consumption of information. This shift has been particularly 
complemented and intensified not only by the aforementioned advances in 
computing and digital technology but also by the emergence of networked 
information and communication technologies, such as the Internet.  
 In an era of increasingly globalised economic markets, it is 
economically valuable and opportune to continuously stimulate, optimise and 
channel probable economic behaviour (Holmes 2007). Collecting, assembling 
and analysing data from customer transactions, which can then be further 
exploited for predictive marketing purposes, is inviting in a fiercely competitive 
economic environment. This is especially true as traditional broadcast 
channels do not support marketing campaign-tracking mechanisms very well. 
This has been corrected in the meantime, as these media updated themselves 
into their digital contemporary equivalents. Television has become Digital TV, 
or technically known as Internet Protocol Television (IPTV). Newspapers have 
also moved online. Both have become amenable to various regimes which aim 
to optimise ‘user’ attention with commercial value and, thus, the distribution of 
content considered relevant for these purposes.45  
Of course, ‘economic drivers’ for Big Data should also be understood in a 
much broader sense to include other sorts of surveillance infrastructures, be 
they for the smooth operating of urban environments (Goode 2011), or in the 
USA increasingly for attracting voters (Holmes 2007). Regarding the design of 
urban environments, architecture critic Sze Tsung Leong (2001) refers to this 
as “control space” (quoted in Holmes 2007) while others, such as geographer 
and urban researcher Stephen Graham, as ‘Splintering Urbanism’ (2001). As 
Holmes (2007) persuasively summarises it, “[T]he environment is over-coded 
with an optimising algorithm, fed by data directly coming from you.” This has 
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45 Such as personalisation, behaviourial advertisements, tracking of interest and subsequent 
display of advertisements on other websites.!
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not only led to certain companies building up vast data repositories46 about 
individuals and offering their clientele to ‘pre-emptively market’ to their 
customers as they transition between different life-phases,47 but also continues 
to economically incentivise and intensify the specific ways such constant 
optimisation manifests in our daily interactions.  
Another example of such over-coding is the more recent practice of 
persuasion-profiling. This is a marketing approach concerned with the optimal 
display of product offers. ‘Optimal’ here is understood as selectively displaying 
cues to which a potential customer will respond most desirably. As the 
inventors describe, in the case of a book this could consist in highlighting that 
‘friends’ from one’s social network have also liked or bought a product, 
displaying endorsements and appraisal by other well-known authors, or, in the 
case of price-sensitive clients and only for them, offering a discount.48 
Considering Big Data in such a light, the difference between identifying a 
potential criminal, buyer or political voter seems almost of secondary 
importance, or merely one of potentially many attributes of a comprehensive 
profile. In summary, then, commercial and economic drivers for the 
development of Big Data can be explained by an intensifying of identifiable 
patterns of human behaviour which can be statistically analysed and 
consequently segmented and targeted to optimise the probability of profitable 
economic transactions or otherwise desirable behaviour. 
 Alongside the aforementioned economic drivers there is a parallel 
development in scientific and academic research. Similarly, the core 
motivation stems from the kinds of questions which can be researched thanks 
to the availability of data but also the capacity to compute them. The National 
Science Foundation summarises this well in their Cyberinfrastructure Vision for 
21st Century Discovery Report:  
  
Once used by a handful of elite researchers in a few research 
communities on select problems, advanced computing has become 
essential to future progress across the frontier of science and 
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46 Acxiom, a US company, divides the entire US population into 70 demographic clusters, 
according to “age, estimated household income, presence and age range of children, marital 
status, home ownership status, estimated net worth and population density (Acxion.com; ac. 11. 
04. 2013).!
47 See case of pregnant teenage girl whose father was unaware of his daughter’s pregnancy 
and was complaining to Walmart for receiving ads for pregnant women 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all; ac. 01. 
10. 2012).!
48 See www.persuasion-profiling.com/ and http://captology.stanford.edu/; ac. 10. 02. 2013.!
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engineering […] Today’s scientists and engineers need access to new 
information technology capabilities, such as distributed wired and 
wireless observing network complexes, and sophisticated simulation 
tools that permit exploration of phenomena that can never be 
observed or replicated by experiment. 
        
     (NSF Cyberinfrastructure 2007)49 
 
 
 What seems of particular importance is their mentioning of a broader 
access to such infrastructure by a larger research community. The interest in 
and potential of Big Data for the humanities and social sciences research 
community, Manovich (2011) argues, stems from the diffusion of the stark 
limitations of up until recently standard data-supported research 
methodologies. As he explains, there was, on the one hand, ‘surface data’ 
containing few data points about many people. This was typically used in fields 
that work with quantitative methods, such as sociology, political sciences, 
economics etc. On the other hand, there was ‘deep data’ with a lot of data 
points about few people. This was typically used in the humanities, such as 
literary and film studies, history but also in non-quantitative schools, such as 
psychology and anthropology (ibid.). Manovich goes on to argue that statistics 
operates in-between the two methodologies with its concept of sampling 
technique, allowing the expansion of “certain types of data about the few into 
the knowledge about the many” (ibid.).  
 Unfortunately, as Manovich rightly points out, sampling comes at a cost; 
while it may in some circumstances allow for inferences about larger 
populations, as we will discuss later in more detail this is always based on a 
number of assumptions which we may never fully know whether they apply to a 
given population or not. Also, the sample is never representative of the actual 
behaviour of any individual or, indeed, all individuals studied; in this sense it 
only creates an image of average behaviour. To that extent, a researcher may 
well fail to appreciate all the different types of actual behaviour. For Manovich, 
the emergence of ‘social media’ has made it possible to eliminate the need to 
choose between surface and deep data. For him, this moment is well 
summarised in the following statement by Latour (2007, 2): 
 
The precise forces that mould our subjectivities and the precise 
characters that furnish our imaginations are all open to inquiries by 
the social sciences. It is as if the inner workings of private worlds 
have been pried open because their inputs and outputs have 
become thoroughly traceable.  
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49 See http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2007/nsf0728/nsf0728.pdf accessed 1/8/2014.!
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Whether one agrees with the selection of terms used above, such as ‘precise 
forces’ and ‘precise characters,’ is open for discussion and will be addressed 
further shortly. Moreover, it would be safe to include ubiquitous computing as 
well as the use and widespread distribution of sensing and computational 
technologies built into everyday objects in Manovich’s picture of social media 
as a constitutive element for generating this possibility. 
 Nevertheless, Manovich’s argument is a useful one and resonates with 
earlier arguments made by John Tukey, a Professor of Science and Statistics 
in the second half of the 20th century. Tukey (1980, 23) argued that classic 
understandings of the functioning of science and engineering that follow a 
straight line from “[research] question => design => collection => analysis => 
answer” do not recognise how research ideas and questions are generated. 
He argues that this mainly happens through quasi-theoretical insights and the 
exploration of past data.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Tukey’s view on process of research idea and question generation  
 
 Most importantly, the ‘question’ and ‘design’ phases do not happen in a 
linear fashion but iteratively, feeding back into each other. For him, data 
exploration manifests and plays a crucial role in every step of the research 
process, from idea formation over research design to data collection, analysis 
and finding research answers. If we accept Tukey’s suggestion as still valid 
today, then extensive data sources such as Big Data may, indeed, signify a 
vast imaginable potential for asking many a research question. Taking a look at 
the contemporary research landscape, it is not difficult to find relevant 
examples of research organisations and projects that are uniquely focused on 
developing research based on Big Data, such as Manovich’s proposal for a 
Cultural Analytics (2008), Google’s Ngram Viewer50 or a call for papers for a 
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50 See http://confluence-project.org; ac. 10. 10. 2012.!
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2013 Digital Humanities Conference with the title ‘Freedom to Explore.’51 
 In summary, the availability of Big Data is anticipated to relieve 
researchers from having to choose between and be satisfied with either 
surface or depth data. Besides physics and computing more generally, this is 
also attractive to both social sciences and humanities research in order to 
raise new research questions and develop new methodologies and practices. 
Such considerations are at the core of the recent discourse on Big Data, which 
aims to critically reflect on the social, cultural, economic and political 
implications thereof.52 
 
 
Reflections on Big data approaches to medical evidence 
 
From the perspective of the medical knowledge paradigms discussed above, 
rather than marking a fundamental shift Big Data can be said to reinforce and 
extend the existing dominant statistical risk-factor paradigm. It does so mainly 
by augmenting and intensifying existing knowledge-seeking processes with 
large-scale computational capacities and broader sets of data considered. 
More specifically, it continues to complement direct, etiological understanding 
with the force of statistical significance, albeit now on a larger scale of data.  
 This can be demonstrated with the Google Flu Trends (GFT) case. For 
this comparative analysis, risk-factor research can be thought of as consisting 
of three broad phases: input, analysis and output. During the input phase, risk 
factors that are deemed relevant for the research are identified.53 In the 
analysis phase, risk factors are methodically evaluated and compared to 
control groups with the aim of generating statistical evidence and probabilities 
as an output. It is important to notice here that, while the evidence is ‘just’ 
statistical and probabilistic, the underlying link between smoking and lung 
cancer is nevertheless thought to be causal in some cases evidenced in 
clinical tests. 
 The phases in the case of GFT are similar. What is different during the 
input phase is that the parameters considered are no longer directly linked in 
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51 See http://dh2013.unl.edu/call-for-proposals/; ac. 10. 10. 2012.!
52 See http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2014/07/03/philosophy-of-data-science-
series-evelyn-ruppert/; ac. 16. 08. 2014.!
53 In the case of linking smoking to lung cancer, extensive interviews were conducted to 
understand potential causal links. To start with, the researcher suspected the use of tar on 
roads as a likely candidate (Doll and Hill 1951).!
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medical etiological terms but only used as measurable indicators of emerging 
pathological incidents. In the case of GFT, this is web search and click 
behaviour.54 The analytic procedure applied in GFT also differs in one crucial 
way: in the absence of the necessity of a medico-etiological link, online 
behaviour is linked to emergent pathology by way of statistically proximate 
patterns compared to offline ILI-related pathological behaviour, that is people 
visiting GP’s in relation to flue-like symptoms. When the patterns of assumed 
indicative online behaviour map neatly onto the relative offline behaviour 
related to ILI across a sample of the national landscape and within the time 
ranges observed, potential epidemic pathology is predicted.  
 Effectively, in the case of GFT a relatively broadly-intended, information-
seeking activity assumes predictive capacity based on statistically-significant, 
homogenous past offline behaviour. In this sense, I argue that the risk-factor 
paradigm in the era of Big Data extends itself by further loosening the need for 
direct medico-etiological understanding in exchange for larger-scale statistical 
analysis of events which can be perceived as possibly indicative of anticipated 
pathological events. Given the absence of further exploratory capacity of the 
underlying data, its epistemological value is somewhat limited. 
 Such an approach to the production of risk-factor indicators brings with it 
a number of issues that need to be highlighted. It might be speculated that, 
just like statistical methods have evolved and increasingly acknowledged all 
sorts of potential and actual biases (Jadad and Enkin 2007, 29), a similar 
development might be anticipated for data science. Developing such an 
appreciation, though, hinges on accessibility and a relatively open conduct. 
Given the relatively undisclosed practice of Big Data analysis, it may take a 
while before a broader set of critical methodological concerns surface. By 
considering broader sets of potentially relevant data, Big Data projects may 
also identify correlations related to potential confounding effects of prior 
research studies that had to be satisfied with controlling a smaller set of 
variables. What, if anything, these correlations mean still requires a more fully 
extrapolated underlying theory so as to make sense of such data patterns as, 
for example, was the case with lung cancer. This resonates with Tukey’s call 
for iterative feedback loops when exploring past data to derive quasi-
theoretical insights for further exploration. The immediate question, then, 
becomes whether and who has the dedicated resources and required skills to 
weed through all those correlations (Kobielus 2012). Also, one may wonder 
what kinds of questions are being paid attention to and which ones may not 
seem worthwhile enough. While the current practice of the global 
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54 In other cases it is weight-gain and overweight/obese people in one’s social network that 
serve as probable indicators (Christakis and Fowler 2007).!
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pharmacological industry concerning orphan diseases may be one indication, 
there may also be speculated a potential for more fine-grained identification of 
long-tail effects (Anderson 2006).      
 From the genealogical discussion regarding the refinement of glucose-
measuring tools from urine to blood-based for diabetes, further parallels can 
be identified with how the risk-factor paradigm has evolved and the 
implications this had on the conception and identification of pathology. An 
example is the case of measuring subtle irregularities in vital signs of 
prematurely-born infants up to 24 hours before outward symptoms become 
visible. It is asserted that, while such minuscule irregularities are not significant 
to trigger an alert, “physicians can provide critical treatment to infants up to 24 
hours before the infection gets worse - making a life-saving difference” 
(Pittman 2012, 12; Blount et al. 2010).  
 As has been the case historically, the refinement of measurements and 
methods also leads to a reconsideration of the borders between health, pre- 
and mildly pathological states and pathology itself. From the material 
accessible,55 it is unclear how exactly a normal state is defined. The authors 
only refer to future refinement by “reviewing the correlation of computed 
features with infants who actually develop nosocomial infection” (Blount et al. 
2010, 117). From an ethical perspective, it is obvious that quantitative 
deviations from such a normal state could hardly be established via a 
randomised controlled trial. Following such a procedure would mean that the 
control group would not be given treatment, which in some cases would 
potentially lead to death in order to establish the causal pathological link. It, 
thus, has to be speculated that normality is derived as the average from the 
overall population of infants or premature infants itself. Pathology, in turn, 
seems to be defined as deviations from such averages. Unclear, however, is 
where and how the border between health and pathology is set. Thus, the 
number of treated false-positive premature infants seems to remain 
unknowable for the moment. It also remains unclear what, if any, iatrogenic 
effects such pre-pathological intervention may occasion and how this is 
accounted for.    
 Consequently, Big Data may be expected to identify endless risk-factor 
correlations, in some cases without offering the possibility to explore and 
interrogate them as seems to be the case with premature infants and GFT 
(Butler 2013). The latter illustrates that, while deviations from the ‘normal’ can 
be measured, they need not be signs of the pathological but in some cases 
simply false-positives that stem from implications of multifaceted interactions 
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55 The authors refer to a future publication regarding details of the nosocomial intervention of Big 
Data.!
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and other media influences. As Google can also capture such media 
influences via their Google News service, it remains to be seen how they will 
avoid to overly enthusiastically self-censor such potential media effects. As of 
this writing, there do not appear to be strong reasons to believe in a relatively 
open conduct for Big Data, given that APIs to this vast data pool are highly 
filtered (Boyd and Crawford 2011). This is hardly surprising as much of the 
immense stock-market capitalisation of corporations may be said to rely on the 
high hopes that these corporates will exploit the data for their own benefit and 
on their own terms. Lastly, given the availability of evidence, the step towards 
intensified policing of certain behaviours seems a small one for some.56 While 
not within the scope of this research, the role of Big Data in surveillance 
practices more broadly has recently been identified and problematised.57 
 
 
Summary 
 
As demonstrated in my discussion so far, the statistical techniques for 
establishing probabilities emerged historically as part of a regime for reform 
and medical policing. They have established a link between quantitative 
measurement of physiological - and increasingly behavioural - parameters and 
probable pathologies over time and across populations. However, it may be 
said that they have never been primarily intended as a source of information 
for meaningful decision-making for and by an individual. To that extent, they 
aim to speak of populations, evidently with little concern for specific 
distinguishing characteristics among individuals, apart from demographic 
aspects. It seems easy to see an improvement of 2% in the probability for men 
to detect the likelihood of prostate cancer with a PSA-test as a truly meaningful 
figure from the perspective of a public health manager. However, from the 
perspective of an individual, the improvement of probability figures from 42% 
to 44% hardly provides a substantially more meaningful basis for deciding on 
taking the risk of lifelong side-effects from a biopsy. In the worst case, only to 
find out that one has figured as a false-positive finding in the earlier PSA-test 
statistic. Thus from the perspective of a potentially affected individual rather 
than that of a public health manager, probabilities seem only partially useful for 
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56 Doctors demand to withhold treatment from obese patients who fail to lose weight as data 
correlations reveal that the treatment seem less effective in those cases and, thus, tax-money is 
being spent less effectively. See http://bit.ly/ICc7re; ac. 15. 02. 2013.!
57 See http://bds.sagepub.com/content/1/2/2053951714541861.full; ac. 18. 08. 2014.!
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decision-making. As Rose argues: 
 
Normativity now becomes a matter of normality, of social and moral 
judgements about whether particular lives are worth living […] The 
judgements of probabilities and of risks that have become central 
both to experimental and clinical practice inescapably connect to 
the judgements of value that are placed upon different forms of 
existence and the logics of treatment they mandate. What is 
normality at the level of the genetic code? Is what is optimal for the 
population necessarily optimal for the individual? 
          (Rose 1998, 165) 
 
 The paradigm of risk factors and, thus, the meaningfulness of probable 
risks is epistemologically characterised by a sharp contrast between a 
population view and an individual perspective. Meaning from a population view 
implies putting a higher value on experimental practice for improving the 
average health of the population with regard to a specific aspect. This takes 
place at the cost of framing healthy people as at risk of pathology, which 
comes as a necessary consequence of the inherent methodological limitations. 
Despite the questionable meaningfulness of risk factors at the individual level, 
such statistical modulations become active mediators (Hacking 2006). The 
specific ways in which probabilities are useful and problematic to individual 
health decision-making will be analysed and discussed in detail in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 3   
Shared medical decision-making and decision support 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter builds upon the biopolitical concerns of evidence-based 
medicine (EBM) I have analysed in the previous chapter, such as the changing 
possibilities and responsibilities projected onto people in sustaining and 
promoting their health. I will do so by considering the assumptions underlying 
the design of distributive mechanisms for risk information concerning cancer.  
 One way such self-responsibility is claimed to be supported is by 
means of decision aids (DA) as a tool in healthcare procedures involving 
shared decision-making (SDM). Decision aids come in the form of videos or 
pamphlets and are developed to support people in making an informed and 
unbiased decision in a medical situation. This is thought possible by providing 
a balanced view of benefits and harms of treatment options according to the 
current evidence-base. Decision aids, thus, consolidate and operate as the 
distributive mechanism by which evidence-based medicine is rolled out to the 
population. In turn, they constitute an object of critical concern for this 
research, both in terms of theoretical analysis as well as design practice. 
Based on the analysis of the limitations underlying the current design of DA’s, 
the subsequent practice-based design project aims at redesigning such 
decision support.  
 The chapter will first define SDM, consider its genealogy and discuss 
the principles based on which decision aids are designed and evaluated. I will 
do so first by analysing two systematic reviews of the performance of DA’s and 
the criteria based on which the evaluation was conducted. Furthermore, I will 
analyse the specific ways in which risk information is presented and the 
implications this has on individuals’ sense- and decision-making. This renders 
more transparent the underlying assumptions and design decisions 
materialising in the design of contemporary DA’s. It is found that, while 
presenting risk information with the use of natural frequencies58 may facilitate 
its immediate readability, I argue that such an approach simultaneously further 
obscures the fundamental uncertainties underlying the generation and 
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58 This is a term introduced by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995). They argue that human 
cognitive processes have evolved along with the sequential counting of events rather than with 
probabilities. Thus, according to evidence collated by them, humans (as well as animals) 
perform much better when information is presented this way.!
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applicability of such information, in particular at the level of the decision-
making individual.  
 In the second part of the chapter I analyse the ways in which such 
informational uncertainties relate to patient autonomy and, in turn, to SDM 
processes. Specifically, I will suggest reconceptualising patient autonomy 
beyond punctate decisions.59 This will also include the larger healthcare 
context, socially-derived standards and norms that influence what is 
considered responsible individual behaviour and the individualisation of risk 
more broadly. Subsequently, I argue that the processes for constructing 
preferences and personal values are of particular interest for this research. 
Unfortunately, relatively little prior research exists as research into SDM thus 
far has not fully addressed this aspect.60 The chapter closes with suggesting 
reconsidering patients as active inquirers and patient autonomy more as a 
collaborative knowledge practice, in particular with regard to the construction 
of preferences and values.  
 
 
Shared Decision-Making 
 
According to the Informed Medical Decisions Foundation, one of the earliest 
organisations61 to research and develop tools for shared decision-making in 
the USA,  
 
Shared decision-making is a collaborative process that allows 
patients and their providers to make healthcare decisions together, 
taking into account the best scientific evidence available, as well as 
the patient’s values and preferences.62  
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59 Kukla (2005, 35) refers to punctate decisions as seen by ethical theorists as those discrete 
choices independent of any implications in a person’s larger health care situation.!
60 This is argued by Epstein and Peters (2009, 196) as well as inferred from the Cochrane 
systematic reviews and the International Patient Decision Aid Standard evaluation criteria 
underlying them as discussed later.!
61 Established in 1989 by John Wennberg and Albert Mulley. Wennberg, as encountered in 
chapter two, is the epidemiologist who initially identified the unwarranted small-area variation in 
medical practice (1982). Mulley will be discussed with regard to the patient preference-
construction process in this chapter. The goal of the organisation is to advance evidence-based, 
shared decision-making by supporting research.!
62 Informed Medical Decisions Foundation, http://informedmedicaldecisions.org/what-is-shared 
decision-making/; ac. 01.09.2013.!
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Shared decision-making evolved partly from critical voices and social 
movements “challenging the paternalistic power that doctors exercised over 
their patients and their lives” (Rose 2006, 10) as well as from the findings on 
geographic variation of medical services by Wennberg (1973, 1982) that led to 
the promotion of evidence-based medicine discussed in the preceding 
chapter. The latter are the geographical variations in clinical practice for what 
was seen as essentially identical medical problems (Chassin et. al 1986).  
 An example of such geographic variations is that in some regions of the 
USA essentially no women underwent lumpectomy surgery63 for early stage 
breast cancer treatment, whereas in others the figure was 50%.64 While the 
variation could theoretically also stem from differences in patient choices, the 
statistical variances did not seem to support this credibly as the patterns 
seemed geographically concentrated, whereas variation due to patient choice, 
it was thought, would have led to more randomly distributed spatial patterns 
(Dartmouth Atlas Project Topic Brief 2007). The variation of clinical practice, 
thus, was found to be attributable, among other things, to local medical 
opinion, also dubbed ‘practice style factor’ by Wennberg (1984). By this, 
Wennberg hypothesised that the geographic variation in medical services 
used stems from differences in clinical judgment by physicians concerning 
favourable treatment forms. While some variation seemed acceptable due to 
the complexity of medical situations, the stark overall variations were also of 
concern with regard to rising healthcare costs (Epstein 1990).  
 The findings led to the formation of what has been named the 
‘Outcomes-movement’65 (ibid.). The motivation and goals of the movement 
included cost-containment as well as a consideration of a broader range of 
outcomes relevant for assessing treatment outcomes and health (ibid.). The 
latter has had a direct influence on the emergence of SDM. Research was 
conducted to start assessing different treatments and their outcomes. In one 
such research project concerning benign prostatic hyperplasia,66 the 
researchers developed a model based on expected utilities to compare a 
watchful waiting approach to surgery intervention (Barry et al. 1988). Watchful 
waiting, as the name indicates, requires regular inspections of symptom 
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63 Surgery to remove lumps from the breast.!
64 Similarly stark discrepancies were identified in other medical treatment contexts (Chassin et 
al. 1986).!
65 With this, Epstein (1990, 266) refers to a variety of organisations, such as the Health Care 
Financing Administration or the newly established Agency for Health Care policy and Research, 
which directed their activities or launched programmes for assessing “the effectiveness of 
medical interventions and developing guidelines for medical practice.”  !
66 An enlargement of the prostate.
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progress before surgery is performed, whereas surgical intervention is an act 
of preventive surgery with a probability of implicating various side-effects, such 
as incontinence and difficulties with erection (BMJ Group). ‘Utilities’ were here 
determined as measurable changes in quality of life months67 as a result of 
these treatments.68 Based on this quantitative comparative model, the research 
concluded that there is a great degree of variance in expected quality of life 
utilities  following the different treatments and, thus, “patient preferences 
should be the dominant factor in the decision whether to recommend 
prostatectomy” (Barry et al. 1988, 3010). These findings were the launching 
pad for shared decision-making procedures and started to establish the 
relevant conceptual basis for SDM, including the distinction between 
‘preference-sensitive’ and ‘effective’ care (Dartmouth Atlas Project Brief 2007).  
Preference-sensitive care is a healthcare situation with several treatment 
options which are considered to have equivalent outcomes. Effective care 
situations, in contrast, have a single best-evidenced medical practice 
(Wennberg 2002). Equivalence of healthcare outcomes is defined and 
measured in terms of indices, such as life-expectancy and quality of life 
months as discussed above. SDM, thus, is the procedure aimed at supporting 
patients in making such preference-sensitive medical decisions based on their 
values and preferences.69  
 The principles it follows and goals it aims to achieve thereby are 
threefold: firstly, ensuring clinical practice is fully informed by best available 
knowledge based on EBM; secondly, in preference-sensitive care situations, 
involving and eliciting patient preferences and values; lastly, reducing variation 
in clinical practice resulting from what was seen as “irrational and uncertain 
application of medical knowledge and experience” which, in some cases, was 
argued to have led to detrimental effects for patients (Chassin et al. 1988). 
Thus, SDM is also fundamentally different from the principle of informed 
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67 Health-related Quality of Life (QoL) is determined by way of surveys among healthy and ill 
people, identifying five categorical aspects which have the most significant impact on QoL 
including mobility, self-care, usual activities (work, study, housework and family or leisure 
activities), pain/discomfort and anxiety/depression. For example, having “some problems 
walking about; some problems washing or dressing self; some problems with performing usual 
activities; moderate pain or discomfort, or being moderately anxious or depressed” is calculated 
to reduce the quality of life by about 50% (see http://www.euroqol.org/about-eq-5d/valuation-of-
eq-5d/eq-5d-3l-value-sets.html ac. 01.03.2014).!
68 The data for such utilities were sourced from the medical literature, patient interview studies 
and Medicare claims data (Barry et al. 1988).!
69 See also Informed Medical Decisions Foundation, http://informedmedicaldecisions.org/what-
is-shared decision-making/. ac. 12.5.2014!
81 !
consent. The key difference between the two is that, in the case of the latter, 
the physician evaluates available treatment options for a patient, selects one 
and is by law bound to get a patient’s consent to it. In contrast, with SDM the 
patient makes an informed choice based on the options explained by the 
physician, including an understanding of probable risks and benefits (Center 
for Public Policy and the Social Sciences 2011).  
 Among the tools that are used to support SDM procedures are decision 
aids. Decision aids are used to frame the decision to be taken by explaining 
the available treatment or therapy options in balanced and unbiased ways. 
Furthermore, the decision aid highlights existing and absent knowledge about 
probable risks and benefits implicated in the various treatment options. Lastly, 
some decision aids may include a discussion of what the likely experience and 
possible side-effects of the treatment options available may be.70 Decision aids 
have been developed for a number of medical situations, ranging from whether 
to take a prostate specific antigen (PSA)-test71 when concerned about prostate 
cancer, to the contextualization of end-of-life care, such as whether one should 
stop treatment that prolongs life.72 Such decision aids, then, highlight and 
provide information about the condition itself, different treatment options 
available, probable implications on life-expectancy, effects on quality of life as 
well as strengths and shortcomings of available evidence. Decision aids come 
as paper-pamphlets, videos or online tutorials. An example of a decision aid 
concerning the question of whether or not to take a PSA test is attached in 
Annex 1 and will be analysed in the section ‘Analysis of a decision aid.’  
 
 
Status quo of decision aids 
 
There have been various assessments concerning clinical decision support 
both for physicians and patients. The following section will consider the 
evidence of how patient decision aids perform and the issues identified which 
impede the efficacy of this approach and set of techniques. Furthermore, I will 
review and discuss the assessment criteria used in the evaluation of the 
performance and effectiveness of contemporary decision aids. This will help to 
further characterise and define decision aids through the expectations on 
which the assessment criteria are based. 
Two systematic reviews for the evaluation of the performance of decision 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 See also Informed Medical Decisions Foundation, http://informedmedicaldecisions.org/shared 
decision-making-in-practice/decision aids/ accessed 12.5.2014.!
71 See http://sdm.rightcare.nhs.uk/pda/psa-testing/introduction/. ac. 03.08.2014.!
72 See http://decisionaid.ohri.ca/AZlist.html. ac. 03.08.2014.!
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aids were performed by the Cochrane Collaboration in 2003 and 2009 
respectively. While the findings reflected here are based on the 2009 review, 
they are largely congruent with the earlier one. Significant and relevant 
deviations will be highlighted and discussed. One such significant difference 
between the two reviews is that the 2009 review was also able to consider the 
use of probabilities in decision aids. In the 2009 review, a total of 55 
randomised controlled trials were considered which evaluated the “efficacy of 
decision aids for people facing difficult treatment or screening decisions” 
(Cochrane Collaboration 2009, 1). The review found that, when compared to 
common care interventions, decision aids performed favourably by improving 
people’s knowledge about options available, reducing decisional conflict with 
regard to feeling uninformed and unclear about personal values, and lowering 
the percentage of people undecided about which option to choose. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of probabilistic information about risk also led to 
more accurate risk perceptions, particularly when presented in quantitative 
form (ibid., 43).73 The review also found that decision aids continue to dampen 
“enthusiasm for major elective surgery […] in favour of more conservative 
options”, as well as accounting for a decreased preference for PSA testing 
(ibid., 43).  
The review results, however, also point out that decision aids do not 
perform better than conventional care practices (that is consultations without 
the support of decision aids) when it comes to satisfaction with decision-
making, anxiety and health outcomes such as quality of life (ibid.). The 
assessment of the decision aid’s performance was based on primary 
outcomes criteria as developed by the International Patient Decision Aid 
Standards (IPDAS) Collaboration74 as well as secondary outcomes concerning 
aspects of behaviour (decisions), health outcomes (quality of life, anxiety) and 
the healthcare system more generally (e.g. patients and physicians’ 
satisfaction, costs, litigation rates) (Cochrane Collaboration 2009, 4).  
 Among the primary outcomes criteria figures evidence “that the decision 
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73 The underlying RCT’s have evaluated the performance of decision aids by using a 
questionnaire to assess patient knowledge. The questionnaire consisted of 36 statements to be 
answered by ‘true’/ ‘false’/ ‘unsure’ responses. Furthermore, to assess risk perception based on 
quantitative probabilities, 4 items with 4 multiple-choice options were included (Whelan et al. 
2004, 437). Importantly, the term ‘risk’ here is understood in the narrow sense of the distribution 
of known potential outcomes following a treatment, such as incontinence. This is different from 
uncertainty, which relates to unknown implications as well as their likelihood of occurrence 
(http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1553508/ ac. 23.07.2014).!
74 A collaboration of more than 100 researchers, practitioners, patients and policy-makers from 
14 countries (Cochrane Collaboration 2009, 3).!
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aid improves the match between the chosen [treatment/ screening] option and 
the features that matter most to the informed patient” (ibid.). Unfortunately, 
there were no trials evaluating the criteria of whether decision aids help 
patients understand that values affect the decision, or discuss values with the 
practitioner” (ibid., 2). This latter aspect, which will be discussed in the section 
‘patient preferences and autonomy’ in detail, seems important in the context of 
preference-sensitive care, such as cancer screening.  
 The findings of the review that decision aids are capable of reducing 
decisional conflict and developing more accurate risk perceptions when 
presented in quantitative form seem favourable outcomes. However, and 
surprisingly, despite these findings, decision aids seem unable to improve 
satisfaction with the decision-making process or relieve anxiety. In order to 
better assess what to make of these findings, it is necessary to more deeply 
inspect the ways in which the presentation of risk information is addressed in 
decision aids, and how this might be connected to satisfaction with the 
decision-making process and anxiety.  
 One of the studies included in the Cochrane Collaboration systematic 
review is that of Whelan et al. (2000) in which they tested a decision aid that 
focused on the interaction and communication between physician and patient 
concerning breast cancer treatment options. From reviewing their decision aid 
that can be viewed online75 it is noticeable that quantitative probabilities are 
presented in the form of natural frequencies such as ‘1 out of 10’ or, at another 
place in the DA, as ‘5 to 10 out of 100’ with regard to the possibility that not all 
of the cancer might be removed and subsequent surgery may be necessary. 
This points to the question of the form in which probabilities are presented in 
DA’s, whether as percentage probabilities (e.g.10%), natural frequencies (e.g. 
‘10 out of 100’), verbally or visually represented, and the effects this might 
have on risk perception.  
 Research on this question stems from psychology. Looking at two 
recent prostate cancer decision aids (BMJ Group; Health Dialog) both make 
use of verbal descriptions as well as natural frequencies, but no use of visual 
representations. Textual descriptions are complemented with natural 
frequency statements for precision. This seems to follow previous research 
findings which indicate that textual descriptions of probabilities alone may 
cause different interpretations (Wallsten et al. 1986). By using natural 
frequencies instead, a number of potential problems and biases may be 
prevented. Among them are framing effects and ratio bias or denominator 
neglect. Framing effects refer to the practice of highlighting the positive or 
negative effects (whether probable or actual) only instead of giving a balanced 
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75 See http://jco.ascopubs.org/content/17/6/1727/F1.large.jpg. ac. 10.07.2014.!
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view of benefits and risks, such as for example stating a 97% survival rate. 
Ratio bias and denominator neglect refer to the perceived difference in risk 
between stating risk as ‘1 out of 10,’ ‘10 out of 100,’ and ‘100 out of 1,000.’ 
Typically the larger the numerator, the larger the perceived risk (Rothman and 
Kiviniemi 1999). There is little research on assessing the effects of visualising 
uncertainty. From reviewing a variety of material (Lipkus 2007; Lipkus and 
Hollands 1999; Spiegelhalter et al. 2011) it rapidly becomes obvious that, with 
regard to the visualisation of risk probabilities, these are often presented in a 
clustered style (see below).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Visualising uncertainty about the future (Spiegelhalter et al. 2011) 
 
 
One study from the discussed review that is of specific interest for this 
research is that by Ancker et al. (2006), in which the typically clustered style of 
visualising risk probabilities has been compared to a scattered style. What the 
study found was that, while a scattered visualisation style renders apparent the 
inherent unpredictability of such risk factors as they relate to individuals, 
particularly people with a low degree of numeracy found it difficult to assess 
and compare magnitudes of risk. Typically, risk visualisations privilege the 
display of magnitudes of risk at the cost of the unpredictability of risk factors.  
 From the perspective of an individual person, privileging magnitude of 
risk as opposed to unpredictability seems partly a questionable design 
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decision because communicating and understanding unpredictability is at 
least as important to prepare for a variety of possible health outcomes, 
irrespective of the magnitudes of risk factors which at the individual level have 
“limited applicability” (Politi et al. 2007). In turn, the question of how to design 
for an understanding of unpredictability and uncertainty is an interesting one 
and will be discussed further in the sections below as well as in the following 
chapter. 
 From their review of evidence on styles and effects of uncertainty 
visualisations, Spiegelhalter et al. (2001, 1399) advise that healthcare advisors 
“use multiple formats because no single representation suits all members of an 
audience” and “perhaps the greatest challenge is to make a visualisation that 
is attractive and informative, and yet conveys its own contingency and 
limitations.” As research by Gigerenzer et al. (2007) demonstrates, the 
capacity to understand statistically-derived risk information, and in particular 
the degree of uncertainty pertaining to it, is rather low amongst both physicians 
and patients. The inability to understand and clearly communicate health 
statistics renders informed shared decision-making an impossibility. Among 
other aspects, their research indicates that both physicians and patients have 
problems understanding conditional probabilities, because such statements 
are linked to different reference classes. Instead, their research findings 
suggest the use of natural frequencies, which refer to base rates,76 and, thus, 
aim at preventing people from committing errors due to the base-rate fallacy.77  
To give an example in the context of breast cancer screening, a conditional 
probability may be formulated as follows: “The probability that a woman has 
breast cancer is 1% (prevalence). If a woman does not have breast cancer, 
the probability that she nevertheless tests positive is 9% (false-positive rate).” 
Using natural frequencies instead, the above would be formulated as follows: 
“Ten out of every 1,000 women have breast cancer. Of the 990 women without 
cancer, about 89 nevertheless test positive.” While natural frequencies seem a 
means to communicate risk information that is less prone to misunderstanding, 
it may be argued that simultaneously such an approach neglects addressing 
the more fundamental uncertainties underlying such risk information.  
 Epidemiological risk information for preventive medicine maps a 
distribution of possible outcomes according to their probabilities. However, as 
discussed in chapter two, such mapping is predicated on a set of assumptions 
which render the positive predictive value of risk information at the individual 
level largely uncertain. These assumptions include, among others, whether the 
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76 A base rate in statistics is the categorical population to which an enumerator refers to.!
77 This is the error in thinking when ignoring the base rate to which an incidence rate refers. For 
example, the effectivity of a treatment of 100 in 1,000 versus 100 in 100,000 is vastly different.!
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individual decision-maker is well represented within the sample population 
based on which the risk factor was derived, whether all of the deterministic 
factors that contributed to pathology in the reference population will remain 
stable and, thus, apply to future populations, uncertainty about the lead time to 
pathology and its course, as well as the notoriously low discriminatory ability of 
epidemiological risk factor at the individual level. Uncertainty, thus, arises as a 
consequence of the difficulty to assess whether a person is not just statistically 
but actually at risk, as well as the distribution of probable outcomes. Apart from 
this technical view of uncertainty, there are other notions of uncertainty which 
either concern the physician-patient interactions (Politi et al. 2007, 690)78 or 
relate to patient values and preferences, that is to say the second half of the 
definition of shared decision-making above, to which I turn now.  
 
 
Patient preferences and autonomy 
 
Patient autonomy is an important element of shared decision-making. This is 
because, in contrast to informed consent, in shared decision-making 
concerning preference-sensitive care situations the patient herself is expected 
to demonstrate the necessary level of comprehension so as to be able to 
choose and decide on the best course of action. From an ethical perspective, 
it is suggested that such autonomy is defined as “the ability to make and act 
upon free, informed decisions resulting from capable and uninfluenced 
deliberation” and “the relevant unit of autonomy are punctate decisions“ which 
refer to distinct choices unrelated to a patient’s larger health care situation and 
context (Kukla 2005, 35).  
 As research on the effects of communicating uncertainties indicates, the 
effects thereof can be beneficial as well as detrimental. The benefits concern 
the capacity to make such informed decisions. On the detrimental side, 
providing exceedingly complex information in combination with the suggested 
simplifying strategies broadly applied in handling risk information (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1974) can, in some situations, lead to avoiding decision-making 
altogether (Politi et al. 2007, 688). As Kukla (2007) and Epstein and Peters 
(2009) point out, in some medical situations where the problem, options and 
consequences are clear, eliciting patient values and preferences is relatively 
uncomplicated. However, in circumstances which exhibit “high-stakes, and 
uncertain situations with potential outcomes that have not been considered or 
cannot be imagined” (ibid., 195), eliciting preferences and values is much 
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more difficult. In such situations, they argue, preferences are constructed 
rather than simply elicited.  
While there is little research on the effects of communicating uncertainty 
instead of just risk (Politi et al. 2007), research does indicate that “patient 
satisfaction is affected by the manner in which the physician handles 
uncertainty, not whether or not he or she presents uncertainty” (ibid., 690). In 
turn, patient satisfaction and trust can be high when a physician is confident 
with uncertainty and it is shared in a collaborative way between physician and 
patient. Some suggest that medical practitioners focus on helping patients 
cope with uncertainty rather than just understanding it (ibid.). This points to 
questions regarding the conceptual and operative understanding of patient 
autonomy; it is worthwhile further inspecting this before considering the ways 
in which the construction of patient preferences can be meaningfully 
supported.  
As Kukla (2005 and 2007) points out, understanding patient autonomy is 
best achieved when considering not just the punctate decisions, but also the 
larger health context of a person. With reference to prenatal healthcare, she 
illustrates well that ethical concerns have focused mostly on “moments of crisis 
or discrete choice […] such as decisions to have or not have prenatal tests, 
abortions, or treatment interventions” (Kukla 2005, 36). However, as she 
argues, typical prenatal healthcare is seldom made up of such tests and 
decisions, and is, instead, best characterised as “routine, ongoing activities, 
some carried out by the woman herself under medical supervision, and some 
carried out in the clinic” (ibid.).  
 This includes all sorts of self-monitoring, following certain health, food 
and exercise regimes, as well as organising to undertake regular medical 
surveillance tests, and in case of symptomatic events even check themselves 
into emergency care (ibid.). In short, “pregnant women are expected to be 
active, self-disciplining participants in their own prenatal healthcare” while, 
importantly, such prenatal healthcare practices are governed by socially-
derived standards in terms of “what we take them to be responsible for doing” 
(ibid.). Thus, Kukla maintains, in essence the sociocultural and medical norms 
governing prenatal healthcare are largely pre-existing, hence found rather than 
being self-determined by pregnant women. Importantly, and socially, pregnant 
women are not just expected to be merely compliant with such norms, but, 
instead, “take them on as their own” (ibid.). As Kukla rightly argues, some 
people would likely deem a pregnant woman abstaining from alcohol not due 
to her own sense of responsibility but only because her doctor said so 
somewhat suspicious. In summary, the example of prenatal healthcare and the 
social and medical norms by which it is guided is exemplary of larger ongoing 
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healthcare activities, which for Kukla “take the form not of crisis management 
and punctate decision-making, but of ongoing practices, including large 
amounts of self-management and surveillance […]” (ibid.).  
 It seems relatively simple to see similar forces at work in cancer 
screening, including public campaigning by pro-screening organisations, such 
as Movember,79 media presence of Hollywood celebrities suggesting to reduce 
one’s personal cancer risk by preventive treatment, and the way such 
approaches build on and further propel the notion of the individualisation of 
risk and responsibility. Underlying the dominant, contemporary 
epidemiological research is a focus on individuals and understanding their 
potential pathological future by way of genomic mechanisms. On what 
grounds it is rational and acceptable for an individual to decide “to lower his 
‘individual risk’ of colon cancer from a high risk of 32 in 10,000 in 5 years to a 
low risk of 8 in 10,000 in 5 years” is open to discussion (Rockhill 2005, 126).  
 Not only is it unclear how patients respond to personalised risk 
estimates (Politi et al. 2007, 692) but also there is no understanding of the 
possible “consequences of imposing massive ‘risk awareness’ among healthy 
individuals through the general population” (Rockhill 2005, 126), although 
narrative problematisations (Sontag 1977) as well as indicative evidence 
(Milton 1973) exist. A side effect of such a focus on individualisation is that 
social and economic aspects that affect public health are generally 
“denigrated as ‘political’ or ‘social,’ rather than scientific concerns,” hence 
deemed irrelevant for the epidemiological agenda (Rockhill 2005, 127). This 
resonates strongly with earlier such concerns as discussed in chapter two 
(Rosen 1974, 67). Also, as Politi et al. (2007, 692) propose,  
 
exactly how to use risk estimates and risk prediction tools to improve 
and inform individual treatment decisions, while acknowledging and 
communicating their limited power to predict individual futures, is a 
critical challenge that will become even more important as new 
disease biomarkers are discovered.  
                                         
                                         
 Following such considerations, the construction of preferences is 
deemed to be of particular importance within the specific context of prostate 
cancer screening. As discussed earlier, the construction of preferences can 
be influenced by various biases, such as the ways in which information is 
presented or framed. Within the medical context, the physician-patient 
encounter may be said to offer the potential to support such preference-
construction processes. Unfortunately, little research exists beyond carefully 
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controlled experiments to better understand the dynamic interactions and 
relationship between physician and patient in this regard (Epstein and Peters 
2009, 196). As Epstein and Peters further point out, current clinical guidelines 
and shared decision-making do not fully address questions on what role 
physicians should take in the construction process and how to best support 
the patient within this process to best cope with uncertainty. Nevertheless, 
Epstein and Peters suggest that respecting and responding to patient 
preferences involves shared deliberation that moves beyond mere information 
provision to helping patients explore, question and construct preferences. 
They suggest that, while the physician-patient relationship provides a 
framework for exploring preferences, other medical professionals and family 
members involved can be helpful as well as decision aids, which are “sensitive 
to default options, framing, and ordering effects [and] encourage deeper 
discussions with family members and clinicians” (ibid.).  
 Such an approach to deriving patient preferences may, in turn, best 
view the patient as an ‘active inquirer.’ As encountered in chapter one, the 
Internet provides a very rich source of medical information, which may also 
affect the physician-patient relationship. In contrast to ethical discourse, 
where, according to Kukla (2007, 28), patients are often framed as passive 
recipients of medical knowledge by medical professionals, patients may 
engage in active inquiry before they visit a medical professional (Zickuhr 
2010).  
 Due to differences in health and statistical literacy such inquiry may be 
subject to less than perfect judgment regarding the quality of information 
found. Given the technical complexity and typical unfamiliarity of laypeople 
with the medical knowledge domain, one of the key tasks for a patient inquirer 
is discerning which sources of information to trust in order to develop an 
understanding of the issues concerned. Reliance on select experts as well as 
other concerned participants in the field can, thus, be considered as 
operatively reasonable within this specific context. Consequently, autonomy 
may be less understood as derived from ‘pure’ individual learning and knowing 
in every detail, but more as a kind of collaborative knowledge practice, 
especially concerning the construction of preferences and values in the 
context of a novel health situation. Within the context of lay medical inquiries, 
Kukla suggests to reposition autonomous inquiry as “skilled and competent 
coping in the course of our investigational practices - our attempts to discern, 
know, predict, and make appropriate guesses and decisions” (Kukla 2007, 
30). For her, such coping and the capacity for autonomous inquiry practically 
materialises and depends in part upon “our social, institutional, and material 
position” (ibid.).  
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 Such collaborative practices, however, can be subject to a variety of 
influences and constraints. For example, there is a history of discriminatory 
practices concerning patients that question or challenge medical authority 
(ibid., 31, 33). Furthermore, the contemporary healthcare system is highly 
specialised, making it difficult in some cases for a patient to get a consolidated 
view of his health situation (ibid.). Also, not all medical interventions require 
informed consent (Kukla 2005, 36) and may, thus, simply be characterised as 
‘routine procedure’ and be less likely to invite critical inquiry. This is despite the 
fact that medical history has witnessed many a routine intervention which over 
time turned out to be of little effectiveness at best (ibid., 31).  
 According to a classic model of the physician-patient relationship (ibid., 
32), physicians are responsible for providing the medical technical expertise or 
‘facts,’ whereas the patient’s role is to be an expert on their own values. 
Medical decisions are, then, based on applying the patient’s values to the 
physician’s ‘facts.’ This seems an overly simplistic model. The idea that 
medical facts are always fully objective is naive at best, as I have discussed by 
way of my analysis of the values and biopolitics inherent in the development of 
medical epistemology in the previous chapter. Furthermore, patients may 
indeed not yet be experts regarding their values when faced with a novel 
medical situation and the lack of experience and imagination of the ways in 
which various treatment courses may affect their life. In contrast, clinically-
experienced physicians have the opportunity to develop vast experience with 
the kinds of social and moral concerns that may surface within their medical 
field of expertise and, thus, may offer some advice and direction on possible 
dilemmas.  
 Unfortunately, as it appears, many medical professionals assess their 
patient’s capacity to usefully manage information found online as rather low; 
more importantly, they see such active and independent inquiry as impeding 
the efficiency of the clinical encounter (Kukla 2007, 33). Whether ‘efficiency’ is 
the relevant metric to be measured and evaluated in shared decision-making 
seems highly questionable. The proliferation of decision aids (Cochrane 
Collaboration 2009), thus, from a broader perspective may also be seen as 
emerging out of a need and desire for measurement (Epstein 1990) and the 
transfer of responsibility onto individuals (Rockhill 2005; Rose 2006). While 
these perspectives are significant, this research is focused on questions of 
design and extended cognitive processes in this regard.  
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Analysis of a decision aid 
 
In analysing the design of the NHS decision aid on ‘Deciding whether to have 
prostate specific antigen (PSA) test’ (BMJ Group),80 a number of issues and 
questions can be identified which are relevant for the practice-based research 
discussed in chapter four, five ans six. To start with, the DA is a five page-long 
document, roughly structured into an introductory page, three pages of 
decision support regarding the PSA test, and one final page providing broader 
questions potentially useful to consider when deciding about the test as well as 
how to get access for further support.  
 On page one, the intended audience is stipulated as well as the 
suggestion that whether one should have a test or not depends on a variety of 
factors, such as “what you think you would do if you had a result that showed a 
raised chance of prostate cancer” (ibid.). As I will argue in my analysis here, 
unfortunately, it is precisely this aspect which seems unsupported in the 
decision aid. The structure of the actual decision support section (pages 2 to 
4) is relatively simple. There are three columns: the first one lists the questions 
people may have, such as “What is the choice?” or “What is the effect on how 
long you live?”; the second one answers these questions from the perspective 
of having a PSA test; the third one does so from the perspective of not having 
the PSA test.  
 While the document appears well structured, the information provided 
seems a lot to understand and absorb. More technically, it seems very 
disturbing and confusing to me that the decision aid on page one clearly 
stipulates that PSA test cannot be used to diagnose prostate cancer with 
certainty, and then in the decision support section goes on to explain that “The 
PSA test can suggest you have cancer when you don’t (overdiagnose 
cancer).” Obviously, this is contradicting, wrong and potentially misleading. 
From looking at the information provided in columns two and three for a 
specific question, it stands out that oftentimes these texts are almost identical, 
with the only difference that in column three they are formulated in inverse 
terms. For example, with regard to the question “What is the effect on chances 
of being diagnosed earlier,” the answer in column two is “Prostate cancer is 
diagnosed 6-8 years earlier in men who have a PSA test,” whereas in column 
three the answer is “Prostate cancer is diagnosed 6-8 years later in men who 
don’t have a PSA test.”  
 The meaningfulness of these statements is partly conveyed in the 
following section concerning the question of “What is the effect of being 
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diagnosed and treated early?” The response in column two and three is that it 
is unclear whether early diagnosis and treatment has an effect on length of life. 
Importantly, what is left out is supporting deliberation on the question stated as 
relevant on the first page, i.e. “What you think you would do if you had a result 
that showed a raised chance of prostate cancer.” For example, there is no 
mention of what it means to be diagnosed with prostate cancer and how that 
affects people in their lives, or, in Mol and Law’s (2004) terms, doing a disease 
rather than having a disease. With this I refer to supporting an imagination and 
sense of what it means to be diagnosed with prostate cancer and, thus, being 
able to deliberate the implications on a person’s own life. With reference to 
Kukla’s (2005) more nuanced notion of patient autonomy, I argue that the NHS 
PSA decision aid fails to achieve this as it does not include any support for 
preference construction or deliberation despite mentioning it.  
 On the final page of the DA, for example, they repeat that choosing the 
best option “means considering how consequences of each option will affect 
your life,” yet these consequences are hardly spelled out in the decision 
support section. For example, with reference to the previously mentioned 
aspect of being diagnosed 6-8 years earlier when having a PSA test, the DA 
does not mention the consequence that some people may suffer from 
iatrogenic effects, such as anxiety, following prostate cancer diagnosis, that is 
to say the lived experience of such a diagnosis.  
 In summary, it may be said that the NHS PSA decision aid is more about 
how a PSA test affects physical bodies and less about how the consequences 
of having or not having a test affect people’s lives. Following my argument 
about the importance of the preference construction process in this chapter, I 
will speculate in chapter four, five and six that there is substantial potential for 
redesigning this aspect of decision support. Furthermore, the DA is written in a 
rather dull style, not dissimilar to an insurance policy. Whether such a use of 
language is supporting people to meaningfully transfer the information 
provided to their personal and social life will be considered in relation to 
extended cognitive processes in chapter four.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have discussed the development of shared decision-making 
as a result of identifying small-area variations in medical practice that were not 
explainable by patient choice as well as forces contesting the paternalistic 
power of doctors over patients. Furthermore, I have analysed the design and 
evaluation of decision aids as one of the tools based on which shared decision 
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making is promoted. Based on the analysis, I have identified and discussed 
the ways in which the presentation of epidemiological risk information has 
implications for individual sense- and decision-making. As I argue, the 
question of how to design for uncertainty is an important and unresolved one. 
Specifically, I have highlighted that, while improving readability, the suggested 
and dominant style of using natural frequencies obscures deeper uncertainties 
inherent in prostate cancer screening decision-making. Within the context of 
decision-support for cancer screening, this raises the question of how they can 
be explored more productively together instead of mutually exclusive.  
 Furthermore, I have discussed and problematised patient autonomy 
with reference to preference-sensitive care situations, such as cancer 
screening, and suggested the need to reconsider the medical and social 
environment as relevant elements in the process of constructing preferences 
and values. Unfortunately, little research apart from controlled experiments 
exists concerning such preference-construction processes, in particular 
concerning the role experienced physicians may play in this. The following 
chapter will consolidate the critical review of the literature in chapters one to 
three and prospectively reflect on the issues identified from the perspective of 
and potential for redesigning decision support.  
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Chapter 4 
Prospective reflection on issues in prostate cancer screening 
decision support 
 
 
           “There is nothing to fear (it may seem) but the probabilities themselves.”         
                                                                                               (Hacking 1990, 5)  
 
Introduction 
 
This research project is interested in a politics and practice of interactivity in 
preventive healthcare decision-making by non-expert individuals. While shared 
decision-making (SDM) with its origin and motivation to identify, address and 
support preference-sensitive care situations sounded promising, as I have 
demonstrated in the previous chapters there are many issues and 
uncertainties involved in SDM for prostate cancer screening. Taking this as a 
starting point, this practice-based research is inspired by Mol and Law’s 
(2004) suggestion to privilege action over knowledge. Following this, and more 
specifically, this research is interested in what such an approach would look 
like for SDM within the context of prostate cancer screening, and which 
theoretical and practical moves we would have to do in following such lines of 
inquiry. 
 My fundamental hypothesis is that shared medical decision-making 
within the context of prostate cancer screening could be productively 
supported by an exploratory model of interaction. I will argue that such a 
model of interaction is better suited to circumstances of sense- and decision-
making under uncertainty, and, thus, to the aspirations of a patient-centred 
care seeking to deeply respect patients as unique living beings and care for 
them on their own terms (Epstein and Street 2011). The underlying cognitive 
processes for such an exploratory interaction model will be conceptualised as 
distributed and performed through the environment instead of being based on 
a information-processing model of mind and cognition. Beyond a critical 
analysis of the underlying interaction and cognition assumptions of current 
decision aids within SDM, the core contribution of this practice-based research 
is an examination of how we could start and go about designing for such 
exploratory interaction with extended cognition in mind within the specified 
context of prostate cancer screening. 
 The chapter is structured as follows: the first part will reflect on the 
issues in medical epistemology and decision-support as identified in the 
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previous chapters from the perspective of ontological politics. I will argue that 
the contemporary design approach to decision support is largely based on an 
information-retrieval model of interaction which tends to obscure the 
ontologically political issues underlying the decisional problem in preventive 
cancer screening. I will discuss the ways such a design approach is 
particularly problematic within the context of preference-sensitive care and the 
recently identified overdiagnosis and overtreatment of various cancers, 
ultimately failing to support the goals of SDM. In the second part of the chapter 
I will introduce the extended mind thesis and distributed cognition based on 
which this practice-based research will investigate the productive potential of 
an exploratory model of interaction to support shared decision-making. 
 
 
Ontological politics in medical epistemology and decision-support 
 
As I have discussed in the previous chapters, there are a number of issues 
contributing to the uncertainty involved in decision-making about prostate 
cancer screening. Among them is the epidemiological nature of data and risk 
factors, their applicability and usefulness for individual decision-making as well 
as the novelty of the decision situation and subsequent absence of established 
values and experience with it. Furthermore, the validity issues with EBM itself 
due to RCT’s being performed with overly healthy participants not 
representative of the complete population, or the regional variances in care, 
are in and by themselves problematic within the context of SDM.  
 The epistemological assumptions underlying evidence-based medicine 
(chapter two) as well as the design of decision aids for supporting shared 
decision-making (chapter three) can be productively viewed through the lens 
of ontological politics. Such a perspective allows us to problematise and 
summarise key aspects which are more or less directly materialised in the 
design of contemporary decision aids and which this practice-based research 
aims to explore and start redesigning. Before venturing into reflecting on the 
identified issues from this perspective, I will start by introducing and 
discussing ontological politics as a term and its role for the methodological 
framing of this research.  
 
 
Ontological politics 
 
The contemporary use of the term ‘ontology’ is twofold. On the one hand, it is 
used in philosophical discourse; on the other hand, it is used in developing 
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and describing information structures in the area of software development. In 
philosophy, ontology refers to the “conditions of possibility we live with” and 
“what belongs to the real” (Mol 1999, 75) by which is meant an inquiry into the 
nature of knowledge of what exists and how these entities can be organised 
and categorised into hierarchies and subdivisions according to definitions of 
similarities and differences. 
 In software development and the computer and information sciences 
more broadly, the use and meaning of the term ‘ontology’ is as a descriptor of 
knowledge, or as Shirky puts it “an explicit specification of a conceptualization” 
(2005). In other words, it is used to conceptually describe sets of data, or data 
about data, also known as metadata. While analytical philosophy is stringent in 
its clarification of what has ontological quality, ontologies in the computer 
sciences are less rigorous in their epistemic endeavour and, as a 
consequence, have developed vastly, so much so in fact that they have, 
according to some, significantly increased the problem they were meant to 
solve (Smith et al. 2005).  
 The question of ontology in the medical field is particularly interesting. 
Regarding the philosophical use of the term, an example within the medical 
context would be that of a disease, such as cancer, its symptoms and 
pathologies. Diseases in medical science are classified in a nosology. As 
mentioned earlier, there are different nosologies, and diseases can be 
classified - among other aspects - according to their cause (etiology), the 
mechanisms by which they are caused (pathogenesis), or by symptoms a 
patient experiences.  
 However, issues with the meaning of the word ‘cancer’ and its continued 
validity and applicability have recently surfaced. Whereas according to 
popular belief cancer is typically closely linked to or expected to lead to 
certain death, recent research on cancer indicates that it “contains a whole 
range of diseases” (Esserman et al. 2013; Welch and Black 2010). Essentially, 
the problem is that screening detects many indolent lesions that may never 
require clinical attention and, thus, come to be known by the person who has 
them. Nevertheless, such lesions continue to be called cancer and the general 
sociocultural interpretation of such non- or not-yet malignant diseases has 
been strong for some time (Sontag 1977). On the basis of research on the 
dramatic levels of overdiagnosis in cancer (Welch and Black 2010), Esserman 
and Thompson (2010) go on to argue that a new definition of cancer is needed 
which makes a diagnostic, prognostic and explicit linguistic difference 
between malignant and indolent cancer.81  
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 Mol (1999) refers to John Law inventing the term ‘ontological politics’ in 
his 1997 book Aircraft Stories: Decentering the Object in Technoscience.82 
However, for our purposes regarding the medical context, Mol’s own work is a 
more relevant source (1998, 144; 1999). Combining the terms ‘ontology’ and 
‘politics’ has the intended effect of highlighting that the conditions by which we 
recognise and navigate reality are not pre-given and, thus, do not 
independently exist a priori of our interactions with such reality. Instead, as Mol 
(1999) stresses, reality and the conditions upon which it exists are configured 
within and through such practices. For her, “the term politics works to 
underline this active mode, this process of shaping, and the fact that its 
character is open and contested” (ibid., 75).  
 Mol, as well as others (Bowker and Star 1999), substantiates this 
argument well with numerous examples, such as the performance of multiple 
ontologies of Atherosclerosis (Mol 1998) or Diabetes (Mol 2008). In this work 
Mol cogently demonstrates the different ways in which medical professionals 
as well as patients do these illnesses in situ, and that such practices, in turn, 
have implications for the conditions of possibility. For example, with regard to 
diabetes Mol and Law (2004, 4) illustrate with their ethnographic work that 
doing diabetes or, as they suggest, “action is privileged over knowledge,” may 
mean a variety of practices for different people. In the case of diabetes, a 
tightly regulated blood-sugar level scheme typically results in fewer 
complications with eyesight and arterial obstruction in later stages of life. 
However, and simultaneously, such a scheme increases the risk of 
hypoglycaemia, which, in turn, may cause brain damage (ibid.).  
 From an ontological political perspective, this implies that “medical 
interventions hardly ever bring pure improvement, plus a few unfortunate ‘side-
effects;’ instead, they introduce a shifting set of tensions” (ibid., 58). Making 
sense of such a shifting set of tensions may well mean very different things in 
the lives of different individuals. As we shall see in the following section, such 
ontological politics have had implications (Wennberg 1982) and, as I will 
argue, continue to have implications which affect patients in less than 
desirable ways. Returning to the topics of evidence-based medicine and 
shared decision-making, I will now start summarising the analytical arguments 
in light of an ontological political perspective.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
studies which is at risk of being unable for uncontrollable influences, hence of little comparative 
epidemiological value (Lochlann 2013, 157).!
82 In following technological projects, Law (1997) demonstrates the complexities inherent and, 
more importantly, the ways in which these interact with each other. Thus, ontology is shaped by 
the way in which we interact with it in our daily practices, hence best not understood as an a 
priori and given truth.!
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Evidence-based medicine 
 
Based on my analysis of medical epistemology in chapter two, various 
mechanisms in the production, distribution and application of medical 
knowledge can be viewed and prospectively summarised from an ontologically 
political perspective. A first fundamental change with ontologically political 
relevance occurred in the transition from bedside to hospital medicine in the 
western world, broadly speaking. As has been argued by Mol and Law (2004) 
and analysed earlier by Foucault (1973), while in bedside medicine doctors 
would make inferences from the sick person’s experiential descriptions, in 
hospital medicine the sick person was muted and deemed incapable of 
knowing about his or her ailments.  
 This was facilitated by developments in the 19th century when doctors 
were trained in specialised and narrow fields of the body as well as equipped 
with a number of -scopes invented to further support the clinical gaze beyond 
the skin of the sick person. An implication of this is that some people today do 
not dare request further information from or even disagree with medical 
professionals for fear of being medically badly treated afterwards (Kukla 2007, 
33). This is obviously rather problematic for the goals of SDM and in situations 
of preference-sensitive care, given that patient autonomy and, thus, a deep 
understanding of benefits and risks is at the heart of SDM. 
 A further methodological shift followed early in the 20th century with the 
introduction of epidemiological methods. As I have analysed in detail in 
chapter two, the principal aim is to identify and preventively manage potential 
pathology based on physiologically measurable indicators which are 
statistically linked to probable future pathology. Here we have a number of 
ontologically political moves: 
 Firstly, I argue that the assumption of the suitability of using postdictive83 
population data (Politi et al. 2007) as a reliable information source for individual 
decision-making in screening contexts is such an ontologically political move. 
This is because the act of framing epidemiological risk data and probabilities 
of a sample population as relevant for individual decision-making rather than 
public health management only is setting the reference to which an individuals 
risk understanding and decision-making is suggested to be taken. This is 
despite the inability to know any one individual’s health outcome (Esposito 
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patterns of incidence with regard to a reference population. Assuming a dynamic model of 
health and pathology (Canguilhem 1994; Hacking 2006), it is unclear whether and to what 
degree such data can predict outcomes in the future (Politi et al. 2007).!
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2007; Politi et al. 2007, 683). As Gigerenzer indicates (2002a, 4), the use of 
such quantitative and probabilistic information can lead to a whole host of 
possible misinterpretations. Recent research claims that the best way such 
quantitative risk information is presented without causing misunderstandings is 
as natural frequencies.84 Nevertheless, the core problem concerning the 
representational character of such information for individual decision-making 
remains or, as I would argue, is even strengthened; this happens by 
generating the illusion of being able to control the future while being unable to 
prevent alternative courses of one’s health and the subsequent need to 
account for one’s previous action and decisions (Esposito 2007).   
 Secondly, and as a precursor to the use of epidemiological risk factors, 
as has recently been identified such samples taken for RCT’s are not always 
very representative of general populations (Goldacre 2012, 110). The 
implication of this is that the epidemiological risk-factor information provides a 
somewhat false sense of security, climbing probability trees with preventive 
treatment while the natural course of pathology might remain unaffected 
(Greenhalgh 2014, 4).  
 Lastly, the use of such information is problematic because of the flawed 
ways in which EBM seems generated, including selective reporting and 
publication bias. These issues have rather direct implications for the conditions 
of possibility and shaping of realities. This is so because such evidence lays 
the foundations for what is considered valid knowledge and, thus, becomes 
available for the application and distribution of EBM in shared decision-making 
with decision aids and decision support, to which I turn now. 
 
 
Shared decision-making and decision support   
 
Following my analysis in chapter three, it could be argued that SDM emerged 
with an (implicit) motivation to counteract some of the ontologically political 
issues in medical epistemology and practice. An illustrative example of this is 
the problem of unwarranted small-area variation in healthcare delivery which 
cannot be satisfactorily explained by patient preferences or intrinsic pathology 
factors as documented by the Dartmouth Atlas (Wennberg 1982). This resulted 
in the differentiation between preference-sensitive care and effective care. To 
briefly recapitulate, the former are healthcare situations in which several 
treatment options are considered to have equivalent health outcomes when 
measured in terms of health economics indices, such as life-expectancy and 
quality of life months, with the treatments, however, affecting patients 
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differently due to their side-effects. The latter are healthcare situations where a 
single best treatment has been evidenced (ibid.). SDM was initiated with 
regards to the need of involving patients in preference-sensitive care 
situations. The goal of such an involvement is to have patients fully informed 
about diagnosis and treatment options, including probable risks and benefits 
thereof.  
 However, despite the best of SDM’s medical and moral intentions, I 
argue that there are a number of strong limitations in its contemporary design 
approach. Firstly, on a conceptual level, the design of the interaction with 
decision aids may be argued to rely on an information-retrieval model of 
interaction as analysed and discussed in chapter one. In short, the assumption 
is that a person has a precise and articulable information need, for example 
whether or not to take a PSA test for prostate cancer screening, which can 
then be directly and unambiguously responded to and upon which the person 
is satisfactorily equipped to take the desired decision.  
 Yet, as discussed above, the decision whether or not to pursue prostate 
cancer screening exhibits substantial uncertainties which go well beyond the 
question of whether or not to take a PSA test. To recapitulate, among the 
uncertainties are questions of representativeness in the sample population, 
whether or not pathologically causal forces remain stable, unknown lead time 
to pathology as well as the notoriously low discriminatory predictive value at 
the level of individuals. Furthermore, the implications of a decision to screen 
materialise over a long time-frame, in the case of prostate cancer typically 20-
25 years, and concern personal, social as well as professional areas of a 
person’s life. It is reasonable to expect that, as people engage in screening 
and live through the experiences of such things as having numerous false-
positive PSA tests followed by repeated biopsies with negative results (see 
chapter seven), the chance that their values and perspective concerning the 
merits of screening might change. Thus, the current model of interaction may 
be too myopic in envisioning the full problem space individuals experience 
and, thus, unable to address the complex context and decisional problem at 
hand. For example, the NHS PSA test decision aid does not include aspects of 
the uncertainties involved in how to deal with the potential of a false-positive or 
false-negative PSA test result, apart from mentioning the possibility and 
probability of such an outcome. It does not offer decision support in how to 
grasp the full extent of its potential ramifications and how to tackle this 
potential or actual problem,85 such as in the case of someone having already 
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had a PSA test and negotiating how to handle the test result. 
 Furthermore, the information provided in the decision aid (DA) is based 
on the assumption that a user of a DA fits within the same epidemiological 
groups. It seems that the aim of articulating the relevance of such statistical 
information as “big groups of men” (BMJ Group) is to generate trust rather than 
supporting a critical examination concerning its representational character. 
Again, as I have discussed above, given the mechanisms by which such 
epidemiological risk information is generated, whether a specific person and 
user of a DA is statistically well represented is unknown. The DA does not 
provide any way to assess this statistical match and, thus, “requires a leap of 
faith” (Politi et al. 2007) from anyone using such information.  
 Secondly, the IR-model comparison seems also to confirm the apparent 
decision- and cognitive-process assumptions underlying the design approach 
of decision aids. The design of contemporary decision aids is usually focused 
on aggregating relevant knowledge and making it available in a structured, 
consolidated and supposedly easy to apprehend form and language. In terms 
of the decision process, the use-assumptions seem to be that: a) all the 
relevant bits of information can be aggregated and provided; b) this 
information will meet a (previously) set idea of what qualifies as a significant 
risk; c) the information processing is straightforward and a decision can be 
taken quickly, unproblematically and without future regret. 
 To recall, meta-analysis by the Cochrane Collaboration (2009) on the 
effectiveness of DA’s indicates that there is a lack of satisfaction with the 
decision-making process. This may be because such a decision-support 
design approach, particularly within the context of treatment options that may 
have similar medical outcomes, ignores patient preferences and runs the risk 
of a silent misdiagnosis. Thus, as Mulley et al. have argued (2012), patient 
preferences matter precisely because, while the health outcome of a variety of 
available treatments is largely the same, the side-effects and uncertain 
outcomes of the various treatments have very different effects on a person’s 
life. The silent misdiagnosis in this case is that of a wrong patient preference 
diagnosis, which, as they argue, typically goes unnoticed today (ibid.). As 
research has shown (ibid.), medical professionals tend to think of themselves 
as better at diagnosing patient preferences than they really are. In the case of 
benign prostate disease, research has shown that surgeons overestimate 
patients’ preference to ameliorate urinary symptoms, where in actual fact 
patients prefer to avoid sexual dysfunction, which is a typical implication of 
surgical treatment (ibid.). Further such examples are plentiful (Moynihan et al. 
2012). Preference diagnosis is defined as 
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a doctor’s inference of what a patient would choose if he or she 
were fully informed. It is an inference because no patient – save 
perhaps the patient who is also a doctor and world-renowned 
specialist in the very disease with which he or she is afflicted – is 
fully informed. Preference diagnosis, like medical diagnosis, is often 
a best estimate based on imperfect information.  
                                
                                           (Mulley et al. 2012)  
 
 
 While the above is a partly useful definition, I would complement it by 
explicitly recognising the various uncertainties regarding one’s personal, social 
and professional life that typically co-exist when a person faces a novel 
medical situation. The difficulty of being well informed, being able to make 
sense of the information and deciding in accordance with one’s personal 
preferences and values precisely stems from the novelty of the situation and 
the subsequent absence of a deliberated and established relevant set of 
values along which to orientate oneself (Kukla 2007).  
 By failing to articulate the underlying uncertainties discussed above 
more explicitly, the design of the DA seems to abstain from engaging the 
patient in the preference-construction process, a necessary element for coping 
with such uncertainties and best deliberating and developing values and 
preferences. In turn, such a design practice has immediate ontological 
relevance concerning patient autonomy, precisely because of the underlying 
uncertainties involved and the ways these can play out in the screening 
patients lives’ as we shall see next.   
 Prostate cancer screening qualifies as a preference-sensitive care 
situation because, as it stands, it remains unclear whether early diagnosis and 
treatment “makes a difference to how long you are likely to live” (BMJ Group). 
This is because prostate cancer often grows very slowly and, in many 
instances, may not generate problems during a man’s lifetime; in other words, 
more men die with prostate cancer than because of it (Ablin 2010). On the 
other side, the chances of prostate cancer treatment, such as removing the 
entire prostate gland (radical prostatectomy), resulting in side-effects are 
relatively real, with 29% for incontinence and 79% for impotence 5 years after 
treatment (Health Dialog, 16).  
 A further key argument why it is particularly relevant to do preference 
diagnosis in the context of prostate cancer screening and, thus, to analyse and 
consider questions of ontological politics is found in the recently identified 
levels of overdiagnosis and overtreatment of various cancer types. According 
to Welch and Black (2010, 605), cancer overdiagnosis can be defined as the 
diagnosis of a ‘cancer’ “that would otherwise not go on to cause symptoms or 
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death.” More specifically, overdiagnosis may also occur if a cancer never 
progresses (or may even regress) following detection, or when the cancer 
progresses at a rate slow enough for a patient to die of other causes before the 
detected cancer causes health problems. In the case of prostate cancer, the 
magnitude of PSA-detected prostate cancers is estimated at 60% (ibid.). The 
same phenomenon is present in a number of other cancer areas (see below). 
The level of overdiagnosis is manifest as the gap between rates of new 
diagnoses compared to morbidity.  
 
  
 
Figure 4.1: Overdiagnosis rates of cancers 
 
 Overdiagnosis and, consequently overtreatment can have substantial 
health implications for patients. As just discussed above, in the case of 
prostate cancer side-effects of treatment regularly include incontinence and 
impotence, not to speak of the psychological burden the fear of cancer puts on 
people and their families (Milton 1973). Early cancer detection, thus, may save 
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some lives while it disturbs and hurts many others.86 As a result, taking an 
informed decision on early cancer detection requires an understanding of the 
benefits and harms involved from a patient’s perspective. As Greenhalgh et al. 
(2014, 353) argue, “[W]e need to develop decision aids that support clinicians 
and patients to clarify the goals of care, raise and answer questions about the 
quality and completeness of evidence, and understand and contextualise 
estimates of benefit and harm.”  
 Following my review of the assumptions embedded in the contemporary 
design of decision aids, generating an understanding of the benefits and 
harms involved in prostate cancer screening may be productively supported 
by explicitly including questions concerning the conditions of possibility as 
part of the design of the decision-making process. Specifically for this 
practice-based research, I will focus on the issues around using 
epidemiological risk information in decision aids as well as applying an 
exploratory interaction model to support preference construction. To this 
extent, I hypothesise that an exploratory model of interaction is better suited 
than an information-retrieval based model to the context and challenges of 
shared decision-making for prostate cancer screening. The former allows for a 
more open-ended design approach as well as hopefully supporting a more 
nuanced and complex understanding of patient autonomy and self-
determination which seems adequate in the context of long-term and 
continuous screening decision situations (Kukla 2005). The key questions, 
thus, become: how to design for shared decision-making with such goals in 
mind? What can we learn about engaging with such ontologically political 
issues in healthcare information interaction and decision-making from a design 
process perspective?  
 Beyond a critical analysis of the underlying interaction and cognition 
assumptions of decision aids within SDM, the core contribution of this research 
is an examination of how we could go about designing for such exploratory 
interaction within the specific context of cancer screening sense- and 
decision-making. In exploring how to address the selected aspects of 
ontological politics in designing for SDM most productively, this practice-
based research takes a different route by opening up the question of what can 
productively be considered as mind and, thus, involved in cognitive 
processes. I do so by assuming that, in some circumstances, mind and 
cognitive processes can be thought of as made up of things outside of the skin 
and skull, involving the social and artifactual environment. The approach I am 
following in this regard is that of extended mind and distributed cognition. 
 In part this move is inspired by Mol and Law’s (2004) suggestion to 
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privilege action over knowledge as discussed above with regards to the lived 
practice of doing diabetes. For them, the action/knowledge distinction is a way 
to “shift the grounds on which questions about the reality of bodies may be 
posed” (ibid., 45). They exemplify this by identifying the shifting set of tensions 
this may implicate for some, as discussed above with regard to diabetes and 
the benefits and risks of a tight regulation of blood sugar levels. Without 
negating knowledge, their perspective is more interested in the implications of 
medicine for the lived practice of being a patient and what we might learn from 
this. Such an approach, they hope, might help to integrate the role and 
perspective of patients back into medical practice, and allow them to account 
for the effects of medicine on lived experience rather than just how it affects 
their bodies (ibid., 58). Considering enacted bodies, as suggested by Mol and 
Law, is thought relevant for framing the extended mind cognitive approach and 
the design approach taken in this research. Moving beyond Mol and Law’s 
suggested distinction between action and knowledge, the approach I am 
following is interested in the epistemic insights following from and through 
embodied action over time.  
 
 
Extended Mind Thesis 
 
In contrast to the conceptualisation of human cognition as developed in the 
preceding chapter, this section will introduce the Extended Mind Thesis [EMT] 
as an alternative perspective on human cognitive processes. In light of the 
criticisms of classical ideas of human cognition, I will argue there are 
convincing arguments that EMT allows for a productive engagement with the 
issues identified in exploratory health information interaction discussed above. 
In particular, I will argue that the approach of EMT is advantageous for 
rethinking and redesigning for interactive (cognitive) processes because it 
recognises wider kinds of artifactual and social ecologies that may 
productively support such processes.  
 This section will develop as follows: firstly, I will introduce and explicate 
EMT. This will serve a dual purpose. Firstly, a detailed consideration will 
explain the different theoretical and empirical insights that combine into EMT, 
rendering, on the other hand, its potential relevance more compelling with 
regards to some of the issues identified in the three preceding chapters. 
Secondly, by way of selected examples, I discuss and illustrate some of the 
more specific arguments of EMT. Thereby I identify the crucial elements in 
which it differs from the classic information-processing model of mind and, 
more importantly, demonstrate its particular relevance and potential for 
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exploratory health information interaction. Significantly, this section as well as 
this practice-based research more broadly is less concerned with the 
intricacies of philosophical and cognitive science arguments concerning ideas 
and questions of computationalism and representation in competing theories 
of human cognition and how EMT accords to them. Instead, I am interested in 
researching the ways in which taking an EMT perspective would affect the 
redesign of exploratory health information interaction.  
 Crucially, and in contrast to classic cognitive theories, in EMT cognition 
is not delimited by processes that occur within one’s brain, but extends into 
and operates through the social and artifactual environment. This is because, 
as evidence suggests, such artifactual and social ecologies play a key role in 
cognitive processes as well as a determinant role in human development and 
evolution more fundamentally. The thesis of extended mind for Clark and 
Chalmers (1998), who first formulated EMT, is that “when parts of the 
environment are coupled to the brain in the right way, they become parts of the 
mind” (Clark 2008, x). The role of the artifactual environment in cognition for 
EMT in its simplest form may be usefully illustrated by considering a number of 
examples.  
 Firstly, the specific case of patients suffering from Alzheimer’s disease: 
a typical symptom of the disease is a progressive mental deterioration leading 
to dementia and memory loss, at first concerning short-term events only and 
over time also long-term ones. A case in point was a group of Alzheimer’s 
disease patients living in inner city St. Louis, USA (Clark 2003, 139). What was 
surprising is that these patients were able to successfully live independently 
despite the fact that they performed rather poorly on standard psychological 
tests evaluating their cognitive capabilities as well as compared to other 
patients at such a stage of disease progression. What seemed to have made 
this independent living possible was the fact that their homes were equipped 
with numerous (cognitive) scaffolds that supported memory for various, 
everyday life practical as well as social situations. Among the scaffolds were  
 
message centers where they stored notes about what to do and 
when; photos of family and friends complete with indications of 
names and relationships; labels and pictures on doors; ‘memory 
books’ to record new events, meetings, and plans; and ‘open-
storage’ strategies in which crucial items, such as pots, pans, and 
checkbooks are always kept in plain view, not locked away in 
drawers.  
                                                                     
(ibid., 140)  
 
 
 While one could be quick to see such external scaffoldings as mere 
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external memory, Clark and Chalmers provide a more subtle argument. For 
them, such arranged mental notes regarding, for example, family relationships 
have been personally generated and, thus, endorsed. In this way, in the case 
of Alzheimer’s patients, they seem to not only work as external memory, which 
they do, but also to generate the necessary condition for their acceptability. 
From personal experience the argument holds equally true in the case of 
making innumerable reading notes during extended periods of PhD research. 
Rereading such notes after a significant pause sometimes leaves one in 
wonder that one has thought a specific thought. In some cases, at least, if it 
were not for the recognition of one’s personal hand-writing, one’s doubt of 
being the author of it would seem almost insurmountable. 
 Secondly, with regards to the role of language, researchers conducted 
a study involving prelinguistic infants who were shown the position of food or a 
toy in a room. They were, then, disoriented and required to try and find the 
previously shown food item or toy. Importantly, the room was constructed in 
such a way that the “location [of the item] was uniquely determinable only by 
remembering conjoined cues concerning the colour of the wall and its 
geometry (e.g. the toy might be hidden in the corner between the long wall and 
the short blue wall)” (Clark 2008, 48) Thus, either geometric or colour cues 
independently would not suffice to locate the items. What the researchers 
found was that prelinguistic infants would only make use of the geometric 
information, “searching randomly in each of the two geometrically 
indistinguishable sites” (ibid.), yet when conducting the experiment with adults 
and linguistically capable children, participants combined geometric and 
colour cues to successfully solve the problem. Furthermore, successful 
combination of the cues was independent of aspects such as intelligence or 
developmental stage. Instead, it was only children able to combine spatial and 
colour descriptions via use of language who could successfully solve the 
problem (ibid., 49). 
 Lastly, with regards to the role of language, a study was conducted with 
Russian-English bilinguals who were trained in sums of two-digit numbers 
presented as words in one of the languages. The test then compared 
participants’ ability to approximately and exactly select their answers from a 
given choice. What the researchers found was that test candidates were 
successful in selecting the correct approximate answers independently of the 
language they were trained in. However, the ability to correctly select the exact 
answers depended on the language they were trained in and was much slower 
in the untrained language (ibid., 51). Interestingly, the way the researchers 
make sense of these findings distinguishes three distinct cognitive abilities: 
firstly, a basic biological ability to distinguish small quantities, such as “1-ness, 
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2-ness, 3-ness and more-than-that-ness” (ibid.); secondly, a basic biological 
ability to distinguish magnitudes, such as an “array of 8 dots from arrays of 16 
dots but not from more closely matched arrays” (ibid.); thirdly, the learned use 
(and thus not biological capacity) of number words of a language and, more 
importantly, that these number words refer to specific and distinct quantities 
(ibid.). What these three cognitive abilities add up to is the capacity to 
acknowledge that “the number word  98 names a unique quantity between 97 
and 99” (ibid.).  
 This last case is particularly interesting and will be relevant in later 
sections when discussing the use of precise quantitative probabilities in 
relation to medical decision aids. This seems particularly so because it is 
difficult to imagine that anyone can have a clear image of, for example, a 98-
ness as compared to a 2-ness; yet, as a consequence of our learned capacity 
to individuate distinct number words, we see it as a precise number in a linear 
and robust sequence of quantities. This is especially problematic in light of the 
various contingent factors constituent in generating probabilistic medical 
evidence, as discussed in chapter two.  
 The exactitude of such a probabilistic figure holds with respect to the 
methodological assumptions, such as an infinite number of experiments, a 
random distribution of error and with regards to a sample of a reference 
population but not necessarily for the decision-making individual patient. This 
is because, by definition, from an individual, biological body perspective, there 
is no such thing as a probability to get cancer: one either develops it or not. 
Probabilities work the other way around: they are a systematic collection of 
individual, actual biological realities expressed in a probabilistic manner as 
based on the presumption that there will be no underlying biological change in 
the constitution of individuals and the population. As Canguilhem has cogently 
argued (1994), this may be a very myopic perspective.    
 The examples aim to illustrate the use of external scaffoldings as well as 
the role of language as a tool for solving various cognitive problems in situ. 
Nevertheless, Clark (1998, 179) rightly raises the question of whether these 
indicative studies on the role of the artifactual and sociocultural (language) 
ecologies are also able to extend the role of EMT with regards to making sense 
of more complex social and cultural interactions, such as “[political] voting, 
consumer choice, planning a two-week vacation, running a country, and so 
on.” To this list I would personally add making sense of complex medical 
information from various sources, or taking medical decisions regarding 
treatment or therapy. Clark posits that EMT is equally applicable and, in such 
circumstances, the external structures are more of a symbolic and social-
institutional character (ibid.). In these more advanced or complex cases of 
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human cognition, he suggests that the role of public language is particularly 
relevant for  
 
social coordination and individual thought. The idea, in short, is that 
advanced cognition depends crucially on our abilities to dissipate 
reasoning: to diffuse achieved knowledge and practical wisdom 
through complex social structures, and to reduce the loads on 
individual brains by locating those brains in complex webs of 
linguistic, social, political, and institutional constraints.  
      
     (ibid.)   
 
    
To that end, and following EMT, cognition may in some cases be better 
described as (more or less significantly) influenced and determined by 
embodied and socially situated circumstances.87 The following section will 
discuss various sources and insights from related fields from which EMT 
emerged and the ways in which it differentiates itself from these other cognitive 
science theories. 
 
 
Venture points for Extended Mind Thesis and related fields 
 
EMT builds on and has evolved from insights from a number of different fields. 
The following discussion aims to identify and explicate its most relevant 
sources of inspiration. The detailed consideration will explain the different 
theoretical and empirical insights that combine into EMT. This will render its 
relevance more compelling for beginning to address the issues with health 
information interaction I have identified in the preceding chapters.  
 EMT may be said to have a short history and a long becoming. As Clark 
notes in the chapter titled ‘Groundings’ in his first book on EMT (1998), the idea 
of mind as deeply linked through action of bodies in the world is at the heart of 
Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927). One important aspect of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology was the notion of ‘Dasein,’ which he has introduced to 
overcome Husserl’s earlier mentalistic concept of intentionality. For him 
‘Dasein,’ or ‘being-in-the-world,’ was the essence of how we encounter the 
world and make sense of it, that is intentionality being inseparable from being 
and doing. He illustrates his concept with the example of the hammer. We 
sometimes act through technology (ready-to-hand) and sometimes are 
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conscious of the tool (present-to-hand) when we need to readjust a tool. For 
him the tool comes into being through the transition of ready-to-hand to 
present-to-hand, thus a process of meaning making as practical and 
purposeful. For Paul Dourish (2004, 138), an interaction design researcher, 
“intentionality sets up a relationship between embodied action and meaning.”  
 Such considerations are further illustrated by the more recent work of 
Alva Noë (2009), a philosopher and neuroscientist, who has reinforced the 
argument for an understanding of cognition as embodied and enacted. 
Building on the work of Maturana and Varela (1987) and others (Dreyfus 1979), 
he cogently demonstrates how the sensorimotor human apparatus is intricately 
involved in the process of seeing. To do this, he refers, for example, to the 
work of Bach-y-Rita, a neuroscientist working on neuroplasticity, who has built 
an apparatus for sensory substitution that should enable blind people to ‘see’ 
again (Noë 2009).  
 Essentially, Bach-y-Rita believed that the eyes where a channel for 
getting visual information to the nervous system and it should be possible to 
achieve this using a different channel. Therefore, he built an apparatus with a 
camera that was linked to an array of vibrators that were placed on the thigh or 
abdomen of subjects. The camera was mounted on a blind person’s head or 
shoulder and, upon use, generated tactile sensations on the skin of the 
subject. The subject could then make judgments about the size and shape of 
rooms, objects within it or even reach out and pick up objects. In fact, subjects 
only needed a few hours to get used to the tactile sensations. Furthermore, 
what is interesting was that somatosensory touch areas of the brain where then 
giving rise to a visual experience rather than one of touch. Thus, use and 
action context generated perceptual plasticity.   
 The insights for embodied cognition can further be supported by 
considering the perspective of developmental biology of cognition (Griffith and 
Stotz 2000, 37). Recent evolutionary epistemology rejects a nativist view on the 
evolution of cognition, which is predicated on the idea that mental capacities 
are innate. Such nativist perspectives hold that “[M]inds are constrained to 
develop in a particular way, and, once developed, they are constrained to 
reason in a particular way” (ibid., 30). In contrast, one strand of evolutionary 
epistemologists view constraints as enabling, instead of a mere reduction of 
possibilities (ibid., 31).  
 According to such a perspective on cognitive development, outcomes 
are not pre-programmed but derive from a cascade of interactions between 
organism and the environment. Among the empirical evidence advanced to 
support such arguments are experiments with infants in which certain 
parameters of a system are selectively changed. For example, coordinated 
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stepping, while present from early infancy, is usually suppressed due to the 
relation of the weight of limbs to muscular force. When such a physical 
constraint is removed, the walking behaviour can be activated much earlier 
(Thelen and Ulrich, 1991, 38 cited in Griffiths and Stotz 2000). As a 
consequence of such theoretical arguments and empirical evidence of a 
developmentalist approach, Griffith and Stotz (2000) argue that constraints in 
development adopt a ‘soft’ role. ‘Soft’ in the sense of their nature as 
probabilistic, instead of deterministic, because contingent on a wide range of 
developmental resources. At the heart of such considerations, and in relation 
to EMT, is the insight that meaningful interaction with the world seems to 
profoundly rely on intentional interactivity facilitated by various means and 
channels of perception in action.  
 Further areas relevant to consider are ‘epistemic action’ from within the 
field of cognitive science and ‘distributed cognition’ as developed by Edwin 
Hutchins (1995a), a cognitive anthropologist. Epistemic actions, as Kirsh and 
Maglio (1994, 513) claim, are “actions performed to uncover information that is 
hidden or hard to compute mentally” as differentiated from pragmatic actions 
“performed to bring one physically closer to a goal.” Kirsh and Maglio 
observed players of Tetris, an interactive video-game in which the player 
needs to arrange objects of various shapes in such ways as to fill in rows at the 
bottom of the screen. Whenever a row is fully filled, it disappears and makes 
space available. When rows cannot be fully filled, they will build up and, thus, 
allow less space to manoeuvre the falling objects. While the objects fall from 
the top of the screen, the player can either rotate or move them from left to 
right.  
 What Kirsh and Maglio observed was that “certain cognitive and 
perceptual problems are more quickly, easily, and reliably solved by 
performing actions in the world than by performing computational actions in 
the head alone” (ibid., 513). The authors’ interpretation of such actions in the 
world is that they improve cognition. An exemplary epistemic action is the 
turning of objects to more easily identify their shape or moving to the far right 
to determine exact position for high-drops. From their study, the authors 
concluded that standard information-processing models of Tetris cognition are 
unable to explain many of the actions performed by the players and make 
them seem unmotivated and superfluous. Furthermore, they found that such 
“traditional accounts are limited because they regard action as having a single 
function: to change the world. By recognizing a second function of action - an 
epistemic function - we can explain many of the actions that a traditional model 
cannot” (ibid.). 
 Lastly, there exists the interesting research on external scaffoldings and 
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distributed cognition by anthropologist Hutchins. Hutchins is interested in the 
cognitive processes that occur in navigation, particularly large military vessels 
(1995a) and airplane cockpits (1995b). What emerges from research on such 
processes of cognition according to Hutchins are three kinds of distributions. 
Firstly, the observation that cognitive processes may be distributed across 
members of a social group. Secondly, cognitive processes may be distributed 
in the sense that the operation of the cognitive system involves coordination 
between internal and external (material or environmental) structures. Thirdly, 
cognitive processes may be distributed through time in such a way that the 
products of earlier events can transform the nature of later events (ibid.). The 
argument for causal coupling goes against much of mainstream grain of brains 
as representational machines endlessly busy creating internal models of the 
external world.  
 As this and other diverse research has come to suggest and support 
(Bach-y-Rita et al. 1969; Brooks 1991; Clark 1998, Maturana and Varela 1987; 
Noë 2009), cognition emerges out of a much more complex entanglement of 
internal and external processes involving perception, attention, memory as well 
as the material and cultural environment (Hutchins 2000, 177). Hayles (2012, 
93) articulates the difference between embedded and extended cognition well: 
“Whereas the embedded approach emphasizes human cognition at the center 
of self-organizing systems that support it, the extended model tends to place 
the emphasis on the cognitive system as a whole and its enrolment of human 
cognition as part of it.” In embedded cognition, people use various objects as 
scaffoldings to support or extend memory and, thus, make possible more 
sophisticated thinking. Hutchins, an anthropologist, demonstrated such use of 
objects in relation to the complex tasks of navigation (Hutchins 1995b). 
Extended cognition, in contrast, places much less emphasis on the human 
mind and, thus, agency as the central controller in cognitive processes (Hayles 
2012, 94).  
 As such, EMT as an approach also stands in sharp contrast to multiple 
other ideas and theories of cognition, such as, for example, exclusively 
genetically determined ideas of human development (Pinker 2003) and, as 
discussed earlier, brain-bound information-processing models of mind and 
rational choice theory. While rational choice theory itself is not a theory of 
cognition but more at home in the field of economics, it is based on cognition 
as brain-bound information processing and relevant to consider in relation to 
decision-making theories. Genetically deterministic ideas of human 
development will not be discussed further, but ideas of rational choice and the 
information-processing model of mind are more close to the topic of this 
research and worth illuminating.  
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 Of particular interest at this stage is considering the cases and 
circumstances in which rational choice theory seems to work as well as, more 
importantly, where it fails to predict outcomes. Ironically, as several authors 
have noted (Satz and Ferejohn 1994), it appears that “neoclassical economic 
theory works best in situations in which individual rational choice has been 
severely limited by the quasi-evolutionary selection of constraining policies and 
institutional practices” (Clark 1998, 182). More specifically, what seems to 
happen is that such institutional structures have evolved in environments of 
strong competitive forces, for example, capital markets, which in turn result in 
firm-level strategies and policies with little leeway for individual beliefs and 
values (ibid.). Furthermore, in other environments, strong communities of 
practice have evolved that exhibit relatively set values and practices of how 
work is to be done (Wenger 1999).  
 Consequently, this also means that in light of this theory, cognitive 
processes are constituted by interactions with a complex ecology of human 
and artifactual elements. Maybe more importantly, such an “expanded notion 
of cognition should make us cautious about the kind of things we design and 
build. Institutions, training, forms of media, linguistic systems, and a multitude 
of other factors will all find new meaning in the light of this theory” (Fuller and 
Matos 2011, 10). This is precisely the issue Clark raises when he suggests that 
“[O]ur biological brains, in concert with these new technologies [search 
engines, digital networks] can thus grow into hybrid minds better able to 
understand the kinds of systems in which they themselves participate” (Clark 
2003, 159).  
 The kinds of ways in which human cognition seems to operate through 
and participate in artifactual ecologies have also been recognised and come 
to be exploited more opportunistically in the field of behavioural economics. 
The field has been popularised by Thaler, an economist and behavioural 
scientist, and Sunstein, a legal scholar and behavioural economist. 
Interventions following this approach are based on the idea that the artifactual 
environment can be designed in such ways that it ‘nudges’ people to behave 
more likely in ways thought to be more beneficial for them than others. For 
example, healthy foods would be placed at the beginning of a long array of 
food-displays in a school canteen rather than at the end. This, it is believed by 
proponents of behavioural economics, will make it more likely for students to 
choose healthy foods than otherwise. Such an approach goes by the 
supposedly self-explanatory term ‘choice-architecture’ (Thaler and Sustain 
2008). Typically, evidence for the performance of such an approach is 
experimental. Indeed, as Gigerenzer, a psychologist, and Berg, an economist, 
argue, the evidence base is rather thin because, rather than researching how 
114 !
people actually make decisions, it is only looking at what decisions they make 
and then generalise from such experimental evidence (Harford 2011).  
 From a more political perspective, a critique voiced is that ‘nudge’ 
interventions are seen as ‘liberal paternalism’ because they are designed and 
imposed top-down and, due to their nebulous presence, do not invite 
participation, reflection and, thus, learning and long-term behaviour change. 
However, it is precisely these aspects that need to be considered in order to 
tackle some of the more vexing problems, such as changing unhealthy diets 
and helping people stop smoking (Rowan 2011). As Esposito (2007) has 
noted, planning (based on probabilities) does not allow the refusal of learning 
from actual experience, which is particularly true when confronted with 
negative outcomes following a decision no matter how likely it was supposed 
to turn out another way. In turn, the preventive action of reducing one’s 
statistical risk neither pre-empts a less desirable course of action nor prepares 
the person to confront and handle such a situation. At the core then, engaging 
with the uncertain character of some medical interventions, such as cancer 
screening, sooner or later requires to recognise and confront the shifting set of 
tensions introduced by such interventions.   
 Specifically problematic for this research is the anticipatory practice of 
surveillance-based medicine (Armstrong 1995; Topol 2012). Such active 
screening of the population is aimed at early identification and prevention of 
specific conditions, such as diabetes, heart diseases as well as various 
cancers, including prostate and breast cancer. Screening procedures 
particularly operate on the epidemiologically determined probable link 
established via a linear gradient smoothly connecting normality (being 
clinically healthy) with risk factors (with or without symptoms) and pathology as 
defined by measureable quantitative changes and corresponding 
probabilities.  
 From an individual and social perspective, risk factors being causally 
linked to probable later pathologies can easily be imagined to morally 
implicate necessary preventive action. Furthermore, as has been highlighted, 
the application of such epidemiological methods has also been extended with 
regards to the ability to affect and control the conditions of new life, as is the 
case with screening of pre-born children (Rose 2006). While being 
probabilistically at risk or actually ill, as defined by the averages of derived 
epidemiological data and linked by the measurement of physiological factors 
(such as blood glucose level or blood pressure), an individual may still be free 
from experiencing actual symptoms. Such situations with regards to diabetes 
have initially been labelled protodiabetic, chemical diabetic, latent diabetic, 
stress diabetic and pre-diabetic, and later been reclassified for clinical 
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diagnosis as chemical, mild or early diabetic (Greene 2007, 100, 106). Clearly, 
the labelling chosen suggests a causally determined pathological progression, 
with little concern for its probabilistic character. Thus, it seems easy to imagine 
an individual’s perceived risk of potentially becoming ill in light of the weight of 
medical nomenclature and the causally argued probabilistic evidence.  
 From an extended-mind thesis perspective, the way in which medical 
evidence is defined, developed and distributed seems particularly problematic 
for the following reasons: firstly, because of the ways in which the evidence is 
presented as factual with natural frequencies88 rather than probabilistically 
and, thus, contingent on the various assumptions and factors based on which 
it was derived. The display of a single quantitative (probability) figure as 
representative and useful for individual decision-making about a clinical test, 
such as that found in decision aids concerning taking a PSA test (BMJ 
Group),89 seems highly problematic. This is precisely due to the potentially 
significant implications that may follow from such a simple blood test that may 
follow a false-positive test result. These implications include mental-stress with 
test result, errors in test result (false positive and false negative), indicated 
need for a biopsy to confirm PSA test results and, thus, the potentially serious 
physical and social side-effects following preventive or early treatment, such 
as incontinency and erectile dysfunction (ibid.). From reviewing decision aids, 
such quantitative information is increasingly given in the form of natural 
frequencies (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 1995). For example, the BMJ Group 
decision aid for taking a PSA test states the following:  
 
 More men who have a PSA test find out they have prostate cancer than 
those who don't have a test. Between 6 and 7 in 100 men who have a 
PSA test are diagnosed with prostate cancer. Between 4 and 5 in 100 
men who don't have a PSA test are diagnosed with prostate cancer. 
                                  
                                   (BMJ Group, 3) 
 
 
 While these relative figures may hold true statistically speaking across a 
certain sample population, the distinctive figure is not suitable to predict one’s 
own outcome, as in fact the actual outcome for oneself at the end of the 
diagnostic process is a binary between having or not having prostate cancer. 
More likely it is serving as an approximation to assess the cost-benefit trade-off 
between, on the one hand, taking the test and risking potential side-effects, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
88 Such as “Ten out of every 1,000 women have breast cancer.” See also chapter three.!
89 See also Appendix 1. This is a decision aid distributed by the NHS which is supposed to 
support individuals in deciding whether they should conduct a PSA test or not.!
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and, on the other hand, not taking the test and risking undetected prostate 
cancer and its potential implications. 
 From an EMT perspective, it seems rather questionable whether and 
how a non-statistical expert is able to make sense of the range of 
contingencies involved in such a simple quantitative probabilistic figure. One 
may wonder whether the presentation of a PSA test statistic as natural 
frequencies figure, instead of a more contingent framing of it, favours its 
acceptance and somehow suppresses a more careful and deliberative 
reflection on its meaningfulness and situated applicability. In some way, it is as 
if quantitative probabilistic evidence can linguistically determine someone to 
be poised to be at risk or even ill. As Politi et al. point out (2007, 692), it is 
hitherto unclear “how patients respond to personalized risk estimated;” 
Rockhill (2004, 127) adds to this that “we are participating in open and 
unsystematic experimentation in these arenas.”  
 Secondly, probabilistically-derived risk-factor evidence is presented 
and framed as already causally linked to potential, and in some cases likely,90 
pathology at a later stage unless preventive measures are taken. As discussed 
above, in some cases, such as with ‘mild diabetes,’ even the nomenclature 
used incorporates such a deterministic logic. The question from a cognitive 
perspective then is how, despite such naming, people make sense of the 
probabilistic nature of such evidence in light of its linear, causal and 
pathological framing. 
 An interesting parallel might be drawn at this point: Merlin Donald, a 
psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist, in his exploratory investigations on 
the evolution of cognition and culture suggests that much of pre-Greek use of 
language was ‘mythic,’ i.e. exclusively used to record myths and complete 
theories. In contrast, the Greeks began using language to record and circulate 
“processes of thought and argument” (Clark 1998, 206). The notation of partial 
knowledge invited others to participate in developing the ideas further, 
criticising and complementing them. For Donald, the result of this was “much 
more than a symbolic invention, like the alphabet, or a specific external 
memory medium, such as improved paper or printing,” but rather “the process 
of externally encoded cognitive change and discovery,” as such language 
moves beyond being a medium for information communication and assumes a 
tool-like character (Donald 1991, 339).  
 From an EMT perspective, this is because such language opens up text 
as an object to reflect upon and, as Clark describes with regards to his own 
writing practice, that it is “these resources [that] enable us to pursue 
manipulations and juxtapositions of ideas and data that would quickly baffle 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 Such as when the percentage probability of an event is larger than 50%.!
117 !
the un-augmented brain“ (Clark 1998, 206). To be sure, there is nothing 
deterministic in either the pre-Greek or the Greek use of language itself; more 
importantly, it seems the culture developed by the Greeks around the use of 
textual language may be said to have facilitated, or as Donald puts it ‘invited,’ 
a more explicit cognitive reception and response to it.    
 Comparing such processes of language use as tool-use to the 
presentation of medical probabilistic facts begins to illustrate that, for the non-
expert user, medical language may be said to display (yet) little possibility for 
explorative interaction and sense-making (literally) with it as a scaffold. This, I 
speculate, may be largely due to the difficulty in understanding this very 
specific and technical language, including the very assumptions and methods 
it is built upon. Such understanding is further undermined by the ways in which 
medical information is presented and is, thus, less amenable to a critical 
examination of its applicability. Comparing this to the previously discussed 
perspective of patient-driven research in the participatory medicine model, 
Scherzer (2012) maintains that “an important component of the patient 
contribution is to balance what evidence-based medicine or conventional 
medical wisdom recommends with what is possible, desirable and most 
acceptable for the individual patient.”91  
 Consequently, the current approach to designing for shared decision-
making can, in the words of Merlin Donald, be said to be oriented along mythic 
trajectories rather than theoretical ones. This is because it conceals the 
panoply of representative assumptions it is built upon, which may simply not 
hold in an individual case. In turn, this concealment also occasions the 
potential for a mismatch between a hoped-for probable future and the actual, 
and unprepared for, pathological development. Furthermore, overdiagnosis 
and overtreatment may in this light also be seen as a consequence of, among 
other things, defensive medicine (Moynihan et al. 2012). Preference 
construction and diagnosis is a timely and necessary task, balancing and 
complementing a decision on probable futures with likely implications and their 
meaningfulness for individuals. Extended cognition, in this regard, is 
hypothesised as a productive approach in supporting such processes of 
preference construction. This is because it employs language as a means by 
which the exploration of values and preferences can be supported by way of 
recognising, questioning, juxtaposing and deriving them in spoken and written 
language. This, in turn, helps identifying shortcomings and novel insights into 
our own thinking about values and preferences. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
91 Personal communication with Norman Scherzer, Executive Director Life Raft Group, 19. 04. 
2012. The Life Raft Group is a foundation supporting research, patient support and advocacy for 
patients with gastrointestinal tumors.!
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 With regard to the focus of the practice-based aspect of the present 
research, it is specifically relevant to consider the case of preventive screening 
for prostate cancer and to reflect on the effects that decision aids seem to 
have on the interpretation of probabilistic medical evidence, such as the 
diagnostic effectiveness of a PSA test. Prostate cancer has a relatively low 
mortality rate of 3% due to the fact that most of it is non-aggressive in nature. 
The consequence of that is that most men of those who have it die with 
prostate cancer rather than because of it (Ablin 2010).  
 However, there are serious potential iatrogenic (typically negative 
consequences following medical intervention) implications from having either a 
biopsy [such as rising figures of bacterial infection which may lead to 
hospitalisation and in 9 out of 10,000 cases even to death (Gale 2011)], which 
is the only method based on which an actual diagnosis of prostate cancer can 
be made, or actual (preventive, early or overdiagnosed) prostate surgery or 
radiation treatment (potentially leading to incontinence and/or erectile 
dysfunction). Lastly, the reduced risk of dying from prostate cancer when 
taking a PSA test is 0.1%, or 1,000 men need to take the test to prevent 1 
death (BMJ Group). Currently, 30 million (Ablin 2010) men take a PSA test a 
year in the USA, which is approximately 54% of the male population older than 
40 years of age. 
 From the evidence available it seems that the minimum we can say is 
that men in this case seem rather risk-averse concerning the long-term risk of 
developing cancer but willing to take various short-term risks of serious side-
effects from cancer screening tests and prevention (over-)treatment. To some 
degree, I speculate, such a pattern might be said to be only a little surprising, 
as the factual evidence in the decision aid seems partially unbalanced. 
According to Lumen et al. (2012), diagnosis of prostate cancer happens six to 
eight years earlier in men who take a PSA test. Currently, it is unknown whether 
early diagnosis and treatment has an effect on expected lifetime (BMJ Group).  
 The above obviously leaves open the question of whether concern 
about prostate cancer is less about dying earlier, and more about the 
(potentially feared) implications for quality of life. The BMJ Group decision aid 
further points out that between 65 and 76 men in 100 (Heijnsdijk et al. 2012; 
Lane et al. 2010) with raised PSA-levels turn out not to have prostate cancer 
upon biopsy. Unfortunately, there is a lack of knowledge on the percentage of 
men who will suffer from the various potential iatrogenic effects of biopsies 
and/or cancer treatment (BMJ Group; Mulley et al. 2012). As research 
suggests, typically risk information is sparsely shared and discussed with 
patients (Politi et al. 2007, 690). When considering the evaluation of the 
performance of decision aids, fewer men seem to be willing to test for PSA 
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(O’Connor et al. 2009, 41). These effects, it may be speculated, trigger 
decision avoidance due to becoming aware of the uncertainties involved (Politi 
et al. 2007, 688).  
 The need for a more socially embedded understanding of medical 
language and knowledge has recently been recognised, as, for example, in 
suggestions made for a ‘Health Knowledge Commons’ (Lodor et al. 2013). The 
proposal for such a commons includes a platform for shared sense-making of 
health data and what such data actually means in people’s everyday and 
social lives. This idea also leans on existing experience from patient-driven 
research platforms, such as ‘Patients Like Me,’ where people can record and 
exchange disease-specific information on their condition, experiences with 
treatments and therapy as well as resulting progress.92 In light of the recent 
evidence on levels of overdiagnosis and overtreatment in prostate cancer 
(Welch and Black 2010), such a move seems timely. 
 
 
Summary of prospective reflection 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has sought to introduce extended cognition as an 
alternative theory of human cognitive processes with particular relevance for 
shared medical decision-making processes. Using illustrative examples, I have 
tried to argue for its potentially productive role in informing research and 
design of complex health information interaction processes. As I have 
discussed, its attractiveness stems from a view on cognitive processes as 
enacted through the material and sociocultural environment, in which language 
assumes a particularly significant and productive role.  
 Furthermore, I have discussed the productive potential of EMT 
specifically with regards to addressing problematic issues in the design of 
decision aids. These issues include the use of quantitative probabilities; the IR 
model-based design approach which obscures more fundamental 
uncertainties underlying such risk factor information; the time-frame 
considered which ignores longer-term ramifications following false-positive test 
results or the realisation of an overdiagnosis; and the absence of supporting 
the construction of preferences and values as a source of decision guidance. 
Redesigning decision-making processes with the premises of EMT in mind is 
hypothesised to productively support making sense of probabilistic risk factor 
information as well as the preferences-construction process and, thus, shared 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 See also http://www.patientslikeme.com/. ac. 21.08.2014. 
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decision-making. In the following chapter, I discuss the selection of issues 
from the critical analysis which will be addressed and operationalized in the 
practice-based research. In chapter 6, I discuss the methodological approach 
and the design process. 
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Chapter 5 
Focus of the practiced-based research and its 
operationalization 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to establish a productive bridge and transfer 
between the critical analysis in chapters 1 to 4 and the practice-based design 
research in chapters 6 to 8. This is necessary and relevant for the following 
reasons. The critical analysis has looked at a variety of relevant topics as they 
relate to the interest of this research, that is the problem of how to start 
redesigning cancer screening decision-support as regards notions of risk and 
uncertainty. In order to provide a productive ground to inform and inspire the 
practice-based design, the critical analysis has required comprehensiveness 
and depth. Numeruous facets of the problem of decision-support in cancer 
screening have been identified through the critical analysis. Given the early 
stage of this research within the larger problem context, the practice-based 
research will focus on a particular selection of these issues.  
This chapter thus aims firstly to link the problems identified in the critical 
analysis as they relate to decision-support in cancer screening by discussing 
the informational health practice that follows from the critical analysis. 
Specifically, my critical analysis finds that the current design of online search 
engine interactivity is strongly oriented towards an information-retrieval (IR) use 
scenario. The IR orientation has been further elaborated by way of algorithmic 
filtering of search results (Feuz et al. 2011). Such an approach however, further 
obscures the health information seeking process which leads me to argue that 
the exploratory nature of health information seeking interactions is badly 
supported by universal search engines today. Alternatively, an exploratory 
model of interaction is proposed as productive for guiding the design of health 
information interactivity, both online and offline.  
Secondly, given the critique of probability theory that was established in the 
critical analysis, my position on how it relates to the practice-based design 
phase will be discussed. The proposed relevancy of an exploratory health 
information interaction approach becomes more apparent when considered 
within the context of making cancer screening decisions based on 
probabilistically derived risk information. Following my critical analysis of EBM, 
I argue that such risk information undermines the fundamental inherent 
uncertainties at the individual decision-making level. Such uncertainties are 
further obscured by risk representations based on natural frequencies and 
magnitudes of risk. This creates an excessive focus on the pre-emption of risk, 
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while leaving out handling the implications of uncertainty, that is when the pre-
emption risk turns out not be succesfull. As my critical analysis highlights, 
current decision-support practices seem to neglect preparing people to cope 
with both the uncertainties in the decision-making process as well as the 
potential implications that might ensue. This neglect comes into being via 
narrow conceptions of patient autonomy. In the context of medical situations 
with substantial uncertainties and potential outcomes that have previously not 
been considered, such as in the case of cancer screening decision-making, I 
argue patient autonomy may be better seen as a collaborative knowledge 
practice (Kukla 2007, 28), in particular with regard to the construction of 
preferences and values (Epstein and Peters 2009, 195). 
Thirdly, following the insights derived from the critical analysis, the chapter will 
discuss the choice of issues which will be operationalised in the practice-
based design research and discuss the respective design requirements. 
Attendeding to the choice of issues lead to the development of two prototypes. 
The first one is an interactive Venn diagram which focuses on facilitating an 
understanding of false-positive and false-negative PSA test results, and by way 
of that the inherent uncertainty in making sense of such quantitative diagnostic 
test results. The second one is a set of reflection cards, that aim to support the 
preference construction process which is necessary when aiming to cope with 
the uncertainty in diagnostic test results. 
 
 
Informational health practice 
 
In Chapters 1 to 4, a critical review and analysis of relevant literatures has 
been conducted in order to elicit a multiperspectival framing of the problem. 
These include online health information search and digital culture studies, 
social and cultural studies of evidence-based medicine, theories of cognition 
and design research. In the practice-based research, I will work on the topic of 
decision-support from these perspectives and how they provide different 
facets to the problem. To this end, the insights gathered from the critical 
analysis operate as a set of connected problems and thus thinking resources 
which my practice-based research is attending to. In what follows, I will 
selectively set these problems up to inform the practice-based design 
research project. Thus, this research draws inspiration, both from the phenoma 
of actual health information practice but equally from theoretical reflections 
such a health information practice is constituted and affected by. 
 
Chapter 1 starts with the observation of a strong interest by some patients to 
be informed and participate in medical decision-making as regards their 
health. One particular and significant way in which such interest manifests is in 
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the frequent use of health information sources online found via search engines. 
According to the Pew Research Center, searching for health information online 
had become the third most common activity among internet users aged 18 and 
above in the USA by 2010 (Zickuhr 2010, 3). For many, health information 
found online affects their medical decision-making in terms of how to treat an 
illness or ask doctors new questions (ibid., 4). Given the prevalence of online 
health information seeking via search engines, the first chapter looks at the 
ways in which health information seeking is supported via the design of online 
search interactivity and, thus, can be assessed.  
To begin with, I argue that the nature of satisfying health information needs is 
often complex. On the side of the information seeking person this is frequently 
complicated by an absence of specific domain knowledge such as not 
knowing adequate key terms to search with, having a differentiated 
understanding of the veracity of the many resources and actors present online, 
or indeed the specific information goal itself. One of the ways in which people 
engaging in information seeking today materialises problematically is in the 
identified user behaviour of ‘thrashing’. Thrashing occurs when users 
continuously search with mostly similar keywords, thus exhibiting an anchoring 
bias. As a consequence, typically search results will not change much and, 
thus, leave users unsatisfied (Morville and Callender 2010). Such behaviour 
thus is exemplary of an absence of knowledge domain comprehension and the 
capacity to query the internet in a range of different directions. A similar lack of 
knowledge domain comprehension materialises when it comes to evaluating 
the relevancy of search results presented in light of ones information seeking 
goal. Recent research on the use of and reliance on highly-ranked search 
results (Pan et al. 2007) has highlighted that search engine users tend to trust 
artificially higher-ranked search results more than those ranked lower on the 
search results page, despite the fact that their abstracts seemed less relevant 
to the task. Thus, accountability for web search results, in the absence of 
specific domain knowledge, seems mostly to rely on the status authoring role 
through those search engines (Rogers 2009).  
Following such empirical insights, Broder (2002) suggests differentiating 
between three different types of search behaviour, which is a useful taxonomy 
for the purposes of the present discussion. Firstly, navigational search queries, 
where users want to find the URL for a specific website. Secondly, 
transactional search queries, such as checking flight prices, which can be 
performed on a number of different yet specific websites. Thirdly, informational 
search queries to find information that may be present on multiple websites 
and where the search goal may not always be clear at the beginning but only 
emerges through the search process itself. Typically, search engine users 
exhibit very little problems with both navigational and transactional search 
queries. This is because, upon being presented with such results, they can 
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easily identify a specific URL or a set of URL’s which will serve they search 
goals well. The empirical account of search engagement described is most 
problematic for informational search queries within a knowledge domain an 
information seeking person has little experience and comprehension of, such 
as the health and medical knowledge domain when a person is confronted with 
a new diagnosis. Such an understanding serves as evaluative criteria for 
analysing the design of search engine interactivity and its adequacy and 
usefulness within the context of health information seeking by non-medical 
experts.  
 
My analysis finds that the current design of online search engine interactivity is 
strongly oriented towards an information-retrieval (IR) use scenario, in which 
users are assumed to know both their information goal as well as relevant key 
terms to search with, and upon presentation of a set of potentially relevant 
search results have little difficulty in locating the desirable and useful results. 
Indeed, such IR orientation has been further elaborated by way of algorithmic 
filtering of search results (Feuz et al. 2011). Such an approach however, further 
obscures the health information seeking process as the information seeking 
person is unable to understand or participate in the filtering process and the 
grounds on which its relevancy has been decided for her. Following my 
analysis of the design of online health information search interactivity in 
chapter 1, the nature of health information seeking interactions is argued to be 
badly supported by universal search engines today. Alternatively, an 
exploratory model of interaction is proposed as productive guiding the design 
of health information interactivity, both online and offline. Such a model of 
interaction entails learning about a knowledge domain, its concepts and actors 
as part of the interaction process itself, from which the informational goal may 
evolve and clarify over the course of multiple sessions.  
  
In chapters 2 to 4, I have looked more specifically at the conditions in which 
such desired participation in medical sense-making and decision-making is 
supported by the larger health information ecology, and in particular with 
regards to cancer screening decision-making. To do this, I have focused on 
the analysis of both, the nature, quality and limitations of evidence-based 
medical knowledge production as it relates to individual health information 
seeking and sense-making, as well as the specific ways in which health 
information interaction and decision-making is currently supported within the 
offline medical encounter such as GP appointments. The analysis finds that the 
ways in which health information is produced and presented as well as the way 
in which decision-making as a process is framed further substantiate the 
potential relevancy and value of the proposed exploratory interaction model for 
supporting shared decision-making in context of cancer screening. The key 
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insights and arguments from the critical analysis will be reiterated here.  
 
Cancer risk information is generated following the evidence-based medicine 
epistemological model. Specifically, based on epidemiological methods such 
as randomised controlled trials, evidence of cancer risk as well as the 
effectivity of diagnostic tests and therapeutic interventions is generated based 
on samples aiming to be representative of reference populations. Apart from 
recently identified epistemological issues concerning the quality of such 
evidence, more fundamental questions exist regarding its meaningful 
applicability at the individual decision-maker level. While epidemiological 
methods calculate a statistical risk across a reference population, at the level 
of the individual decision making person, such statistical average risk 
information may be said to bear little predictive value. This is due to the fact, 
that pathology at the individual level is more akin to a binary logic, one 
develops cancer or not. The use of propabilistically derived cancer risk-factor 
information can at best improve the ‘average health of a population’. In 
prostate cancer screening, this is operationalised by means of the 
epidemiologically determined probable link established via a linear gradient 
smoothly connecting normality (being clinically healthy) with risk factors (with 
or without symptoms) and pathology as defined by measureable quantitative 
changes and corresponding probabilities of PSA blood values.  
Unfortunately however, this comes at the cost of framing healthy people as at 
risk of future pathology, due to methodical limitations that materialise in the 
form of false-positive and false-negative test results, and, thus, over- and 
underdiagnosis of cancer. An example of a false-positive diagnostic test result 
and thus overdiagnosis occurs when a patient receives the “diagnosis of a 
‘cancer’ that would otherwise not go on to cause symptoms or death” and 
which may nevertheless be treated preventively (Welch and Black 2010), while 
false-negative test results and underdiagnosis refers to the opposite scenario.  
 
As has been discussed in chapter 3, the style of presentation of evidence-
based medicine cancer risk information creates further complexities. This 
specifically concerns the use of natural frequencies and visualisations of 
magnitudes of risk. To reiterate, natural frequencies refer to base rates, and, 
thus, aim at preventing people from committing errors due to the base-rate 
fallacy. Focusing on an understanding of risk in contemporary cancer 
screening decision-support comes at the cost of obscuring the fundamental 
uncertainties involved in such decision-making at the individual level. In turn, 
this generates the illusion of being able to control the future while being unable 
to prevent alternative courses of one’s health and the subsequent need to 
account for one’s previous action and decisions (Esposito 2007). This relates 
to the scope and framing of contemporary decision-support processes.  
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As my analysis has identified, there is an absence of supporting preference 
construction for preference sensitive care decision situations such as cancer 
screening. Preference sensitive medical care situations refer to healthcare 
situations, for which there is no single best medical practice to follow, while the 
implications of the medical practices available can affect peoples’ personal 
lives very differently. Thus, as Mulley et al. argue (2012), patient preferences 
matter in such situations. Unfortunately, medical professionals do not appear to 
be very good at diagnosing patient preferences (ibid.) either. 
 
The understanding of informational health practice that follows from this, is one 
that highlights an asymmetry between the information needs of people and 
patients and the ways in which health information can be accessed and 
interacted with and, thus, may facilitate participation in shared decision-
making. Furthermore, current informational health practice may be said to lack 
addressing patient information needs in a quality (in the sense of the distinctive 
characteristics it is made of rather than degrees of excellence) that is attentive 
to the full scope of potential implications such medical decision-making may 
require patients to consider and factor into the decision-making process. 
Instead of accounting for the irreducible uncertainty at the individual level 
involved in screening decision-making based on probabilistically derived 
epidemiological risk information, the focus is put on representations of 
magnitudes of risk, which are largely unintelligible at that decision-making 
level. Instead, coping with potential implications inherent in such uncertainy 
calls for preference sensitive decision-making. This includes questions such as 
who to involve and account for and which implications to be able to cope with 
and in which contexts. As the critical analysis highlights, such an 
understanding is not reflected in contemporary design of decision-aids.  
 
To that end, the understanding that follows from a critical analysis of such 
informational health practice is that contemporary decision-support for cancer 
screening is primarily focused on an attempt to pre-empt risk. However, it 
omits to simultaneously attend to the underlying inherent uncertainty of such 
risk information at the level of the deciding individual, and more importantly, 
how the unpredictable effects of this may need to be coped with. It is as if the 
contemporary understanding of preventive medicine with regards to screening 
is only concerned with the biological aspects of prevention, irrespective of the 
potential psychological and sociocultural implications this may have for 
people. Thus, the attempt to prevent and pre-empt biological malignancy in 
diagnoses of prostate cancer may simultaneously actively generate a whole 
host of new problems such as anxiety, incontinency and impotency, which are 
currently not considered as relevant to be prevently considered, factored in 
and attempted to be preprared for coping with their potential arrival. My 
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research aims to foreground these aspects as part of the decision-making 
process. The ways in which this will be operationalised will be discussed 
below.   
Having consolidated the understanding of informational health practice that 
follows from the critical analysis of literatures, I hope to have been able to 
convey the ways in which these subject areas are interestingly and 
problematically interrelated and provide a meaningful set of facets to the 
problem of cancer screening decision-support. In the following sections, I will 
clarify my position regarding the role of probabilistically derived cancer risk 
information for this research. Furthermore, I will outline which aspects in the 
critical analysis have been selected to be operationalised in the practice-
based research component of this thesis.  
 
 
Position on probability theory 
 
The literature review and critical analysis has identified and problematized a 
range of issues inherent to evidence-based medicine and current 
understandings and design approaches towards decision-support. The 
analysis in the preceding chapters has particularly identified both valuable and 
critical aspects of probability theory regarding its role in medical epistemology. 
The critique is specifically focused on its indiscriminate application to support 
individual decision-making generally speaking, and in particular as it relates to 
preference-sensitive care situations such as cancer screening. To this end, this 
critique does not negate the role of probability theory in medical epistemology 
per se, but the specifically identified limitations inform the focus for the design 
research phase of this research project. This design research thus aims to 
address those limitations by researching how to most productively complement 
decision-support. Instead of focusing on a smooth relaying of risk-information 
such as seems to be the aim of using natural frequencies (chapter three) in 
decision-aids, this design research aims to explore how to design for 
uncertainty, which may be said to be (a yet underarticulated but) inherent and 
uncontrollable component of probability theory.      
 
In the sections below I will discuss two of the issues identified in the critical 
analysis that will be operationalised in the design research phase of the 
project. Thereby, I will also consolidate the main arguments why the issues 
have been selected as desirable aspects for the design research and how they 
relate to the critique of probability theory in the preceding chapters.    
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Operationalization of selective aspects from the critical analysis  
 
For the practice-based part of the research project, a selection of two focus 
areas has been made. As part of the design research, a set of prototypes have 
then been developed to start exploring and addressing some of the problems 
identified in the literature review. The first prototype is an interactive Venn 
diagram, aiming to support the understanding of false-positive and false-
negative PSA test results. The second prototype is a set of reflection cards 
aiming to support prospective reflection and preference construction process. 
The following section discusses the selection of the two issues and the 
respective design requirements following from the critical analysis.   
 
The first issue the practice-based component of this design research is 
concerned with is the understanding of the limitations of using epidemiological 
risk information in decision-support at the individual level. One of the ways in 
which this materialises problematically in decision-support today, is as a lack 
of understanding false-positive and false-negative test results and the 
implications this may have for an individual patient. A brief summary of the 
main issues identified and discussed in the critical analysis chapters seems 
valuable at this stage. 
To start with, there are significant issues with decision-making patients being 
able to make sense of statistical information (see chapter 1). Risk information 
visualisations often represent magnitudes of risk rather than the actual random 
distribution of risk at the individual level (see chapter 3). To use magnitudes of 
risk is a questionable design decision in particular within the context of shared-
decision making. The applicability of such risk probabilities at the individual 
level is generally questionable due the notoriously low discriminatory 
predicitive value of such risk-factor information (see chapter 2). Furthermore, in 
the specific case of prostate cancer, there is a very high level of false-positive 
test results with the PSA test (see chapter 2) and thus resulting in the 
requirement to undertake a biopsy in order to clarify the veracity of the PSA 
test result (see chapter 4). The logic of improving the average health of a 
population by means of screening, and, thus, the resulting numeruous false-
positive PSA test results comes at the cost of framing healthy people as at risk 
of pathology. This in turn, may implicate a number of side-effects such as 
infections, anxiety, incontency and impotency resulting from the repeated 
biopsies and potential preventive measures conducted affecting all people 
undertaking screening, that is the healthy and the pathological ones.  
 
In aiming to develop epistemic interactivity for an understanding of false-
positive and false-negative test results, this design research aims to render 
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more intelligible and meaningful both the specific meaning of probabilistically 
derived risk information as well as its limited predictive ability at the individual 
level. In the best of cases, it is hoped that such an understanding would allow 
to prospectively imagine the potential courses of actions deemed necessary to 
clarify borderline PSA test results as well as the downstream implications this 
may have for the individual such as anxiety, infections as well as potential 
overdiagnosis and corresponding side-effects such as incontinency and 
impotency. To this end, the prototypes envisioned would complicate and 
complement what probability theory may make appear as rationally desirable 
with a prospective reflection of the personal cost such pre-emptive risk 
management may come at. Thus, the design intervention does not aim to 
devalue the informational value derived from probability theory, but rather 
support an understanding of the underlying uncertainty inherent to it, and thus, 
may render a need for means by which its fallout may personally and socially 
best be coped with and accounted for more desirable. Following from my 
critical analysis in the preceding chapters, this is a limitation of probability 
theory, which in a context of shared decision making needs to be addressed 
so as to adequatly live up to the demands of it. This brings me to a second 
issue. 
 
The second issue the practice-based component of this design research is 
concerned with is supporting the personal preference construction processes 
in preference sensitive medical care situations, such as cancer screening. 
Given the limitations discussed with regards to the meaningfulness of 
probabilistic risk information at the individual level in the context of preference-
sensitive care as well as the absence of supporting preference construction in 
contemporary decision-aids, such a design research focus seems most urgent 
and promising. As discussed in the critical analysis, this is relevant because 
decision-support based on epidemiological risk factor information alone, does 
not help prepare for coping with other than predicted or desired outcomes. 
Nevertheless, the ways in which cancer screening and its implications affect 
individuals in their personal and social lives varies greatly. As a consequence, 
preferences and values matter when making decisions about cancer 
screening. The information and decision environment is complex and patient 
autonomy may better be conceptualised as a collaborative knowledge 
practice. The patient may better be conceptualised as an active inquirer, 
supported among others by experiencd physicians, who may be said to have 
the opportunity to develop vast experience with the kinds of social and moral 
concerns that may surface within their medical field of expertice, and, thus, 
may offer some valuable advice and direction on possible dilemmas (Kukla 
2007). In the following section, I will discuss the specific requirements on the 
design process which follow from the literature review for each of the two 
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issues selected. 
Focus 1:  
One of the core requirements is to support a differentiation between 
understanding risk and uncertainty. While the former can be calculated at the 
population level, its applicability and intelligibility at the individual remains 
fundamentally uncertain. The design process and resulting artefact thus, 
should support people to grasp uncertainty. This in turn also means finding a 
way to undo the reliance on magnitudes of risk as a relevant information cue 
for individual decision making. Following the extended mind thesis, such 
interactivity should be enacted by the patient/decision-making person rather 
than just received as information through reading in a brochure or hearing from 
a doctor. Being able to switch from an epidemiological perspective to the 
meaning of a test result from an individual perspective is necessary. The ways 
in which such a perspective switch occurs in the best of cases should enable 
raising meaningful questions about each corresponding state, and in turn, 
such interactivity may be meaningful and productive as epistemic interaction. 
That is, interacting with the prototype allows to explore, interrogate and start 
grasping uncertainty in prostate cancer screening decision-making.  
 
Focus 2:   
Complementing an understanding of the underlying inherent uncertainty in 
prostate cancer screening decision-making is a need for means by which 
implications thereof may personally and socially best be coped with and 
accounted for. Thus, the design process should facilitate considering the 
information concerning screening and its potential implications in the light of 
ones own personal and social life. This in turn should support identifying ones 
values and help constructing personal preferences. Deliberating personal 
values and preferences in such a novel situation may best be supported 
through the design of artefacts which help identifying relevant ‘cognitive 
scaffolds’. This may be in terms of people to speak to as well as the 
meaningfulness of relevant language to be used and explored, but also the 
artefactual environment used to support such deliberation. As part of such 
deliberative processes, identifying normative values in ones social 
environment, one might feel influenced by, is equally important. Lastly, the 
design should operate on a time scale that factors in delicate conversations 
with ones wider social network and being able to reflect on thoughts and 
comments made.   
 
Given these requirements onto the design process, the design strategy 
followed is the research through design method [RTD]. The method will be 
introduced and discussed in the following chapter in detail. 
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Chapter 6  
Design project and method 
 
Introduction 
 
As discussed in chapter three, the perspective taken in the visualisation and 
communication of risk information seems largely oriented along 
epidemiological principles and public health management. This makes it less 
relevant or, at least, insufficient for supporting individual decision-making. The 
visualisations seem unable to support the specific issue of understanding risk 
from an individual decision-taker’s perspective, particularly with respect to the 
probabilistic character of such information and the randomly distributed nature 
of such risk (and in turn the false-positive or false-negative results). In effect, 
existing risk and uncertainty visualisations give a false sense of risk distribution 
which, from an individual perspective, does not apply; as in the case of a 
single event probability, the actual outcome is (more like) a binary as one is 
either affected or not.  
 Besides the identification and analysis of the fundamental problems 
discussed in chapters one on search interaction models, chapter two on 
evidence-based medicine and chapter three on risk information 
communication and models of decision-making, various less directly related 
resources fundamentally inspired and informed the design process. These will 
be discussed in the following sections as well as where directly relevant for the 
design process. 
 
 
Inspiration for the design process 
 
In deliberating about the design process and the expectations I had 
concerning the specificity and capacity of the tools to be designed within the 
problem space described, various writers articulated well such potentials. 
Clark (2009) himself suggested putting EMT to use for transformative purposes 
rather than replicative ones. With this he refers to a variety of newly-developed 
technologies, such as telepresence, often aimed at replicating in detail our 
existing forms of bodily action and experience. In contrast, he highlights, for 
example, e-mail as a new technology providing a variety of new and 
complementary functionalities to make use of written language. This includes 
allowing people to interact informally, swiftly and asynchronously, while 
keeping a trace of the communication.  
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 Transferred to the context of prostate cancer risk visualisations, I take 
Clark’s suggestion to mean moving away from the reductionist ways such risk 
information is verbally and visually provided today (see my analysis in chapter 
three), making it unlikely to support a transformative understanding of the 
potential personal implications of uncertainty in the screening processes. In 
contrast, Clark (2003, 111) is hoping for EMT-inspired and informed design to 
be “expanding and reinventing our sense of body and action […] and, thus, 
allow to expand the types of engagement we enter to.” The potential I see in 
this stems from combining Mol and Law’s suggestion to privilege action with 
EMT’s epistemic action to achieve such an expanded sense of body and 
action.  
 David Spiegelhalter, a statistician and Professor for the Public 
Understanding of Risk at Cambridge University, summarised succinctly his 
expectation of risk visualisations. For him, “the greatest challenge is to make a 
visualisation that conveys its own contingency and limitations” (Spiegelhalter 
2011, 1400). This is a particularly relevant and desirable characteristic of an 
information visualisation when considered in light of prostate cancer screening, 
as argued in chapter four. This is because such contingencies and limitations 
need to become part of the cognitive and social processes which are 
facilitated by the visualisation in the first place. As my discussion in chapter 
three highlighted, this is seldom the case in today’s risk information 
visualisations.  
 The challenge of conveying the model’s own contingencies and 
limitations is an aspect also taken up by Fuller in relation to decision-support 
systems more broadly. He specifically refers to the redistributive mechanisms 
concerning “the way it can help displace and redefine expertise, valid 
knowledge, the landscape of choice and the rationalisation one makes of it” 
(Fuller 2012, 134). A more detailed discussion of the relevance of these 
inspiring perspectives will follow as part of the prototype development 
process. 
 A slightly different view on the question of expertise, chance and how 
we account for decisions has been articulated by Bursztaijn et al. (1981). For 
them, uncertainty plays a much larger role in medicine than has previously 
been acknowledged and, thus, needs to be accounted for accordingly in the 
medical methods. They proposed doing so by explicitly differentiating between 
medical situations 
 
that are largely governed by chance and situations, in which skill 
can be decisive. By ‘chance’ situations we mean those where nature 
must take its course; by ‘skill’ situations we mean those where 
human action can influence the outcome. When we speak of ‘skill’ vs 
‘chance,’ we are not talking about the degree of predictability that a 
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situation exhibits, but about the degree of control one may exert 
over it through the exercise of skill. 
 
      (ibid., 196) 
 
 
 This view of chance and skill is precisely applicable in the context of 
prostate cancer screening. While the result of a PSA test is to a large degree 
governed by chance, undertaking a biopsy skilfully can actually identify and 
diagnose a person’s health situation.93 Interestingly, the authors argue that a 
common error in medical decision-making is to regard chance situations as 
skill situations and vice versa. As is the case with prostate cancer screening, to 
see the PSA test as a skill situation and disregard the substantial level of 
unpredictability that plays into it comes down to a form of defensive medicine. 
The problem with such an attitude is obviously that it neglects to factor in its 
own performativity, potentially manifesting in iatrogenic effects discussed 
earlier. By explicitly and actively appreciating the role chance plays in some 
medical situations, Bursztjain et al. (ibid.) hope to enable both doctors and 
patients to use and refine their decision-making skills to live with anxiety 
instead of allowing anxiety to lessen their skills. For them, by actively 
acknowledging chance situations and ‘gambling’ on them, patients not only 
gain experience but also 
 
a better sense of the probabilities, that is, which contingencies are 
controllable and which are not. They will then be able to make better 
choices in the future. Beyond this, the very act of making an 
informed choice can give a patient a sense of being in control, 
which in itself may reduce the stress of illness and with it the 
physical as well as emotional damage suffered by the patient. 
 
      (ibid., 203)  
 
In the context of PSA testing and the question of undertaking biopsies, the 
‘gamble’ refers to the personal decision on how often to test, how to interpret 
the results and, consequently, how often to undertake a biopsy. Should a 
person having had a negative biopsy after a 4.1 PSA test undertake another 
biopsy when the most recent PSA test result was 4.2 or 4.3, or wait until it has 
risen beyond 5.0?  
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93 Even if still with some degree of uncertainty (personal communication with Felix Huber, 25. 
02. 2014).!
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Methodological considerations and research through design method 
 
Before discussing the actual design process, this section will set out and 
discuss the methodological approach taken for this research. Research 
through design (RTD) is a research method which privileges the exploration of 
a research question through the articulation and evaluation of designs. As 
such, the designer is more cautious in terms of approaching a design problem 
in ways that may prove productive in a person’s future situated uses (Suchman 
1987). As Gaver (2012, 940) argues, RTD is generative rather than 
comparative in nature, hence interested in the question of ‘what might be’ 
rather than designing ‘the right thing’ (Zimmermann et al. 2007, 498).  
 The method was first given its name by Frayling (1993) and has been 
further articulated by Buchanan (2001) but may also be said to be strongly 
influenced by Schön’s knowing-in-action (1983). Schön, among other things an 
educator, developed his arguments for knowing-in-action based on what he 
termed professional artistry, by which he meant a competence in practice that 
does not depend on the ability to articulate such actions in conscious ways. 
Instead, such skilful competence is developed by learning “to appreciate, 
directly and without intermediate reasoning, the qualities of the materials that 
we apprehend through the tacit sensations of the tool in our hand” (ibid.). This 
relates to a form of knowledge in which meaning is deeply intertwined with our 
embodied interactions with the environment; in the context of a research 
project, RTD explores understandings in particular situations.94  
 This perspective is closely related to the arguments made by Dourish 
(2004), Noe (2009) and Clark (1998, 2008) (as discussed in chapter four) and, 
thus, serves to highlight and further substantiate the relevance of RTD in light 
of the hypothesised productivity of EMT for exploratory interaction. This is 
because, within the context of this research, RTD may be said to be applying 
an EMT perspective onto the design research process itself. In this way, it is as 
if I explore the potential for epistemic action in a style of research practice that 
is in congruence with the very goal of identifying such epistemic action by way 
of designing it.  
 As Schön (1983) argues, knowing-in-action is guided by a kind of 
normativity of doing things right, be that riding a bicycle or catching a ball. In 
contrast to this, he refers to reflection-in-action as situations in which we notice 
that our usual action in a new context produces an outcome that does not meet 
our expectations. However, instead of reflecting on the outcome after the fact, 
in some situations we reflect “in the midst of action without interrupting it” 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 Michael Polanyi, a polymath, referred to this as ‘tacit knowledge’ (Polanyi 1958). !
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(ibid., 54) and, thus, make immediate changes. What such reflection-in-action 
does is applying a tacit (Polanyi 1958) knowing-in-action combined with an 
inquisitive mind led, for example, by a specific research question.  
 The outcome of such a process, as Gaver (2011) argues, is generative 
in nature and, thus, the method is often chosen as a research method in 
contexts that are thought to exhibit a potential to create new knowledge. This 
happens, for example, through the annotation of the resulting designs (ibid.), 
which may take the form of prototypical artefacts or whole systems (Gaver 
2012). For him “the resulting designs are seen as embodying designers’ 
judgments about valid ways to address the possibilities and problems implicit 
in such situations, and reflection on these results allows a range of topical, 
procedural, pragmatic and conceptual insights to be articulated” (ibid., 937). 
 Most recently the discussion within the field of Human-Computer 
Interaction (HCI) has turned to questions of developing agreed methodological 
standards of what constitutes “good design research” (Forlizzi et al. 2011; 
Gaver 2012). The goal of such a development would be “conceptual 
contributions to relevant and rigorous theory, which exhibits a level of 
extensibility and verifiability designers can apply in research in practice” 
(Gaver 2012; Zimmermann and Forlizzi 2008). Such calls for standardisation 
are symptomatic of more fundamental methodological discussions in the larger 
field of HCI concerning the introduction and legitimate acceptance of a third 
paradigm for framing interactivity (Harrison et al. 2007). While according to 
Harrison et al. (ibid.), the first paradigm (human factors or ergonomics) is 
largely oriented towards specific and opportunistic man-machine optimisations 
with little interest in theoretical generalisations, the second paradigm’s central 
credo is the information-processing model of mind. This allows for the efficient 
modelling, design and positivistic evaluation of man-machine interactions, and 
subsequently theorising.  
 The third paradigm, in contrast, considers interaction as “a form of 
meaning making in which the artefact and its context are mutually defining and 
subject to multiple interpretations” (ibid., 6; Sengers and Gaver 2007) and 
aims at supporting situated action (Suchman 1987). Approaching shared 
decision-making with an openness for situated action may create space for 
deliberation which may support the preference-construction process. As I 
discussed earlier, not all patients see themselves capable of meaningfully 
interacting with an informationally complex situation or may even fear being 
medically ill-treated when raising questions that may be perceived as 
challenges to the medical professional.  
 Within the context of this research, no relevant design work seems to 
have been produced from the perspective of EMT (Smart 2012; Smart et al. 
137 !
2010). Yet, the generative nature of RTD promises to be most productive as its 
performativity is concerned less with questions of epistemology and more with 
ontological politics (Law and Urry 2005). The generative nature of RTD entails 
an interest not only in the creative reframing or actual generation of novel 
contexts, but also thereby debating and inviting reactions on what is 
ontologically relevant. In light of such a view on the role and potential 
productivity of RTD, “the assumption that shared standards are necessary, 
possible or desirable, are potentially repressive acts of ontological politics” 
(Gaver 2012, 943). This is because such standardisation would pre-emptively 
limit renegotiating and exploring ontological possibilities and, thus, politics in 
an unconstrained way.  
 
 
Planned design process 
 
Following the discussion of the various hypothesized problems and design 
potentials when introducing EMT in relation to prostate cancer screening in 
chapter four, the design process at first aimed at developing a way in which 
these varying issues could be integrated. This was thought possible by firstly 
creating the individual tools that address the specific decision problems, and, 
secondly, by developing an overarching narrative structure which would 
integrate the individual tools in a meaningful and coherent way. The hoped-for 
effect was that, through such narrative integration, the individual decision 
aspects could be synthesised and, thus, facilitate a consolidated decision 
concerning the underlying question of whether or not to screen.  
 The overarching narrative structure was envisioned as a decision 
process which would include screening as well as diagnosing phases in 
prostate cancer screening. The motivation to include the actual cancer 
diagnosis phase was thought relevant as it provides a feedback on the 
screening outcome. This feedback includes the problematic false-positive and 
false-negative diagnostic findings as well as the continuing difficulty in 
diagnosing malignancy of prostate cancer and, thus, making prognosis,95 
which may materialise in diagnosis such as mild or medium-aggressive 
cancer. The implication of this is the difficulty of deciding what treatment path 
to follow, if any.  
 An early mapping exercise of the many steps necessary to bring 
together the individual decisional components in developing an overarching 
narrative structure, as illustrated below, quickly indicated how extensive this 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
95 Personal communication with Felix Huber, a GP, and Cédrix Poyet, a urologist, with whom I 
evaluated my decision support tools in February 2014.!
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would likely need to become.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Prostate cancer screening decision process overview 
 
 In light of the existing constraints of doctor-patient consultations as well 
as the early stages of developing and experimenting with decision tools for 
epistemic action, such an approach seemed too laden with presumptions, 
leaving little space for appropriation by patients or doctors, hence an unlikely 
fruitful starting point for collaborating with medical professionals. Furthermore, 
when reconsidering the idea of an overarching narrative structure from the 
perspective of EMT, the idea seemed too invasive and not perceivably 
contributing to the goal of creating a relevant cognitive scaffolding open 
enough for others to participate in the design process.  
 From a RTD perspective, such an approach seemed to potentially 
change the kind of insights that can be gathered. Instead of researching the 
kinds of exploratory potentials that may emerge through the use of tools aimed 
at supporting epistemic action, a grand overarching narrative structure would 
potentially have generated more, or even too much, of a self-referential focus, 
that is too much of a focus on the tools themselves. Thus, it would more likely 
have asked whether or not the collection of tools through such narrative 
structure would better contribute to a consolidated decision. Clearly, this 
question is not at the forefront of this research, hence my decision to quickly 
abandon the approach of having an overarching narrative structure and, 
instead, focus on specific aspects only. 
 Due to the issues discussed, I reoriented the design process and chose 
to focus on two specific key aspects. Problem space #1 is the need to support 
an understanding of the probabilistic character of information underlying a PSA 
test and the implications of that from an individual decision-takers’ perspective. 
Problem space #2 is developing tools for anticipating and reflecting on the 
ways in which the screening process might affect a decision takers’ personal, 
social and professional everyday life, and how such preferences should be 
139 !
factored into the screening decision-making process. 
 These two areas of focus were selected because they are thought to be 
core elements involved in the decision-making process. With regard to 
problem space #1, typically the epidemiological and, thus, probabilistic nature 
of the PSA threshold is often not well understood by people (Gigerenzer 2002, 
4). This causes difficulties in grasping the meaning of an individual’s PSA test 
result in relation to actual health and pathology and, consequently, 
understanding potentially false-positive and false-negative results and their 
implications.  
 Concerning the problem space #2, for a variety of reasons discussed 
earlier SDM is far from common today. Prominently among these reasons 
figures the absence of participation and involvement of concerned people and 
patients. A direct consequence of this of course is that, when resorting to a 
doctor’s recommended path of action, people omit deliberating treatment 
options and the potential implications affecting their personal lives. Neglecting 
to deliberate these difficult aspects also prevents anticipating personal 
preferences and factoring them into the decision-making process. This issue 
has recently been labelled as ‘preference diagnoses’ (Mulley et al. 2012) and 
extends my earlier discussion concerning the identification and importance of 
preference-sensitive care (see chapter three).  
 These two areas of concern and interest were also selected as they are 
expected to provide a productive starting ground based on which this 
research can begin to understand how to design for and with EMT in mind. 
This is thought possible because the design challenges in both areas are very 
real and well understood by doctors, with whom I need to work closely in 
developing relevant tools. Thus, the expectation of what the designed 
prototypes should achieve in the best of cases was also very clear and will be 
discussed at the beginning of the next chapter. How this can be achieved, 
however, is at the very core of this research and design process and, thus, of 
the following documentation. Lastly, focusing on individual aspects separately 
was thought to allow for the more minimal and reserved approach that I felt is 
strongly desirable for the given context. 
 
 
Problem space #1 - switching perspectives  
 
As part of the exercise in developing an overarching narrative structure,96 a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 As explained above, this was thought necessary to facilitate bringing the individual 
deliberations together to a consolidated decision on the question of whether to screen for 
prostate cancer or not.!
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number of ideas for tools addressing specific decision problems emerged. The 
following sections will discuss the insights gathered while iterating early 
prototypes of these tools with respect to their suitability for epistemic action. 
This early phase of the design process was instructive in developing a sense 
of which design aspects seemed key to focus on and refine as well as which 
were thought to be less suitable and productive for this research. This 
reflective design process allowed me to eventually hone in on two specific tool-
ideas and, thus, make an informed decision against other potential prototypical 
tools. As will be discussed, this was a necessary step in being able to focus 
the design process and invest the necessary time and resources on the 
prioritised tool ideas. 
 
 
Idea #1a – Stencil 
 
The prime goal of the first idea to support an understanding of the probabilistic 
nature of PSA test results was to address the typically grouped style of 
visualisation of relative risk (see Figure 11 below). Such a style of visualisation 
fails to highlight the random distributive character of the risk of both pathology 
and, thus, of errors in identifying false-positive and false-negative results with 
overly sensitive markers, such as the PSA test.  
 As we can see in the visualization out of 1,000 men screened, the 
distribution of results is arranged in such a way so as to get a sense for the 
magnitude of relations between the different results. What this obfuscates, 
however, is precisely the random distributive character of the results. Thus, this 
style of visualization is unable to visualise the dynamic of the process in order 
to unravel which of the individuals with a positive PSA test result may in fact 
have a false-positive result which can only be detected upon conducting a 
biopsy. Some may argue that it is less important having a sense for the random 
distributive character of test outcomes compared to the relations of the 
diagnostic outcome and the number of men needed to be screened and 
treated. While the latter has a quality of a general micro-economic benefit vs. 
harm trade-off, the former hints at the a priori fictional (because probabilistic 
only) character of such a trade-off, which will necessarily manifest in a binary 
outcome one will have to deal with. 
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Figure 6.2: Grouped visualization style of prostate cancer screening outcome97 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
97 Image: U.S. Preventive Services Task Force Recommendation Statement (published on 17. 
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 In order to convey a sense of the random distributive character of the 
PSA test outcome, the prototype was envisioned in the form of a stencil-based 
interaction. In a nutshell, a person would be given a paper with several rows of 
printed people-like icons on it. Each such icon would represent a person 
participating in the prostate screening process by taking the PSA test. The 
person would then pick one of those icons as being representative of himself 
and circle it. Furthermore, the person could circle other icons for prostate 
cancer screening relevant men in his social proximity and name them 
correspondingly. Next the doctor would overlay the stencil, which has holes on 
randomly distributed positions (but on the same row-and-icon-based 
underlying layout), so as to mark all those people who would find themselves 
with a positive PSA test result.  
 Importantly, these positive PSA test results would also include false-
positive ones. In case the previously selected icon would be among the 
positive PSA test results, the doctor would then be able to contextualise the 
result by explaining that, while the result is positive, it could also be a false-
positive one, and that the PSA test in itself is unable to differentiate among the 
two. In case the selected icon is not among the positive PSA test results, the 
doctor would be able to explain that this result could be either a true- or false- 
negative result. Furthermore, having other socially-proximate men relevant for 
prostate cancer screening circled and named was hoped to make the 
somewhat uncanny character of random distribution of pathology and error 
and its implications more broadly relevant.   
 
 
Discussion of idea 
 
A number of aspects of this idea seemed useful. Among them was its 
simplicity, as it would not take much effort to explain its application to doctors. 
In addition, it has similarity to the metaphor of throwing a coin when explaining 
the random distribution phenomena. Lastly, it was hoped the selection and 
marking process would make the quasi-binary98 character of pathology at the 
level of an individual more clearly understandable. As discussed earlier, the 
use of quantitative risk information and its visualisation (marking only one half 
of a people-icon as pathological to correctly represent the statistics) in some 
cases led to misunderstandings; for example, people understood they would 
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07. 2012 in the Annals of Internal Medicine).!
98 See my discussion and problematisation on this in chapter two referring to Canguilhem 
(1994).!
143 !
be experiencing symptoms or side-effects more or less often, depending of the 
quantitative risk information given, rather than being or not being affected by 
them (Gigerenzer 2002a, 4). 
 However, while potentially supporting a clearer understanding of the 
binary character of pathology, the form factor would not have allowed to more 
clearly visualise and enact an understanding of the simultaneous possibility 
and unknowability of a positive PSA test result to be either a true positive 
(pathologic) or a false positive (being healthy). Yet, this very aspect is at the 
core of what needs to be understood about the capacity and limitations of PSA 
testing. Thus, I felt that, since this aspect would not have been supported by 
the interaction with the tool and had to be explained by the doctor, the tool was 
limited in its potential for epistemic action beyond explaining the binary 
character of pathology.  
 Furthermore, the interactions with it were mostly to be performed by and 
necessarily but unproductively repetitive for the doctor, thus less suitable to 
support epistemic action for the actual decision taker. Also, its very form did 
not seem to allow to usefully include the issue with false-negative test results. 
Moreover, I was sceptical that the necessity of having a person initially select 
the icon representative for him would be understood as a credible simulation of 
the process. After all, the PSA test does operate on an actual biological reality 
rather than on an only simulated randomness; as a result, the perceived and 
speculated risk was that the simulation would be seen as an abstract mental 
exercise only, without much actual relevancy in assessing a person’s 
susceptibility to developing prostate cancer or having it.  
 Nevertheless, iterating and prototyping the idea did allow for a number 
of insights that were productive for the continuing EMT-inspired design 
process. Firstly, designing for epistemic action by definition makes it 
necessary that the action is to be performed by the decision taker and not the 
doctor who is well aware of the underlying problems. Thus, the tool should be 
designed in ways that shift the interaction to the relevant person. Furthermore, 
while simplicity is useful, this should be employed with great care. In the above 
example, it may have been too simplistic and, thus, reductionist, as the design 
articulated more strongly the binary character of potential pathology and 
seemed less potent to facilitate an interactive understanding of true- and false-
positive results. Additionally, the simulative character of this prototypical idea 
would have potentially diverted too much attention away from the epistemic 
action itself by requiring understanding and accepting its fictional set-up in the 
first place. The danger of this might have echoed in a lack of relevancy on the 
part of the decision taker in a very real context as well as a lack of acceptance 
on the part of the doctor.  
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 Instead, designing for epistemic action within the informational 
complexity of this context seems to require precisely orienting the interactional 
design to prioritised issues only, so as (again) not to overload the tool in the 
first place. Furthermore, by aiming for designed interactions to facilitate 
epistemic action, the specificity of such interactions should be anticipating and 
allowing for multiple interpretations. That is to say, the design of epistemic 
actions should not be over-engineered towards one specific way of conveying 
a specific aspect but, rather, aim at allowing for a degree of underspecification 
in its design.  
 As a working hypothesis, I believe such a design approach might be 
better suited to evoke meaningful and epistemic interactions. This is because, 
when cognition is supported through the environment, it is likely that people 
are used to a variety of scaffoldings that they may have used in the past; 
consequently, there is no one solution for all. Lastly, by leaving open an 
interpretative space, such a tool would potentially more usefully elicit a 
doctor’s perceived role in contextualising and responding to possible 
interpretations.  
  
 
Idea #1b - Grid  
 
In reflecting on the limitations discovered in the stencil idea prototyping 
process, the aspect of productively designing epistemic interactions around 
the potential multiple meanings of a PSA test result was identified as a key 
point of focus and refinement. This specific aspect is at the core of 
understanding the uncertainties involved in the screening process and, thus, 
needed to be addressed.  
 Building on the previous idea, I experimented further with visual forms 
that would allow expressing such uncertainty. One such idea was based on 
using a grid as the underlying visual structure (see Figure 12). Again a person 
would have to select his position (see Figure 12 below) on the grid and, then, 
the doctor would reveal a randomly distributed set of PSA test results. What is 
different, however, is that the underlying visual form allowed for a layering of 
specificity of the results. The first layer would be the level of specificity 
revealed by a PSA test (see Figure 13 below). To uncover the second layer of 
specificity, the participant would need to be willing to undertake a biopsy (see 
image step 3 below). Only then would he be able to see which of the positive 
PSA test results were true positives and, thus, might require cancer treatment, 
and which ones were false positives and, thus, require no treatment. 
 
145 !
 
 
Figure 6.3: Idea #1b - Step 1: select position 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Idea #1b - Step 2: positive PSA test result 
 
Figure 6.5: Idea #1b - Step 3: negative biopsy result 
 
 
 Step 2 would reveal which people (positions on the grid) would receive 
a positive PSA test result. By displaying a fully black hexagon, the PSA test 
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result would leave uncertain whether or not ‘underneath’ the black hexagon a 
true-positive (green triangle) or false-positive (blue empty hexagon) result 
would be found. This level of certainty would only become knowable if the 
person were to undertake a biopsy.   
 
 
Discussion of idea 
 
Compared to the stencil idea, this variant seemed to better encapsulate and 
visually articulate the uncertainty issues involved in PSA test results. While the 
visual form of hexagons did structurally facilitate to illustrate the duality of 
possible underlying health states of a PSA test result, its form seemed highly 
abstract for the context. Whether or not such a form would allow for 
appreciating the uncertainty issue involved seemed questionable. The reasons 
for such doubt were, once again, to be found in the limitations that the stencil 
idea exhibited as discussed above.  
 Additionally, the explanatory complexity in simulating the screening 
process and the meaning of each stage was increased, without a 
corresponding increase in the expected benefits through productive epistemic 
interactivity on the part of the decision taker. Furthermore, such an approach 
would most likely need to be developed digitally, and would require a narrative 
structure for it to make sense. This exercise reaffirmed the need to continue 
focusing on and experimenting with the visual form of uncertainty as well as 
finding ways to address the various identified issues. 
 Learning from the ideation and prototyping exercises thus far, it became 
increasingly clear that the tool for epistemic action I was aiming for should 
exhibit a number of key characteristics. Firstly, it should follow a minimal and 
underspecified design approach; with this I refer to the seeming complexity 
introduced with the hexagons which could assume multiple states. Improving 
the design in this respect would likely keep the requirements for explanatory 
embedding to a minimum and the tool itself lightweight and sharply focused on 
the core aspect of visualising and understanding uncertainty. Secondly, this 
specific thematic focus must be at the core of its interactivity. Such interactivity 
would most likely be epistemically productive if not just repetitive but 
instructive and transformative in understanding such aspects as the duality of 
health states of a PSA test result. Thirdly, such epistemic action should chiefly 
be enactable through a decision taker rather than having to be facilitated only 
by the medical professional. 
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Idea #2a - Venn diagram (mapping) 
 
This emerging set of design criteria led me to experiment with a visual 
mapping of health states already used in chapter two to initially clarify my 
understanding of the historic views on the relations of health and pathology. 
Essentially, what I did there and continued to do here (see below) is applying 
EMT to the design process by thinking through visual diagrams. This was done 
by creating them and, thus, clarifying the meaning of the relations in them, or, 
as Schön (1983) would call it, performing reflection-in-action.  
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Figure 6.6: Historical view of relations of health and illness 
 
 The reflexive use of EMT may be seen as an attempt to understand and 
critically reflect on the meaning of one’s performed tacit knowledge practice. 
Or, in other words, as an active exploration of the possibly multiple meanings 
of one’s performed action. Such a visual and epistemic mapping exercise was 
helpful and clarified the underlying uncertainty issue (see also discussion in 
chapter two). What was needed now was finding ways to build on this by 
making it understandable by interacting with it. 
 A way to engage a decision maker in such interaction while keeping the 
design minimal and focused was by having him map the result of a PSA test 
onto such a Venn diagram. For this I envisioned the simple exercise whereby 
the doctor would use such a Venn diagram and instruct the person to use pins 
and map the PSA test result onto the Venn diagram. To do this, the person 
would be given coloured pins for positive, negative and false-positive test 
results, the numbers of which would correspond to the epidemiologically 
known distribution of PSA test results. The doctor would then be able to 
observe where the pins were mapped and, if necessary, facilitate through 
discussion what the overlapping zone between health and pathology means. 
By having a person map his understanding of these states, this approach 
would serve as a simple test of their understanding, allowing thus the doctor to 
intervene should there be misunderstandings or questions about it.  
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Figure 6.7: Idea #2a - mapping of PSA test result  
 
 A second and more refined version of the diagram included a scale for 
the PSA test result. This version would have allowed mapping an individual 
PSA test result, such as 4.3, onto the diagram. By way of this quantitative 
specificity, I envisioned the discussion between doctor and decision taker 
would be even more concrete concerning the localisation and meaning of 
false-positive results. Instead, the tool would allow to precisely locate a real or 
imagined PSA test result, such as 3.9 or 4.3, and, consequently, discuss the 
seeming pathophysiological urgency such borderline results seem to suggest 
(Greene 2007, 112), given that 4.0 is a widely used threshold indicating 
potential pathology.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Idea #2a - mapping of PSA test result - epidemiological perspective 
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 In order to clarify and problematise the meaning of such borderline 
results and the potentially felt uncertainty whether or not to undertake a biopsy, 
at this very point the tool should allow for the mentioned transition from the 
epidemiological perspective towards that of an individual person. This was 
delivered by another visual Venn diagram that illustrated such a false-positive 
test result by moving the relevant health and pathology circles: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Idea #2a - mapping of PSA test result - individual perspective 
 
The insight I crystallised from this exercise was that the Venn diagram should 
be interactable. Thus, the relation between the scale and the circles in the 
diagram needs to be changeable. I experimented with this requirement in the 
form of a paper prototype first. 
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Figure 6.10: Idea #2a - mapping of PSA test result - movable scale 
 
 The paper prototype was designed by fixing the position of the circles 
and having the scale movable. This allowed to reposition the boundaries of 
health and pathology as, for example, in the case when a person had a 4.5 
PSA test result and, upon conducting a biopsy, had learnt that he did not have 
prostate cancer as the PSA test result was a false-positive one. However, the 
fixed positions seemed problematic and not supportive in fully explaining such 
a potential situation. This is because, in contextualising such a negative biopsy 
result, the health and pathology circles for an individual could theoretically be 
anywhere from 4.5 to 10.0 and, importantly, from the perspective of an 
individual, no longer overlap after the biopsy. Emerging directly out of this was 
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the question of how large the problematic and, thus, overlapping zone 
between health and pathology should be.  
 I addressed this difficulty in a preliminary meeting with one of the 
medical professionals I planned to evaluate the final tools with. From a 
methodological perspective, the meeting was aimed at generating an interest 
in my work and the subsequent expert evaluation of the decision-support tools. 
Furthermore, the goal of the meeting was to ensure that my design work was 
oriented along relevant problems from the perspective of clinical practice as 
well as clarifying technical questions, such as the negative biopsy range 
above.  
 To my surprise, my conversation with urologist Cédric Poyet from the 
Prostate Carcinoma Centre at the University Hospital quickly revealed that, for 
him, the problematic zone for false-positive PSA test results was in fact very 
large and ranged from almost zero to 10 on the PSA scale.99 This assessment 
was also confirmed in the evaluation with Felix Huber, GP and president of a 
network of group practices counting 250 GP’s. Both of them also confirmed 
that this was an important issue with patients in their medical practice 
concerning prostate cancer screening. From an epidemiological perspective, 
this is little surprising, as it simply stems from the statistical variation which is 
the source of defining the mean and, thus, a threshold as a cut-off 
distinguishing between health and (potential) pathology. This is precisely the 
limitation of using such epidemiological data for individual decision-making, as 
it suggests a calculable likelihood of pathology inferred from a population as 
applicable to an individual’s risk as meaningful information for decision-making 
(Politi et al. 2007, 682).  
 
 
Discussion 
 
The advantages of the mapping approach were that the interaction was shifted 
to the decision-making person, allowing, thus, for the doctor to potentially take 
on a more observing and facilitating role. Moreover, the design approach is 
utterly simple and requires very little explanation of how to use it. However, 
when using it myself and reflecting on it, I still found myself dissatisfied with the 
epistemic potential of the interactivity. Essentially, it seemed that, instead of 
generating an understanding by way of interacting with the tool, this interaction 
design approach required mapping an already existing understanding a 
person has onto a visual diagram. Thus, the act of interacting with it was again 
largely repetitive and would at best provoke the question about the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
99 It is important to note that this is specific to the PSA test.!
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overlapping zone of health and pathology states without necessarily clarifying 
it much through the interaction itself. This, I believe, was due to the static form 
of the diagram inherent in both the mapping exercise and the movable-scale 
paper prototype, which only had the capacity to represent the epidemiological 
perspective and not the actual quasi-binary state of health or pathology of an 
individual at a specific point in time (such as when making a biopsy).  
 The overlapping zone of the Venn diagram silently represents both the 
implications from overly sensitive markers, such as a PSA test, as well as a 
specific epidemiological view. The latter requires and assumes a long-term 
perspective rather than that of a specific point in time by linking current 
biological states to future probable pathology exactly by visualising these 
states as overlapping in the Venn diagram. What I thought was needed on top 
of the advantages of this approach was finding a way in which the interaction 
would allow a shift between an epidemiological and individual perspective in 
relation to a PSA test result. 
 My view on the necessary next step in developing the prototype was 
confirmed in a meeting with Cédric Poyet where I presented the Venn 
diagrams and discussed them with him. He explained that, in his daily 
consultation practice, he often thought about creating a tool which would allow 
him and his screening participants to track multiple PSA values and biopsy 
outcomes over time. This would not only allow them to see progression over 
time but also better understand a participant’s likely individual relation of health 
and pathology beyond the epidemiological threshold suggested.   
 
 
Idea #2b - Venn diagram (interaction) 
 
The Venn diagram mapping approach fulfilled some of the desirable criteria, 
such as following a minimal and underspecified design approach, hence 
keeping informational overhead to a minimum. Furthermore, this approach also 
shifted the interaction to the relevant person, i.e. the decision taker. The 
necessary next step was to improve the design of the actual interactivity and 
have the thematic focus of understanding uncertainty through interacting with 
the tool at its core. While this was partly achieved with the movable-scale 
paper prototype, this approach was limited in its ability to illustrate the full 
spectrum of the epidemiological and individual perspectives. To improve the 
potential for epistemic action through interactivity, the next prototype needed 
to be able to fully address this.  
 Having realised from the paper prototype that a movable scale is 
insufficient to address this, the next prototype experimented with the 
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manoeuvrability of the health and pathology circles of the Venn diagram, while 
keeping the scale fixed. This approach, it was expected, would finally allow for 
the necessary flexibility to visualise both the epidemiological (overlapping 
circles) and the individual person’s (non-overlapping circles) relations between 
health and pathology, and in this way support contextualisation of the meaning 
of such relations by the doctor. In designing this prototype, a number of 
elements were thought necessary to incorporate.  
 First of all, the ease of use for changing the relations between health 
and pathology is paramount. The design should allow for fluidly altering these 
relations, so as to be able to quickly switch between the different views. 
Furthermore, the form factor should anticipate and allow for note-making, so as 
to use the tool over a longer time and possibly multiple PSA test results. With 
regard to such a longer time-frame for its context of use, the idea for the tool 
was to not only support the discussion during the consultation but, also, to be 
seen by doctors as something they can hand over to their patient for home use 
once they have explained how to use it. Thus, space for instructions on how to 
use it should be allocated accordingly.  
 Given these requirements, and keeping in mind that the age-range of 
the prostate screening population is between 45-70 years, the overall size of 
the tool should enable both portability and easy handling and reading of its 
contents,. Lastly, with a view to winning over doctors for an evaluation with 
actual patients, the tool should be seen as useful and professionally produced 
for a larger scale evaluation as well as designed in a way that it can be 
economically produced and quickly made available.  
 In order to meet these increasingly ambitious requirements while 
satisfying the criteria for the tool to be seen as a minimalistic working 
prototype, I worked together with the Japanese product designer Kione Kochi. 
This collaboration was methodologically significant because Kione had the 
product design skills to experiment with various ways in which the imagined 
interaction could be physically built. This, in turn, allowed for discussing the 
benefits and drawbacks of more detailed aspects of the design. Furthermore, 
she could design the tool so that it would be robust and professionally 
producable in larger numbers, should a patient evaluation follow.100  
 In setting up the design of the final prototype, I briefed Kione on the 
prostate cancer screening context, the core problems involved in PSA testing, 
and the need for undertaking biopsies to clarify the uncertainty stemming from 
PSA testing. Furthermore, we discussed the Venn diagram with the different 
states and relations of health and pathology and their meaning. The paper 
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100 After the completion of the thesis and in subsequent collaboration with the medical 
professionals.!
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prototype with the movable scale was demonstrated and its limitations 
explained. Lastly, I ran through the requirements discussed in the previous 
paragraph and the criterion for the form factor to retain an appearance of 
minimalism and underspecification.  
 The design process ran through three stages: firstly, a draft conceptual 
design; secondly, an implementational clarification of the detailed interactions 
possible; thirdly, a review of the working prototype. Each of these will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
 
Draft conceptual design 
 
To start with, the basic interactivity was conceptualised as two sliders which 
would allow to easily manoeuvre the position of health and pathology states 
and, thus, their relation from overlapping to adjacent. This was envisioned to 
work as two translucent layers, with printed and positioned elements 
positioned on them accordingly. The scale of PSA test results was set to a 
fixed position in this prototype. Given the design brief, these layers would be 
integrated in a form factor of about postcard size and made of cardboard. The 
foldable cardboard would be designed in such ways so as to accommodate 
space for instructions and notes. The conceptual sketch below visualises the 
design we aspired towards.    
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Figure 6.11: Conceptual design for interactive Venn diagram 
 
 
Prototype production 
 
When producing the cardboard prototype, a series of detailed questions 
surfaced that required implementational clarification of the detailed interactions 
possible. This specifically concerned clarifying the definition of the minimum 
and maximum zones for health and pathology states as well as the necessary 
and possible overlapping zone for these states. From reviewing the relevant 
literature, these values seemed neither easily nor non-ambiguously definable. 
Based on the literature and as a working hypothesis, for the epidemiologic 
view I assumed the minimum healthy-only zone to be from 0 to 2, the minimum 
pathological-only zone to be from 8 to10, and thus the overlapping range to be 
from 2-8. Clearly, this was an aspect that needed to be clarified with the 
medical experts before such a tool could be evaluated with actual decision-
making persons. 
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Figure 6.12: Interactive Venn diagram - minimum healthy and pathological 
zones 
 
 
Review of the working prototype   
 
Once the working prototype was available, I conducted a review of it. One of 
the aims of the review was to examine whether the requirements and criteria 
that evolved throughout the design project could be integrated in sensible 
ways. From my perspective, this approach worked well as the working 
prototype was both very minimal and its interactivity fully focused on the core 
issue it aimed to address, i.e. the shift from an epidemiological to an individual 
person’s perspective on the relations of health and pathology.  
 From an EMT perspective, the way the prototype was to achieve this 
was by its ability to change the resolution of the mapping from the multiple 
possible states of a person as per the epidemiological perspective of a PSA 
test result (overlapping circles) to the perspective of an individual after having 
conducted a biopsy (non-overlapping circles). For example, upon receiving 
the PSA test result, the doctor would explain the test result in terms of 
overlapping health and pathology circles, indicating the possibilities for false-
positive and false-negative results. In order to resolve such uncertainty, a 
doctor can further explain that a biopsy would need to be conducted. The 
result of the biopsy would be to switch from the epidemiologic (overlapping 
circles) view to the individual view and this would happen by moving the slides 
to be adjacent and, thus, the actual binary meaning of an individual’s test 
result to be displayed. This epistemic move is the diagnostic equivalent of 
undertaking a biopsy as explained earlier.  
 Due to the minimalistic design approach, there seemed no need for 
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additional explanatory information as was the case with earlier design ideas 
and prototypes. Furthermore, the tool with its form factor allowed for easy 
handling and use over a longer time-frame, hence marking multiple PSA and 
biopsy results. Lastly, the tool could be designed in such a way that it would 
seem professionally produced. This led me to the decision that this should be 
the final working prototype to evaluate with relevant medical professionals in 
the field of prostate cancer screening.   
 Moreover, in reviewing the working prototype, I prospectively reflected 
on the planned evaluation with doctors and what I expected would happen in 
terms of their reaction to it. In other words, I tried to reflect on whether the tool 
would be well understood and appear useful in supporting their constrained 
patient consultation situation when explaining prostate cancer screening and 
its possible implications. At the heart of this was of course the question of 
whether the tool would allow to visually, interactively and meaningfully illustrate 
the issue of false-positive results.  
 A concern I had was that the use and conceptual understanding of a 
Venn diagram may not be broadly known and, thus, may not easily facilitate 
epistemic action for understanding false-positive test results. Generally, I 
wondered which aspects of the tool would seem most useful, problematic, 
limited or in need of further attention and modification. Among these was the 
question of whether doctors would see the tool as something they could hand 
over to patients once they had explained how to use it. This would be key for it 
to become a useful tool for people themselves in making sense of test result 
information should they decide to start the screening process.  
 More peripherally, and partly more as an aesthetic question, I wondered 
whether the texture of the health and pathology zones could be made more 
meaningful. This could potentially be achieved by exchanging an abstract 
pattern with the application of a man-like symbol instead. Given the early 
stages in designing for epistemic action and deliberately following a 
minimalistic and underspecified design approach, it seemed prudent to expect 
these questions to become partly answered when evaluating the tool with 
relevant medical professionals.  
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Figure 6.13: Interactive Venn diagram final prototype - epidemiological 
perspective101 
 
 
 
Figure 6.14: Interactive Venn diagram final prototype - individual perspective102 
 
 Before such evaluation could begin, I envisioned a second tool to 
facilitate the screening decision-making process. This second tool, as 
discussed earlier, was aiming at addressing the issue with people’s tendency 
not to participate in shared decision making and, thus, neglecting to deliberate 
personal preferences and factor them into the decision-making process. The 
following section will discuss the relevant design process focusing on this 
aspect. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 The prototype is the size of a C6 Envelope, made of sturdy cardboard on the outside and 
with coloured but transparent slides on the inside. See also Appendix 2.!
102 The levers on either side allow for the shifting of the overlapping zones. The left lever is for 
‘Health’ and the right lever is for ‘Pathology.’!
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Problem area #2 - preference diagnosis in shared decision making  
 
As mentioned in the introductory section of this chapter, the second problem 
area I decided to focus on stemmed from patients’ non-participation in shared 
decision making and their tendency to defer this to doctors and follow their 
suggested path of action.103 Such behaviour is problematic as it omits 
deliberating on treatment options, the implications these might have for one’s 
personal and social life, and the potential for retrospective regret after having 
followed a certain treatment path and only then learning about alternative 
possibilities (Mulley et al.  2012).  
 With regard to the specific context of prostate cancer screening, some 
of the potential iatrogenic implications of the screening process may manifest 
in psychological, physical and social realities. At the level of PSA testing, the 
uncertainty of having a false-positive or false-negative test result may make 
some people anxious (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force 2012). Conducting 
a biopsy, i.e. a surgical intervention usually undertaken in a hospital or clinic, 
additionally carries the risk of bacterial infections, which is increasingly 
problematic in hospitals and, in some cases, even lethal (Gale 2011). In the 
case of deciding to treat early cancer, potential side-effects of such treatment 
typically include incontinence and impotency. Such worries are reinforced by 
the fact that prostate cancer is among the cancers with a significant degree of 
overdiagnosis and overtreatment (Essermann and Thompson 2010; Welch and 
Black 2010). 
 I hypothesised that this contextual backdrop could productively be dealt 
with by prospectively reflecting on the potential positive and negative 
implications of the prostate cancer screening. I was, thus, motivated to 
develop tools for anticipating and reflecting on the ways the screening process 
might affect a decision taker’s personal, social and professional everyday life 
as well as how corresponding preferences might be relevant for factoring into 
the screening decision-taking process.  
 Inspiration for creating a way to facilitate prospective reflection while 
building on the ideas of EMT was specifically found in the work of Elena 
Esposito, an Italian sociologist. In a 2007 essay, she compared the 
performativity and productivity of probability theory to realistic narrative fiction 
(Esposito 2007). To start with, she raises the question of how to deal with 
situations of uncertainty. She suggests that, in cases where we are inclined 
towards social consensus of decisions to be taken, a tool is needed which 
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103 Personal communication with Felix Huber and Cédric Poyet, 25. 02. 2014.!
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would allow accounting for one’s decision so they are also intelligible to other 
actors. For Esposito, this is precisely what probability theory provides, an 
instrument which promises future events to be calculable and, thus, possible to 
plan. This, in turn, would help us prevent regrets in the future, while 
maintaining consensus with other actors in the present.  
 However, Esposito argues that such planning cannot operate as a norm 
on the basis of which one can refuse to learn from actual experience. This is 
particularly true for those affected by the negative and considered less 
probable implications of such decisions (ibid.). For her, probability theory 
creates the illusion of present futures, future situations imagined from a 
person’s present understanding, which remain unintelligible beyond the 
hoped-for and more probable outcome. Realistic fiction, however, allows to 
reflect on future presents, future situations informed by a broader 
understanding of possible outcomes, personal implications and what we make 
of them. Precisely as an instrument, its fictional character is utterly transparent 
yet realistic and, thus, actionable in its narrative content. 
 The extended mind thesis was thought potent in supporting such 
prospective reflection, among other reasons by way of building on its 
(hypothesised) role in our use of written and spoken language. In a nutshell, 
Clark (1998) argues that the act of speaking or writing helps us memorise and 
remember newly acquired information. Once spoken or written down, it 
becomes available for evaluation and self-reflection. Such evaluation and 
reflection processes help subsequently identify flaws in a plan we made, or 
critically reflect on the unreliability of our own initial judgment (ibid., 208).  
 Furthermore, and when anticipating longer interactive time-frames, Clark 
compares the potential of written language to the function that the aerial roots 
of mangroves have. These roots act over time by collecting debris (notes, 
questions, thoughts) and, thus, generate the fertile ground on which the 
mangrove tree can grow (understanding, insight, opinion). Similarly, through 
the use of spoken and written language by making notes, reflecting on them 
over time and being able to involve others may provide a useful ground for 
making an informed decision about complex issues, such as cancer 
screening.  
 
 
Phase 1 - Prospective reflection cards  
 
The way I approached these challenges was by creating a set of prospective 
reflection cards. The cards were thought to become operative as a 
complementary tool to existing decision aids and information brochures that 
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tend to be fairly functional and contain a lot of rigorously collated information. 
The aim for the cards was to facilitate ‘translating’ such medical information 
meaningfully to one’s personal life as well as possibly stimulating an interest in 
reading those brochures in the first place.104 In this way, it was also hoped that 
the cards would support the role of doctors in assuming more of a facilitating 
role as part of the shared decision-making process by contextualising medical 
information and how this might be relevant in specific aspects of a screening 
participant’s life. Furthermore, it was hoped that the cards would generate a 
useful ground to evoke and discuss preferences and, thus, factor them into the 
screening decision-making process accordingly.105  
 Given these hoped-for uses, I chose cards as a lightweight approach in 
contrast to a multi-page brochure, as they can be used individually at home or 
when out of one’s home. Furthermore, cards are already used for all sorts of 
purposes, such as games, learning and note-taking; hence the hope they 
would appear as a familiar object, unrelated to the medical context and 
something people would more easily engage with.  
 The question of how many cards should be developed rose early in the 
design and review process. It was specifically triggered as a consequence of 
phase one in the design and development process of what the cards should 
be and do. In this phase, I started out with focusing on developing scenarios 
which would allow people to get a sense of the various side-effects one may 
experience as part of the screening and treatment of prostate cancer. This 
seemed particularly important, given that these side-effects might have 
developed only as a consequence of having been overdiagnosed and 
overtreated (Welch and Black 2010), hence, theoretically at least, avoidable. 
Thus, I conceptualised the cards as ‘task cards’ describing an everyday social 
setting and scenario in which the card-reader should put himself in the coming 
days. The cards also ask the reader to respond to the scenario described 
within the actual situation.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
104 In my first meeting with Felix Huber, a GP and author of a carefully written information 
brochure on prostate cancer screening, he indicated that men typically read the information 
brochures only in the waiting room or briefly during the consultation, but less likely afterwards.!
105 Assessment criteria will be discussed in the following chapter.!
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Figure 6.15: Prospective reflection cards - first prototype 
 
I developed and reviewed an initial draft card with a number of people among 
family and friends, including one person who had been doing PSA tests for a 
number of years already. Furthermore, I also discussed the cards with 
supervisors as well as Eva Ebnöther, a professional medical writer who wrote 
the prostate cancer information brochure for the Swiss Cancer League. From a 
methodological perspective, and in the spirit of RTD, such early discussions 
were aimed at inflecting my designed intentions with and through the 
interpretation of the material by potentially relevant ‘users.’ This allowed me to 
become sensitive to the interpretative issues of using cards for the purposes I 
envisioned.  
 From the review and discussions, a few aspects surfaced as very 
problematic in this first draft. Firstly, both the design of the cards and the 
description of the scenarios seemed rather generic, and I had doubts about 
their capacity to evoke the desired reflections and responses. Secondly, and 
more fundamentally, the scenarios focused almost exclusively on handling 
social situations with side-effects. From the epidemiological data, there is also 
obviously the likelihood that no such implications surface. These situations 
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should equally be anticipated and become part of the card set. More 
generally, this triggered the question of what the balance of scenarios can and 
should be.  
 Lastly, and to my surprise, from my first discussion with urologist Cédric 
Poyet I learned that impotency and incontinence side-effects are experienced 
as a result of actual prostate cancer treatment and not of having a biopsy. This 
medical aspect was clearly wrongly understood and, thus, misrepresented in 
the cards. After learning this, I reviewed the NHS decision aid again and was 
deeply concerned about their very ambiguous description on this matter, 
which had misled me. In summary, for the next phases of development I 
decided that more focus should be placed on a narrative style of scenario, on 
fear and uncertainty of getting cancer instead of the side-effects of preventive 
treatment (as suggested by urologist Cédric Poyet) as well as deliberating and 
defining the underlying logic for the distribution of the social and medical 
scenarios across the card set. 
 
 
Phase 2 - Size of card set and scenario distribution 
 
I started this phase by considering on what grounds and logic the screening 
scenarios covered in the card set would be distributed. By this I refer to the 
practical question of how to decide how many cards there should be that help 
in reflection on a scenario where someone conducting cancer screening 
experiences side-effects, as opposed to the number of cards with scenarios 
where such negative experiences are absent. Producing a set of cards that 
only cover one type of scenario, such as when people screening for cancer 
experience side-effects, clearly deviates from the statistical reality of cancer 
screening (not everyone experiences side-effects), and thus may be said to be 
politically “biased”. Such a bias seemed unwarranted and undesirable as well 
as being potentially reminiscent of “fear-mongering”. Unbiasing the card set 
thus required clarifying and developing an underlying set of assumptions 
based on which the number of cards would be meaningfully defined and their 
content structured accordingly. So as to define this underlying set of 
assumptions, I mapped the prostate cancer screening process from taking a 
PSA test through to actual prostate cancer diagnosis and treatment. I 
augmented the map with the relevant statistical data that is also used, for 
example, in the NHS decision aid for a PSA test. This map shows the statistical 
distribution of potential scenarios that might affect a person during the cancer 
screening process.  
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Figure 6.16: Prostate cancer screening process and informational gaps 
 
 This allowed me to do two things: firstly, project the total number of 
cards it would take should I decide that the whole screening process would be 
covered. Secondly, and more importantly, this map allows to reflect on the 
distribution and relative share of cards for specific aspects of the screening 
process, and what their content would likely need to be. As it turned out, 
settling these questions was fundamental to making the card set both 
intelligible and effective. This is best explained with the following example.  
 My initial assumption was to include the whole prostate cancer 
screening process. In order to define the total number of cards needed, one 
needs to start at the end of the screening process by determining the number 
of cards to be included for actual prostate cancer diagnosis. If we say there 
are 10 cards based on which the outcome of a biopsy would allow to stipulate 
a diagnosis, the distribution according to the diagram above would be as 
follows: 7 negative biopsy results (i.e. false-positive PSA tests) and 3 positive 
biopsy results, of which 1-2 would be non-aggressive prostate cancer largely 
depending upon age of the screening participant. Thus, regressing from these 
10 cards that represent the 86% deciding to have a biopsy translates into 11.6 
cards for that 16/17% having a raised PSA level, which incorporates those 10 
cards. The 11.6 cards which represent the 16/17% with a raised PSA level, in 
turn, are a fraction of all people taking a PSA test, which would amount to 70.3 
cards.  
 
166 !
 
Figure 6.17: Projection of reflection cards for decision-making process 
 
 Needless to say, 70 cards seemed a lot both in terms of people using 
them but also in creating a meaningful set of them. In order to assess this, I 
deliberated what kind of scenarios and content would need to be created for 
the cards so that they would be meaningful for the phase of the corresponding 
screening process. With reference to the diagram above, this exercise 
included thinking about the content of 58 (70-12) cards for people with a 
negative PSA test result. The content for such a scenario would have needed 
to include the potential worry of having a false-negative result (15% of these 
results, source: NHS decision aid). Unfortunately, it is not known how many 
people worry about false-negative test results. Even if this figure were as high 
as 50%, this would have left approximately 30 cards stating that one has had a 
negative PSA test result without much further narrative potential. This seemed 
a comparatively high number in relation to the total set, thus risking rendering 
the whole set rather dull.  
 As a thinking exercise, I explored the idea of focusing the card set on 
the assumption that one has had a positive PSA test result or, in terms of 
prospective reflection, one imagined what one would do in the case one had 
one. The reason for this was also that, from the statistical information available, 
it clearly seemed that at least a great many people are seriously worried about 
a positive PSA test result. Among the population with a positive PSA test result, 
86% undertake a biopsy despite the fact that 70-80% of these results are false-
positive ones. A similarly high figure seems unlikely for people undertaking a 
biopsy after having a negative PSA test result, even though this figure is 
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unfortunately unknown. In doing this thought exercise, the 16/17% with a 
positive PSA test result transpired as the starting point for the cascade that 
would encompass all subsequent screening process phases and cards. The 
distribution logic for the cards is visualised in the following diagram. Adding up 
the number of cards for the various scenarios amounts to a total of 25 cards. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.18: Distribution of cards under assumption of positive PSA test result 
 
 As a starting point for the card set, venturing off from a positive PSA test 
result seemed to make a lot of sense. The next question to be answered, 
however, was how far the cards should cover the screening process. More 
specifically, should they cover the phase of cancer diagnosis as well as 
cancer treatment, including the corresponding side-effects following cancer 
treatment? I decided not to include the actual cancer treatment phase, as this 
would have nothing to do with uncertainty as part of the anticipatory screening 
process itself. The latter ends upon cancer diagnosis and, thus, should 
theoretically clarify any uncertainty issues. I write ‘theoretically’ as the issues of 
cancer overdiagnosis and overtreatment obviously do leave significant 
degrees of uncertainty unresolved (Moynihan et al. 2012). But the character of 
uncertainty in this area has a different quality compared to the PSA test 
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uncertainty, and, thus, requires a different engagement with it.106 This would 
have meant entering a field of medical expertise which I did not have and 
could not easily acquire nor credibly or ethically feel equipped to engage with. 
Most likely, I expected that engaging with these advanced issues of 
uncertainty would also potentially cross a boundary with the medical 
professionals that would not be favourable to my project, at the very least not 
in the initial phase of collaboration.  
 A further consideration was that the scenarios in the cards should reflect 
people in different stages of the screening process. This led me to the decision 
to have 4 cards for scenarios such as ‘people undecided about biopsy’. 
Typically, when looking at decision aids, such aspects of being in the process 
of deciding are not reflected. Instead, what is highlighted is the final statistical 
distribution of how screening eventually plays out across a population. With 
this, the focus for the cards in terms of which aspects of the screening process 
to consider was finally set.   
 
 
Phase 3 - narrative style and focusing on uncertainty 
 
Having solved the question concerning the distribution logic of the scenarios in 
the card set, I next focused on narrative style and putting more emphasis on 
the uncertainty of developing cancer instead of the side-effects from treatment 
of cancer.107 Following the envisioned use and contexts, I also explored various 
form factors and paper qualities. Especially length of text used, size of font but 
also having enough space for taking notes would largely determine the size of 
the cards.  
 Furthermore, I aimed for a minimalistic design in order to make the 
cards visually light as well as inviting to look at. To achieve lightness, I got rid 
of the header separation line from the initial card design both on the front and 
back. I changed the font to what seemed a less formal looking one, the colour 
of the paper from white to ecru and a thicker paper with more texture. On the 
back, I exchanged the header ‘notes’ with various prompts to take notes that 
were related to the scenario on the front, such as “At first, I thought…” 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
106 This is because uncertainty with overdiagnosis relates to the difficult question of prognosis of 
the pathological development of an identified cancerous lesion and what an adequate course of 
action may be.!
107 As suggested in the first meeting with urologist Cédric Poyet (see above).!
169 !
 
Figure 6.19: Early card prototype and updated one 
 
 
Figure 6.20: Different sizes of card prototypes  
(Translation: Love – The screening test result is slightly above the recommended 
threshold. Your GP recommends you to conduct a biopsy, just to be sure. How will 
you respond?) 
 
 The final structure of the cards was made up of a header section, the 
actual scenario, questions for reflection and, on the reverse, a prompt to take 
notes semantically related to the scenario described on the front. As a move 
towards a more narrative style, I discarded the generic category headers 
‘work, family, hobbies, future’ I had in the first draft and started to be more 
context-specific. I tried to use the header as a way to describe the contextual 
setting of the scenario which follows. Examples used were ‘among friends’ or 
‘you and your GP talk about next steps.’ This already seemed to relax the 
cards in their appearance and address. In trying to develop more narrative 
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scenarios, I aimed at shifting the focus on various imagined social settings in 
which a person engaged in screening could find himself. Particularly, I tried to 
generate scenarios where the question of uncertainty would be addressed 
socially, see for example below. 
 
     
Figure 6.21: Reflection card final prototype, back and front 
 
 
Review and discussion of the card prototyping process 
 
Developing 25 cards with what felt could be relevant and realistic scenarios 
was challenging. As part of the scenario development process, I considered to 
open up this part of the process for future versions by engaging people who 
conduct screening and live through these issues of uncertainty. The way this 
could be realised was by running workshops or even, at a later stage, setting 
up an online version of the cards which would allow people to generate their 
own cards and share them with others. As a starting ground, however, I drew 
indirect inspiration from reading through relevant online fora entries of people 
engaged in prostate cancer screening.  
 Concerning the language used when developing the cards, I tried again 
to follow a degree of underspecification. This seemed difficult to achieve and I 
felt it ran the risk of the cards seeming technically incorrect or unprofessional 
by being too vague. Nevertheless, I tried achieving a subtle balance, for 
example by not using any quantitative probabilistic information so often found 
in medical decision aids and information brochures. Instead, I resorted to 
using subjunctive forms or at best descriptive words such as ‘often,’ or ‘in 
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some cases.’ I followed this approach when describing the results of a PSA 
test. To give an example, a card would start with ‘You had a PSA test and the 
result was slightly below/above the recommended threshold.’    
 The final aspect I changed in the cards’ appearance, apart from size, 
paper texture and font, was that I decided to include illustrations. The reason 
for doing so was, again, to make the cards appear less sterile, which seemed 
important given their content and the hoped-for engagement with them. This 
was an indication I noticed during my various discussions when reviewing the 
prototypes. However, and importantly, what the illustrations should not do was 
to somehow represent anything specific that was described in the scenario on 
the cards. Rather, the hope was to further support evoking a reaction to or 
reflection on the card’s content. To that extent, the illustrations were selected 
based on their capacity for associative potential and, at best, to create a 
tension between the text and the illustration itself. With the integration of 
illustrations, the card set seemed finalised as a robust working prototype which 
should allow me to find out whether they are seen as valuable and productive 
in the eyes of relevant medical professionals. The full set of cards can be 
found in Appendix 3.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, using research through design as a method for the design and 
development process was very productive in a variety of ways. First and 
foremost, it helped elicit a sense and understanding for the difficulty of 
designing for epistemic action. This challenge is made up of at least three 
aspects: 
 Firstly, the process of clarifying which particular informational aspect I 
should specifically focus on when designing for epistemic action and, thus, be 
able to support an understanding of. As I have highlighted, this requires a 
precise understanding of the context on the part of the designer, separating 
out aspects thought to be of lesser importance and formulating a working 
hypothesis as to what aspect is believed to be the key epistemic goal. As the 
design process described above has revealed, RTD allows for such a working 
hypothesis to be continuously refined. It does so by aiming to explore 
understandings in a particular situation, and, in that regard, has helped 
focusing the iterative design process described above towards supporting 
such a situational understanding. This, in turn, provided the lens through which 
I was able to prospectively reflect upon the relevancy of the potential 
interactions with the developed prototypes and refine them successively. 
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 Secondly, the actual design of epistemic action requires identifying 
possible and relevant forms of interaction which may productively support 
reflection-in-action. Here, RTD was especially helpful in working through and 
reflecting-in-action various prototypes, in turn allowing to test and clarify 
understanding as well as evaluating the epistemic capacity of the designed 
interactions. Specifically, RTD helped clarify which role the users of my 
prototypes would likely take on when using them and the implications this 
might have for the desired epistemic action. 
 Thirdly, identifying the multiple possible and valid interpretations of any 
such epistemic action that seem to remain no matter how specific one has 
thought to have designed it. Importantly, what this does is supporting a (late) 
realisation of the potentially many valid ways in which text as well as 
visualisations can be read, interpreted and understood (Sengers and Gaver 
2007). Given this, what is of importance is approaching the design of such 
decision support tools with a knowingness which permits “a condition of 
recognising the processing of the situation to unfold in a way that allows the 
user of the designed tool to also enter in some kind of composition with the 
design process” (Fuller 2014).108 Shared decision-making (SDM), in turn, may 
also need to be understood as the actual making of the necessary conditions 
for a decision to be made, rather than today’s design of SDM that seems more 
akin to shared decision taking based on facts presented. With this, I 
specifically refer to the complexity and richness of the design process of such 
conditions that materialise in a decision-support tool as developed and 
described in this chapter.  
 The design and development process also evoked thinking about 
relevant aspects and questions concerning the evaluation. The expected 
outcome from the evaluation will be discussed at the start of the next chapter 
and followed by the actual findings from the evaluation and a discussion 
thereof. The latter will also reflect on the issues, methodological limitations and 
lessons coming out of the design and evaluation process.  
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108 Personal communication, 02. 06. 2014.!
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Chapter 7  
Evaluation and research findings 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will discuss the research findings. I will do so firstly by reflecting 
on the expectations and the hoped-for outcomes of the evaluation phase that 
emerged out of theoretical arguments in chapter 1 to 4 as well as the design 
process itself. Secondly, I will discuss the evaluation process and outcomes. 
Based on this I will then discuss and methodologically interpret the research 
findings. Lastly, I will highlight and reflect upon both methodological 
challenges and insights during the design and evaluation process.  
 Before proceeding to the discussion of the evaluation sessions and 
interpretation of research findings, it is useful and necessary to situate the 
hopes and expectations from this phase of the research. Together with the 
methodological interpretative framework discussed later, this will allow me to 
clarify both the role and meaning of the prototypical tools for this research as it 
emerged through the design process and evaluation sessions.  
 To start with, it is important to characterise the context within which this 
research seeks to make a relevant contribution. This research context can be 
described as a technically specialised field. Consequently, high barriers could 
potentially exist in terms of being accepted, in particular as a non-medical 
professional. This is because I am designing material which is to be used in 
the process of patient consultations. Typically, such material seems to be 
developed by medical professionals with an interest in decision support.  
 Furthermore, it has to be noted that I have no prior documented 
practical engagement or expertise in this area, thus the research is almost 
purely informed by a critical reading of relevant literature as well as my design 
practice in other non-medical related areas. It goes without saying that the 
opportunity to observe processes in medical consultations requires access to 
these contexts, which is not easily facilitated and involves a variety of ethical 
and professional approvals. When introducing myself with a background in 
design and cultural studies to medical professionals I spoke to during this 
research, I was met with interest; nevertheless, some explanation was required 
as to how I arrived at this topic and why it makes sense to engage with it from 
my background.  
 As regards more formal aspects, this research project is completely 
self-initiated as well as self-funded. All these aspects can and have made it 
difficult to get access to and cooperation with relevant medical professionals. 
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The process of identifying and winning over relevant medical professionals to 
cooperate with was very lengthy and ran in parallel to the design process itself 
as will be explained below. The evaluation sessions with the medical 
professionals must, thus, be seen from multiple perspectives.  
 As I have come to realise throughout the design and evaluation 
process, this constitutes the first phase of a much longer research project, 
which from a methodological standpoint aims at entering a more intensive co-
creation process with relevant medical professionals and patients as well as 
eventually evaluating the resulting designs with both of them. Needless to say, 
such a project would operate on a scale and timeline that would require more 
substantive resources and infrastructures, rendering it well beyond the 
capacity frame of this PhD research. This, however, will only become possible 
once I have established and documented that there is a need and perceived 
relevancy on the side of medical professionals, and that my knowledge and 
experience are accepted and seen as desirable and complimentary within this 
context.   
 Following these contextual considerations, the desired outcome of the 
evaluation phase of this research project concerns three broad aspects. 
Firstly, I was hoping to get a sense of the topical relevancy of what I do with my 
decision support tools and, as a consequence, commitment by the medical 
professionals to cooperate short-term with the prototype evaluation. This was 
thought important so as to understand whether what I perceived as the 
decisional problem from the literature review maps onto the actual clinical 
decisional problems as encountered by physicians and patients alike.  
 Furthermore, prior research suggests (Bates et al. 2003) that the 
acceptance of decision-support tools is critically dependent on medical 
professionals finding the tools relevant to their consultation practice. Based on 
this as well as the self-funded nature of this research, I decided to only work 
with medical professionals in the first phase. This led me to contact relevant 
medical professionals during the design process phase of the project in order 
to clarify medical questions and ensure clinical relevancy of my research and 
design focus. Additionally, the hope was that topical relevancy and 
acceptance, in turn, might open the path to undertake field research 
concerning physician-patient consultations in the future. As a result of the 
decision to work with medical professionals but not patients in this phase of the 
research, no ethics statement is necessary. 
 Secondly, I was hoping to generate interest in the particular design 
approach towards decision support I chose. Feedback on this aspect was 
deemed crucial so as to better understand and steer relevant and useful future 
design process and prototyping directions. This aspect was factored into the 
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design process by following a design approach which aimed at generating 
prototypes which are minimal enough to invite participation in refining them, 
while at the same time being finished enough so as to be perceived relevant 
and productive for potential patient evaluation.  
 This latter aspect relates to the third and last hope of the evaluation 
phase. This is the perceived relevancy of the prototypes so as to generate 
interest and commitment for a longer-term collaboration with the goal to 
evaluate the prototypes for their relevancy, capacity to support the specific 
decisional aspects and potential in an evaluation with actual patients. With this 
I refer particularly to the potential gap between representations of the 
decisional problems in the literature, predominantly written by medical 
professionals, and accounts from a patient’s perspective, such as those 
provided more recently by Kukla (2007, 2005) and Carel (2008).   
 In order to answer these questions, I organised evaluation sessions with 
three medical professionals. Professor Jacques Cornuz is a specialist in social 
and preventive medicine, highly engaged in the practice of shared decision 
making and director of the university hospital in Lausanne, Switzerland. I had 
identified him through a paper he co-published on the state of SDM in 
Switzerland (Cornuz et al. 2011). More specifically, I was interested in his 
appraisal of my tools and, in particular, their underlying design approach 
which is vastly different from existing decision aids. Given his broad 
experience and practical engagement in the field of SDM, his specific 
expertise was deemed highly relevant for my research and its application 
within the Swiss medical context.  
 Felix Huber is a GP with a long-term critical engagement with the 
various issues of prostate cancer screening described earlier. He is also the 
founder and president of a network of group practices of GP’s in Switzerland. I 
had become aware of him through what I deemed to be a very balanced 
medical information brochure concerning prostate cancer that he had co-
written (Huber et al. 2012). I vaguely expected that, in his professional role as 
a GP, he would be slightly differently involved in the role of advising people on 
whether or not to screen for prostate cancer compared to a urologist. The 
latter, I understood, would be someone to be involved once there was actual 
concern of potential prostate cancer based on a positive PSA test result with a 
GP patient. This question of the role of different professionals in the screening 
consultation process was something to be further clarified as part of the 
sessions, particularly since the literature was not informative on this aspect.      
 Lastly, Cédric Poyet is a urological medical specialist and a Deputy 
Head of the Prostate Carcinoma Center at the University Hospital in Zurich, 
Switzerland. In his role, he could be using my tool as well as engaging with 
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potential patient users on a daily basis. Thus, he could be said to have 
extensive relevant experience to comment on the challenges with prostate 
cancer screening in everyday medical consultation practice. This, I expected, 
would allow him to comment on and assess the relevancy and capacity of my 
prototypes from a variety of important perspectives: firstly, evaluating my tools 
from a medical technical perspective, which I thought was important so as to 
ensure they were technically correct and fit for purpose; secondly, his central 
position in matters of prostate cancer screening should enable him to give 
feedback on whether the tools focus on aspects relevant for better supporting 
the consultation process; lastly, his extensive experience would allow him to 
estimate the tool’s capacity for epistemic action for a variety of different types 
of persons, be they young or old and with different visual and linguistic 
literacies.  
 Evaluating with medical professionals of different kinds was intentional. 
My aim was to generate multiple perspectives on the tools and the role they 
might play in different settings and for different medical professionals. This 
aspect seemed particularly important, given the absence of practical insights 
into the consultation practice in these settings. In organising the evaluation 
sessions, I was able to meet Cédric Poyet and Felix Huber once before the 
actual sessions to personally introduce myself, this research and my interest to 
win them as participants for the evaluation sessions. With Jacques Cornuz I 
was only able to have e-mail exchanges in which I introduced the research 
and he declared interest in participating in such an evaluation session.  
 There were also much more immediate hopes and expectations 
concerning feedback on the prototypes and their potential role as part of 
medical consultations. One role the prototypes were hoped to play was that of 
a useful inflection point for discussing the problem space with medical 
professionals. I was particularly interested in learning how they assess the 
project based on their everyday medical practice and the kinds of challenges 
they meet in explaining prostate cancer screening and its potential 
implications. Thus, inherent was the question of which aspects were to be 
supported in the medical consultation process and should, thus, be focused 
on in the prototype design process.  
 Given the difficulty of accessing relevant medical professionals early in 
the design process, a problem that can be easily imagined to surface in a 
variety of contexts and, more particularly, in the context of entering a new 
problem space and field, the design focus decisions I took were exclusively 
based on my review of the literature. To some degree, thus, I had to speculate 
on whether such literature represents well the kinds of challenges medical 
professionals would deem (most) relevant.  
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 Directly following questions of what to focus on were also considerations 
of how the tools would specifically be put to use as part of the consultation 
process itself. This was an area which seemed most difficult to prospectively 
assess, because of the previously mentioned absence of prior experience with 
the everyday medical consultation process. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the tools were designed so as to be used by actual decision-taking 
persons instead of something to be operated by the medical professional. The 
question, thus, was whether the medical professionals would see this as both 
desirable and well supported with the tools I created.  
 Inherent in how the tools would become operative in the consultation 
process was the research question of whether the medical professionals would 
see the potential and capacity for epistemic action in the design of the tools. 
Having medical professionals recognise a capacity in the tools for clarifying 
false-positive and false-negative results as well as the preference-construction 
and diagnosis process would indicate that the tools a) facilitate translating 
medical information from DA’s to one’s personal life, and b) allow doctors to 
take on more of a facilitating role. In turn, this would imply that screening 
decisions would be less often deferred from patient to doctors and more often 
taken in a shared decision-making manner. 
 
 
Evaluation sessions 
 
The sessions were planned as semi-structured interviews along the following 
lines: First, I gave an overview of the evaluation session and what would 
happen within the planned total time of about 45 minutes. This is the amount of 
time I deemed appropriate when asking medical professionals to participate, 
and long enough to achieve the engaged discussion I was aiming for. Then, I 
gave a brief introduction of the screening decision problems, my analysis of 
the shortcomings of existing approaches and an overview of the tools I 
designed. Subsequently, I introduced the Venn diagram interaction tool, 
explained how it works and highlighted the specific decision problem it seeks 
to address. I explained the tool by way of a scenario when a patient has 
undertaken a PSA test and received a result of 3.7 or 4.1 score. Additionally, I 
explained the particular inspiration for the design stemming from an EMT 
perspective as discussed previously.  
 Following this introduction I started the conversation by asking the 
following questions: 
 
- Is the tool understandable for the medical professional and patient? 
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- What is your assessment of the capacity of the tool to support clarification of 
the decisional problem relating to understanding false-positive and false-
negative test results and whether or not to have a biopsy? 
- Will the tool be deemed relevant and used by decision-takers? 
 
 After having explored the specific questions concerning the Venn 
diagram interaction tool, I introduced the reflection cards, how they work and 
the specific decision problem they aim at addressing. This was followed by 
highlighting the particular sources of design inspiration I gained from EMT and 
by starting to ask the following questions:  
 
- Are the cards understandable for the medical professional and patient? 
- What is your assessment of the capacity of the cards to support clarification 
of preference diagnosis and, thus, whether or not to engage in prostate cancer 
screening? 
- Will the cards be deemed relevant and used by decision-takers? 
 
 After having explored the tool #2 specific questions, I directed the 
discussion towards more fundamental questions concerning both tools and 
their overall role in such SDM processes. The questions I had were the 
following:   
 
- Was the selection of thematic focus relevant for supporting SDM processes? 
- What will happen if tools were used by patients? 
-Would you use the tools yourself? What would you want to change/improve? 
- Do they make good use of doctor time? 
- Do you have an interest in further collaboration for tool refinement and 
evaluation? 
 
 
Session with Jacques Cornuz 
 
The first session was with Jacques Cornuz and took place at the University 
Hospital in Lausanne on the 21st of February 2014. I would have preferred to 
have this session last, since this was the first time we met, but the availability of 
doctors was beyond my control. Thus, I anticipated needing a little more time 
to introduce myself as well as the research project. However, given his 
expertise and engagement with SDM, I thought there was not too much of a 
risk loosing much session time on this aspect. Hence, I approached this first 
session optimistically and with great curiosity.  
 When I met Jacques Cornuz in his office, he quickly asked his colleague 
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Reto Auer, a medical doctor with a background in epidemiology and 
biostatistics and Head of the clinic at the university hospital, to join as he would 
have to leave after 45 minutes to attend a funeral. This seemed to me a ‘good 
sign,’ indicating that my research was of interest to them and they were 
anticipating a longer conversation. I started the session by introducing myself 
in terms of professional and academic background.109 I then introduced my 
academic research project, which - in a nutshell - ventures from the 
observation of an online health search phenomenon and then builds on a 
critical review of evidence-based medicine and existing decision-support 
approaches in SDM with the goal to re-design decision-support tools inspired 
by extended and distributed cognitive theories.  
 Interestingly, both of them pointed out quickly that SDM does not really 
work well today for a variety of reasons, key among them being the lack of 
interest on the side of patients/participants. This candid acknowledgement was 
partly surprising to me, as the literature pointed more towards a problem of 
adoption by medical professionals. However, my very own appraisal of existing 
decision-support approaches (see chapter three), hence the motivation for this 
research, was that there was a ‘design problem,’ even though I was not aware 
of the magnitude of the lack of interest by participants to this point.  
 After a brief discussion on the decision problems involved in prostate 
cancer screening, I introduced the reflection cards by explaining how they 
should be used and could be integrated in a consultative process. I also 
explained the thinking behind their design and the hope they could support 
extended and distributed cognitive processes. As I expected this aspect to be 
of much less interest to the medical professionals, I kept this part rather short 
when preparing for the evaluation sessions. Much to my surprise, this turned 
out to be of substantial interest to both Jacques Cornuz and Reto Auer. They 
explained that, as part of their engagement in the development of shared 
decision-making from a perspective of preventive medicine, they have 
witnessed a number of other tested and failed approaches to facilitate 
behaviour change. Among them was for example behavioural economics 
which, for them, was incapable of tackling their professional challenges, such 
as getting pregnant women to stop smoking.  
 The cards were first met with what seemed reserved curiosity by the 
medical professionals. One of the first questions from Jacques Cornuz was 
whether the cards operated with precise quantitative risk information as part of 
the scenarios. I explained that they did not and that this was one of the 
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109 Professionally I explained that I am a lecturer and deputy Head of Interaction Design at 
Zurich University of the Arts, as well as having 20 years of professional experience in various 
roles as a designer, consultant, researcher and analyst.!
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intentions in designing cards. Furthermore, I explicated that the purpose of this 
linguistic underspecification was, on the one hand, to stress the 
complementary function of the cards to the more extensively informative 
brochures and, more particularly, the consultation with the medical 
professional; on the other hand, to avoid the impression of an exact figure 
which serves as a reliable ground for planning and individual decision-making 
in this specific context. In relation to the latter, the absence of such quantitative 
risk information should, in the best of cases, direct attention to the prospective 
reflection facilitated by the questions on the cards.  
 The two medical professionals agreed that this was an interesting take 
on designing decision support, in particular also with regard to respecting the 
literacy levels of some of their patients, which can be problematic with 
extensive information brochures that include such quantitative risk information. 
Furthermore, they noted one aspect of the reflection cards which was 
structurally very different from existing decision-support approaches. For them, 
what the cards did was introducing and, in this way, reframing the time 
dimension of decision taking. Existing tools seemed designed for something 
akin to instant decision taking or, as they put it, “sitting down, decide and then 
execute decision” based on the current life of a decision taker (Kukla 2005, 
35).  
 The reflection cards, in contrast, introduced a much longer time 
dimension both for the actual decision-taking process and the time-frame for 
which the decision should be accounted for. In other words, the decisional 
goal supported by existing tools is to make the best decision for the current 
situation of the decision taker, and the information provided seems to be 
selected and designed particularly to support this motivation. My approach, in 
contrast, aimed at both factoring in a longer time-frame for which the decision 
taken should be valid and, as a consequence, explicitly anticipating shifting 
values and criteria for assessing and accounting for the decision.  
 Given the long time-frame a prostate screening process occupies (up to 
25 years), such an approach seemed very interesting and valuable to them. 
This perspective was inherent in my design approach, especially as a 
consequence of the inspiration found in Esposito’s future present (2007). 
However, it was less apparent to me that the orientation of current decision 
aids seemed designed so clearly from and for a perspective of current lives 
only. In retrospect, this is much more obvious now. Since decision aids are not 
yet inclined to also support the much longer-term and potentially time-
consuming preference-construction process, their focus is on the short-term 
preventive action avoiding the long-term significant risk of cancer.  
 Building on this observation, we also discussed the potential of a digital 
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version of the cards. My idea for an online version was that it should make 
accessible and visible the notes and decisions of other prostate cancer 
screening decision takers. This, in turn, would allow other people (screening 
decision takers as well as related ones) to understand and potentially be 
inspired by the ways in which such circumstances and decisions are being 
taken and accounted for. The potential benefits highlighted by Cornuz and 
Auer would also be to make the decision process a less isolated one as well as 
making visible that it is less linear than one might think.  
 This latter aspect is concerned with the experience of learning what it 
means to be doing screening. As it transpired from my literature review and 
was confirmed in my session with Cédric Poyet later, it is quite common for a 
person engaged in prostate cancer screening to have multiple biopsies based 
on false-positive PSA tests. Thus, it is not unlikely that such an experience 
might change people’s minds as to the value of PSA testing and undertaking 
biopsies. To this end, both Cornuz and Auer saw the cards as an interesting 
and lightweight approach that might be productive for a variety of people and 
contexts.  
 However, they also pointed out two likely limitations for the productivity 
of the cards. The first is that, based on their experience, men are much less 
likely to actively engage in a shared medical decision-making process. As they 
explained, typically men will ask the doctor for a recommendation of what to do 
and generally follow this suggested course of action. According to Cornuz and 
Auer, men within European western culture tend to be less inclined to engage 
with their health and body.  
 Secondly, Auer remarked that, while he sees potential in the cards, they 
will not be able to ‘unbias’ the medical professionals themselves. With that he 
meant that, often, medical professionals have a relatively set opinion as to the 
best path of action and stick to that. Thus, as discussed earlier, the source of 
the problem for acknowledging preference-sensitive care and preference 
diagnosis would, according to Auer, remain unchallenged and unchanged. 
This was an interesting comment which I did not anticipate, as my working 
assumption was that doctors may have an interest in SDM so as to redistribute 
the responsibility for implications of the actual course of action followed. In 
retrospect, it may be said to be only partially surprising to hear such a 
comment from a medical professional engaged in the area of SDM: unbiasing 
medical professionals could be seen as one of the core problems to address 
since the identification of unwarranted small-area variation by Wennberg 
(1973).  
 In the second part of the session, I introduced the PSA Venn interaction 
tool along with the decisional problem it seeks to support. Interestingly, while 
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Cornuz immediately understood the tool and found it useful, Auer had 
problems in making sense of it. He was particularly irritated by the visual form 
chosen, given that in his medical training he was not used to a Venn diagram 
but to a line-graph for such matters. While the visual form did not work for both, 
the tool was of interest to them as something to be handed over and handled 
by the patient after a brief introduction. Also, they found the topical focus of the 
tool - enabling the shift from an epidemiological perspective to an individual 
one - very relevant for SDM. In the case of Auer, who first questioned the need 
for patients to understand this aspect, his opinion shifted after having him 
imagine being a patient having had a PSA test and then using the tool to make 
sense of it.    
 Another question the two doctors had was whether and how I saw my 
tools to complement existing decision-supporting material, such as brochures 
and videos. The question probably stems from the fact that some of this 
material is already in circulation and, thus, any new material should add to 
rather than duplicate that. My response to their question was that a key 
element that informed the design of my tools was the idea and hope that 
particularly the reflection cards would precisely facilitate the process of 
appropriating technical information (as provided by brochures and videos) by 
transferring it to a person’s personal and social life and, thus, making it socially 
meaningful.  
 They both agreed that the tools were interesting for their purposes and 
agreed to proceed with the project to a patient evaluation phase at their 
hospital. Interestingly, with regard to my question of what they thought the 
reactions and outcomes of actual patients using the tools would be, they 
responded that they simply did not know, as my approach was structurally so 
different from previous ones. Lastly, they saw a great need to include non-
medical professionals with backgrounds such as myself into the process of 
further developing SDM-tools, and invited me to an SDM meeting in July which 
would bring together French and Canadian medical professionals engaged in 
the SDM field. The meeting would address SDM in a number of other cancer-
related fields, such as colon cancer, which, according to Auer, is a somehow 
opposite problem when compared to prostate cancer. With colon cancer, 
treatment is very effective, but very few people engage in screening and can, 
thus, be diagnosed and treated. 
      
 
Session with Felix Huber 
 
The session with Felix Huber was held in his office in his group practice in 
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Zurich. Because we met once before, the session needed much less 
introduction. I briefly gave an overview of how I thought we could run the 
session, asked for permission to audio-record it and started introducing the 
reflection cards. In the first meeting with Huber, I had already shown him an 
earlier prototype of the cards, so he was vaguely familiar with them. Thus, in 
the evaluation session, I explained the phase of the screening process they 
are focused on and the distribution of the scenarios according to the 
epidemiological statistics so as to be unbiased.  
 His first impression of the cards was that they presuppose a relatively 
high level of understanding on the matter of prostate screening on behalf of the 
reader. For him, a patient would first have had to read an information brochure 
on prostate cancer, such as the one he wrote, that introduces the topic. 
Hence, he was sceptical about the cards suitability for daily consultative 
purposes. When asked where he saw the potential difficulties arising, he 
referred to his observation that few men read their information brochure about 
prostate cancer screening.  
 Furthermore, about two-thirds of the men that see him in this regard 
simply ask him to tell them what to do, without any desire to engage in the 
decision-making process. For him this is not a satisfying experience, as he 
would rather see the patient taking this decision himself. I explained that my 
hope was that the cards might generate a deeper interest in the matter by a) 
situating the potential course and implications of the screening process in 
actual life circumstances, and b) framing the decision process over the course 
of a week, which - in turn - might lead to more engaged conversations with a 
GP. Huber thought that this might indeed make patients more interested in the 
matter. Nevertheless he admitted that generally men as a target user group 
were very difficult to work with as they often seem to lack an interest in 
engaging with their health. He also thought about whether to make the 
language used in the cards even simpler so as to address more potential 
users, but simultaneously worried whether such a strategy would allow to still 
produce meaningful cards supporting the preference-construction process. He 
suspected that, whilst he found the tool very good, it might not be used very 
often for the reasons mentioned above.  
 At this point, the conversation took an unexpected turn. Huber 
suggested to focus on women and breast cancer, instead, and develop the 
very same reflection cards for this purpose. For him, the cards would be very 
likely to work well in this context, as the breast cancer topic is emotionally a lot 
more charged and, in contrast to prostate cancer, affects women early in their 
lives. He mentioned that he also wrote a corresponding information brochure 
for breast cancer and that, in the gynaecological practice of a relative, women 
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are requesting and using the brochures a lot. Adding to this was also the 
current news that the Swiss Medical Board, an institution with the power to 
recommend but not to oblige, had decided to no longer recommend the use of 
mammography as the potential benefits do not outweigh its disadvantages 
(2014). Huber also offered to put me in contact with said gynaecologist to work 
on the reflection cards for breast cancer. For him the issue that needed be 
understood by women is the fact that many are overdiagnosed and 
overtreated, which as a problem is similar to the prostate cancer screening 
issues discussed earlier.  
 In the second part of the session, I introduced the PSA Venn interaction 
tool. Huber immediately confirmed that the tool makes the dilemma of 
interpreting PSA test results very easily understandable visually through the 
overlapping of the health and pathology circles. For him, the ability of the tool 
to show that even a person with a PSA score of 8.0 can still be healthy while 
someone with a score of 2.0 may already be having cancer was very useful to 
support a consultation. Furthermore, the tool would make clear that only by 
conducting a biopsy could the shift towards an individual’s perspective, or 
from overlapping to adjacent circles, be made. Also the possibility to add 
notes and use the tool over an extended period and possibly multiple PSA 
tests was desirable for Huber. While he was sceptical regarding the broad use 
of the reflection cards, he was nevertheless willing to use both tools with 
patients by setting up a corresponding patient evaluation project in the months 
ahead.   
 
 
Session with Cédric Poyet 
 
The final session with Cédric Poyet, the urologist, was held in my office at 
Zurich University of the Arts. I started the session by introducing the reflection 
cards, how they were developed and what part of the screening process they 
cover. Poyet read the scenarios of a few cards and then started to reflect on 
their potential from the perspective of his everyday consultation experience. 
The first thing he noted was that some of the scenarios might be more likely to 
occur and, thus, be relevant in a setting of a urological specialist rather than a 
GP. The card and scenario he referred to was where a person already had a 
second negative biopsy. From his perspective, such a scenario would be less 
likely to happen with a person being in consultation with a GP.  
 Furthermore, he reported that, from his experience, people in screening 
are less concerned with potential side-effects of cancer treatment should that 
ever be necessary, but much more with the uncertainty of whether or not they 
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have or will develop cancer. The uncertainty seems to even increase in the 
scenario just mentioned above where a person had undertaken multiple 
biopsies with negative results. In such situations, Poyet mentioned that people 
often find it difficult to accept that the biopsy was not able to find cancer 
despite the (false-) positive PSA test result and continue to think that the 
cancer must be there. It is almost as if there was some kind of anchoring or 
path-dependent thinking being triggered by those false-positive PSA test 
results. 
 I followed up with Poyet whether my imagined scenario that a person 
may have had multiple negative biopsies over the course of the screening is a 
common one. Poyet confirmed that it is particularly common at the Prostate 
Carcinoma Centre at the University Hospital, as very often they get referrals 
from external urologists asking them to undertake another biopsy so as to 
confirm their own biopsy results. I explained the reasons why I included such a 
scenario in the cards, which stem from my review of existing information 
brochures and decision aids. I noticed that none of the brochures and decision 
aids I had reviewed make this operative aspect of doing screening very clear 
by explaining that a person may find themselves with recurring positive PSA 
test results and, as a consequence, undertaking multiple biopsies which turn 
out to be negative.  
 Additionally, the reviewed information material does not highlight how 
this affects people’s sense of uncertainty and the discomfort this generates. 
This clarification led to another very interesting question from Poyet, i.e. who I 
would hand these cards out to. At first I thought he meant this as a general 
question regarding who would distribute the cards, but he quickly clarified that 
his question was whether I intended to hand these cards out also to people 
that have already had a third negative biopsy, similarly to the scenario just 
discussed.  
 My original intention was that the cards should primarily be directed at 
people not having started with prostate cancer screening and trying to decide 
whether or not to do so, or people who just got their first PSA test result back 
and want to make sense of it. At the same time, my thinking was that I could 
obviously not prevent these cards from possibly finding their way to people 
already engaged in prostate cancer screening who experience uncertainty 
about its merits. Poyet was of the opinion that the cards would compel such 
people to grapple with this decision actively.  
 Responding to my question of whether people would actually use the 
cards and actively engage in the decision-making process, Poyet responded 
with a ‘yes and no.’ Like Huber, Cornuz and Auer, he thought that maybe a 
third of the people would use the reflection cards while many would also 
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simply delegate the decision-making to the doctor. Again, men turned out to 
be a particularly difficult group for such active involvement in health decisions 
and, again, women were suggested as more likely to be open to such a 
decision-support tool. For him, the best way to motivate people becoming 
involved in their health would be by introducing such tools as part of the 
consultation process, either by a doctor or a nurse.  
 When I asked Poyet whether he could see himself using the tools in his 
institution and consultation process, he explained that the problem might be 
that he does not see the people who are still at the stage of deciding whether 
or not to start prostate screening very much. These are more likely to be found 
in consultation with a GP practice. He usually sees people being referred by a 
GP with a heightened PSA based on which the GP requests a biopsy to be 
undertaken. In such a situation, he believes that the reflection cards could be 
counterproductive by reopening the question of whether or not to screen. This 
could potentially harm the credibility and trust in the GP on the part of the 
patient as well as possibly trust in medicine as such. In such a situation, Poyet 
explained, he would first do the medical examination as requested and only 
then possibly re-evaluate the person’s medical situation and discuss it with him 
as a next step.  
 This was a rather unexpected moment in the evaluation session. The 
reflection cards seem to have uncovered an aspect of the social and 
professional understanding of and dynamic between various medical roles in 
which a person may find himself. To a degree, I was a bit shocked by the 
apparent and implicit shared understanding among medical professionals that 
seems to prevent a medical specialist from inquiring into a referred patient’s 
full understanding of the potential implications of the screening process he is 
about to start. The reflection cards seemed to have uncovered this by way of 
situating the scenarios in a variety of different moments within the larger 
screening process, some of which - according to Poyet - belong more to the 
world of medical specialists like him, while others belong to the practice of 
GPs. Thus, by being very specific in terms of the scenarios, the cards had 
unintentionally operated as probes into the professional practices of medical 
professionals and the underlying understanding of their role within the larger 
screening process. Again, neither from my review of the literature nor that of 
decision aids and information brochures would a prostate cancer screening 
decision-taking person become possibly aware of such aspects. From my 
perspective, I would particularly expect the medical specialist to make me 
aware of the full benefits, implications and risks of the procedures he is likely to 
know much more about than a GP. 
 I asked Poyet whether he could imagine the following scenario: a 
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person with the age to potentially start with prostate cancer screening visits his 
GP; instead of doing a PSA test, the GP hands him the cards and refers him to 
a specialist, such as Poyet, for an initial consultation excluding any medical 
examination. Poyet confirmed that this would actually be his most desirable 
situation, as, based on his particular expertise and experience, he thought he 
is in a much stronger position to consult a person in this regard and answer 
their questions. For him, the worst scenario, and simultaneously probably the 
very reason why the PSA test has become so disreputable, is that the PSA test 
is just undertaken without prior reflection on the potential implications thereof 
by conducting a preference diagnosis with the person.  
 Given the strong interest Huber and Poyet share in having well-informed 
and actively involved people in the decision-making process, I suggested to 
set up a meeting between the two so that we could discuss a patient 
evaluation project of my tools which would also consider a change in the 
consultative process between the GP and the specialist as just laid out. Poyet 
was very interested and enthusiastic about it and even suggested that this 
could lead to setting up a regular prostate cancer consultation hour where not 
just people interested in the matter but also their GPs could participate. Poyet 
explained that they successfully run a similar model with oncologists when 
having to discuss whether or not certain patients should be put on 
chemotherapy. Because the patients already know Poyet well and do not want 
to consult a medical specialist totally unknown to them, Poyet asks the 
oncologists to join the consultation he has with the patient and so they discuss 
the questions the patient has in that environment.  
 Furthermore, for Poyet it would be important and interesting to see how 
GPs perceive the specialist’s role and what they could contribute towards a 
better collaboration with the patient in mind. He feared that GPs may 
sometimes be hesitant to refer a patient to the specialist as GPs see them as 
too eager to conduct medical analysis, such as biopsies. Interestingly, some 
kind of self-reproducing feedback and feedforward loops appear to exist: 
  On the one hand, a specialist such as Poyet sees patients referred to 
them by GPs and external urologists; he believes he has to conduct the 
medical analysis expected of him as a specialist by the GPs and external 
urologists without having the freedom to independently consult those patients 
about the process. Doing so, he believes, would question the credibility of and 
trust in those external medical professionals on the part of the patient and, 
consequently, negatively affect the relationship between the medical 
professionals and the specialist.  
 On the other hand, Poyet fears that those external medical professionals 
see the specialists as too eager to conduct medical analysis only, and are 
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hesitant to refer patients because of that. It is almost as if there is a vacuum 
inhibiting an explicit clarification of what the expected and, more importantly, 
most suitable role is for a specialist, which seems to stem from an implicit 
understanding among those medical professionals.   
 I suggested to Poyet that the potential of having a regular prostate 
cancer consultation hour could also include the aspect that people could learn 
about the uncertainties involved in prostate cancer screening without first 
having to have a PSA test and, subsequently, finding themselves in a situation 
where they feel they have to continue with medical analysis in case the result is 
near or above the threshold. This is something he confirmed.  
 This borderline test result situation brought me to the second part of the 
evaluation session where I introduced the Venn interaction tool. Poyet’s first 
question was who would be handling the tool and I explained that this would 
be the doctor so as to show to the patient how to use it. Poyet commented that 
this would be a useful visualisation to demonstrate the different risks, such as 
when someone never had a biopsy and, thus, the overlapping zone would be 
much larger. At that stage in the discussion he also showed me the Prostate 
Risk Calculator, an Apple iPhone application developed by the Prostate 
Cancer Research Foundation Rotterdam. What was particularly interesting is 
that the application makes a difference between detectable cancer risk and 
relevant cancer risk, which in the exemplary case was 10% for the former and 
1% for the latter. The difference between the two lies at the heart of the 
problem of overdiagnosis and overtreatment (Esserman et al. 2013). 
 Poyet, like Huber, Cornuz and Auer, was very interested in evaluating 
the tools with actual patients. As discussed above, for him such an evaluation 
project would make most sense if it is set up in such a way so as to also 
consider and look into the referral processes between the various medical 
professionals typically involved in the screening process. I fully agreed that 
evaluating the tools would make most sense with such an extended 
understanding of the relevant environment and processes to be considered.  
 
 
Summary of research findings, challenges and methodological 
interpretation 
 
To summarise, the evaluation sessions were very productive and informative in 
a number of different ways. I will first summarise the key findings before 
proceeding to discuss their methodological interpretation as well as 
challenges I faced during the research. The next and final chapter will reflect 
on how to design and research with extended cognitive processes in mind by 
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way of research through design. 
 To start with, the three medical professionals who found the thematic 
focus of my tools relevant and were interested in participating in an evaluation 
session were all highly relevant and qualified to comment on my research from 
both a medico-technical and a clinical practice perspective. The fact that, at 
the end of the evaluation session, all three of them confirmed an interest to 
further collaborate and evaluate with patients is a strong general confirmation 
of both the topical relevancy and potency of the design approach chosen and 
developed in this research. Furthermore, and more specifically, the prototypes 
functioned well as an inflection point for discussing my understanding of the 
problem space which in turn materialised in the prototypes.  
 The Venn interaction diagram was immediately found particularly useful 
for clinical practice and thought to exhibit a high potential for clarifying with 
patients the issue of the probabilistic nature of PSA test results and the 
inherent potential of false-positive and false-negative test results. Very little 
introduction and explanation was necessary. Thus, with regards to the Venn 
interaction diagram, there was a good match in terms of the hypothesised 
thematic relevance and the actual clinical and decisional situation to be 
addressed and clarified with patients.  
 In terms of the relevancy of the reflection cards, I have come to a 
slightly different appraisal. The cards were generally found relevant, 
interesting, well-developed as a tool and, at least for some of the people in 
prostate cancer screening, suitable and acceptable. Their potential for 
epistemic action was much more difficult to assess by the medical 
professionals. Since my design approach is rather new within the domain of 
medical decision support, there simply seems to be no prior experience to 
which the reflection cards could be compared to and, thus, a potential patient 
response to be inferred from such experience by the medical professionals. 
Considering the mostly information retrieval-based design approach 
underlying contemporary decision-aids and lack of uptake in SDM, there 
seems generally very little ground to compare novel approaches building on 
more explorative involvement on the part of patients.  
 Simultaneously, and more fundamentally I suspect, at the heart of this 
inability to imagine potential responses of people to the reflection cards lies an 
absence of the practice of carrying out preference diagnoses, as has been 
argued by Mulley et al. recently (2012). My speculation was partly confirmed 
by Poyet, the urologist, who estimated that many a medical examination would 
no longer be necessary if a preference diagnosis and careful SDM were better 
supported before starting the prostate cancer screening process.110  
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 Nevertheless, and specifically from a SDM perspective as noted by 
Auer and Cornuz from the University Hospital Lausanne, of interest and value 
was in particular the ways in which the cards reconceptualise the time-frame 
within which the decision should be taken as well as for which it should be 
valid and accounted for. The difference noted was that the cards, in contrast to 
existing information brochures and decision aids, view and, in turn, support 
decision-making not as something to be made instantly as part of the 
consultation with a doctor (Kukla 2005) but more like a process over the 
course of days or weeks and possibly a second consultation. Such a notion of 
time lies of course at the very heart of the extended mind thesis and distributed 
cognition, which, as discussed earlier, build on the premise that in some 
situations cognition is supported by the social and artifactual environment. In 
turn, such exploratory processes of cognition are best allowed some time to 
unfold. 
 Interestingly, while all of the medical professionals had an opinion as to 
how many patients might use the tools, none of them could imagine what 
would happen if the tools were being used by actual patients as part of the 
decision-making process. All of them were very interested in and affirmative of 
the underlying cognitive understanding based on which the tools were 
designed. This, I speculate, may have indirectly led to the perceived potential 
in the tools, hence the interest of the medical professionals to evaluate them 
with actual patients. The question of how these tools would support such 
extended cognitive processes with patients will, thus, be evaluated in a future 
research project.  
 Unexpectedly and importantly, my prototype tools came to function as 
probes for diagnosing the underlying and practiced understanding of and 
dynamics between medical professionals and their roles. This is particularly 
significant because the acceptance and productivity of SDM-tools, such as the 
ones I have designed, may depend on a subtle understanding of such 
dynamics as my literature review has shown (Bates et al. 2003). Thus, research 
through design as an approach seems to have been productive in non-
intrusively unearthing ways in which designerly interventions may be 
introduced as prototypes but simultaneously come to act as probes or, as I 
suggest calling them, probotypes.  
 A brief recapitulation will help analytically clarify and position 
probotypes in relation to prototypes and cultural probes. At the outset, this 
research was influenced by two constraints which were actively and 
reflectively considered throughout the design process. The first one was the 
fact that, by and large, my problem space assessment and thematic focus for 
the probotypes were based on a literature review rather than any clinical 
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practice appraisal. The second one was the hypothesis of this research, i.e. 
that the decisional challenges are best seen and addressed as exploratory 
types of interactions conceptualised as extended cognitive processes. The 
synthesis of these two constraints led me to develop what I call a minimal 
reserved approach towards the development of the probotypes. This minimal 
reserved design approach can be characterised as follows: 
 Firstly, while I had a firm sense for the thematic problems to be focused 
on, I had no way of knowing how these were actually dealt with in clinical 
practice. In turn, I kept the design firmly focused on supporting epistemic 
action, while keeping explanatory embedding of the design to a minimum. As 
can be seen, there are no instructions on how to use either of the tools or, in 
the case of the Venn interaction diagram, any explanatory notes on the tool 
itself.  
 Secondly, and with regards to EMT, by way of the design process I 
successively came to realise the many possible interpretations of the epistemic 
actions I designed, no matter how detailed and focused I believe them to have 
been designed. This, in turn, affected my view and expectation of the role of 
my probotypes in the evaluation phase. I would argue that prototypes are 
classically developed with a very clear use-case in mind, meaning that both 
the problem addressed and desirable outcome and the use-context are 
(thought to be) relatively clear. As a consequence, the evaluation of prototypes 
is usually aimed at confirming the effectiveness and efficiency with which the 
prototype achieves the desired goal.  
 Cultural probes may be conceptualised and employed as a way to 
explore a problem and design space by way of engaging participants with the 
probes. Gaver et al. (2004, 53) originally intended them to be “collections of 
evocative tasks meant to elicit inspirational responses from people - not 
comprehensive information from them.” In that sense, while they are directed 
towards exploring a thematic area and how this manifests in the daily lives of 
people, they are not functionally directed to address or solve a specific 
problem.111 In turn, the evaluation of the material produced by cultural probes 
is focused on allowing designers to get a better sense for a thematic context 
from the perspective of affected and engaged people and, thus, empathically 
inspire design which “could enrich people’s lives in new and pleasurable 
ways” (ibid.). 
 Probotypes, as the name indicates, somewhat occupy a middle 
ground. They are semi-directed, by which I mean a) functionally directed to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111 Cultural probes in the beginning were often somewhat misunderstood and overly 
rationalized, even to the extent of using them to do requirements analysis (Gaver et al. 2004).!
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address a particular problem, in my case epistemic action, but b) processually 
underspecified; by this I mean the specific way in which they are to be put to 
work in a particular situation is intentionally left open for discussion and indeed 
constitutes an important part of the research and evaluation itself. Some may 
argue that prototypes inherently hold the same potential, that is to say for users 
to put them to work differently than intended by the designer, which is 
obviously impossible to control for. The difference with probotypes, however, is 
that such other-than-intended tool use is not some unexpected, serendipitous 
accident, but should be actively designed for by following a minimal reserved 
approach through suggesting interpretational openness as well as being 
anticipated and allowed for during field work (see previous chapter). In this 
regard, they are clearly inspired and informed by a rich body of work112 in the 
development of cultural probes and, thus, may be argued to be a special type 
of cultural probe. 
 Reconceptualising my prototypes as probotypes was also supported by 
the RTD method, which conceptualises prototypes as more interested in what 
might be (Gaver 2012) rather than designing the right thing (Zimmermann et al. 
2006). Such an understanding is clearly in line with the commitments and 
motivations of this research stemming from identifying a variety of issues in 
medical epistemology that arguably fall within the category of ontological 
politics as discussed in chapter four. While some suggest that RTD should 
employ more standardised methods and procedures, including evaluation, 
with the aim of extensibility and verifiability, such a development would in light 
of this research be counterproductive (Zimmermann et al. 2006). I speculate 
that the diagnostic potential of probotypes in the understanding of professional 
roles and practices would have been less likely to have surfaced. This is 
because the insights probotypes may produce are better seen as context-
specific and, thus, contingent. This, in turn, allows designers to more 
meaningfully engage with the intricacies of a specialist field (Collins 2014, 73) 
which may be vital when approaching interaction design from an extended 
cognitive processes perspective (Hollan et al. 2006, 179). I write vital because 
this allows, as shown in my case above, to better understand how medical 
professionals interact with task and work environments, including social 
structures. In turn, researchers and designers will be able to take into account 
how professionals with different roles coordinate their interactions and the role 
tools may play in such an environment. Probotypes may, thus, be defined as a 
particular diagnostic approach of applying the RTD method in order to elicit 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
112 The inspiration stems to a large part from the body of work developed by Gaver and 
colleagues in the Interaction Research Studio at Goldsmiths College, London. See: 
http://www.gold.ac.uk/interaction/. ac. 20.10.2014.!
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(professional) practices and more precisely diagnose potentials for meaningful 
interactions within complex processes and environments.  
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Chapter 8  
Discussion of implications and future directions 
 
Brief introduction 
 
In this final chapter I will summarise and discuss the development of this 
work, its claims and findings, the implications it raises as well as its limitations. 
The first part will focus on the theoretical review of the literature and the 
formulation of the research hypothesis. I will especially focus on the issues 
identified in medical epistemology and evidence-based medicine as well as 
the implications this has for decision-making in preference-sensitive care 
situations,113 such as prostate cancer screening. In turn, the hypothesis and its 
main claims will be reviewed.  
The second part will focus on the development of the practice-based 
research aspect of the thesis. Here, I will discuss the research method and 
insights generated during the design phase as well as the research findings 
with reference to the hypothesis and its main claims. Given the interdisciplinary 
nature of this project, the aim of this final chapter is to consolidate the main 
research questions, their methodical and methodological considerations, the 
findings and the implications it raises.   
  
 
Research context and hypothesis 
 
This research launched out of the observation that, by 2010, searching for 
health information online had become the third most “popular” activity among 
internet users of 18 years and above in the USA (Zickuhr 2010, 3). For many, 
health information found online affects their medical decision-making. 
However, as documented (Gigerenzer 2002, 4; Gigerenzer and Gray 2011, 3), 
there are significant issues with understanding and carefully assessing health 
information, such as difficulties in understanding statistical information as well 
as critically assessing the quality of medical information (Kukla 2007, 33). 
Whether found online or in a decision aid provided by a medical professional, 
cancer risk information based on which to decide whether or not to conduct 
screening is probabilistic in nature. As discussed in chapter three, such 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
113 To recapitulate: preference-sensitive care relates to medical situations for which there is no 
single best treatment. However, the implications of the treatment options have significant and 
diverse effects on patients and their lives; thus, their preferences matter.!
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information is typically presented as natural frequencies or in a clustered 
visualisation style privileging magnitudes of risk at the expense of the uncertain 
character of how it plays out at the individual level. As discussed in chapter 
four, significant levels of overdiagnosis and overtreatment have been identified 
in cancer screening (Welch and Black 2010). This means that the diagnostic 
and preventive treatment interventions help some people by treating all 
identified (and willing) as potentially at risk, but is also missing others due to 
false-negative results. Also, in the case of prostate cancer, preventive 
interventions may entail a variety of iatrogenic effects. These include 
incontinency, impotence, anxieties as well as bacterial and potentially lethal 
infections from conducting biopsies (Gale 2011). Unfortunately, evidence-
based medicine has witnessed a number of issues, including selective 
reporting and reporting bias, which leads to a significant distortion of the 
evidence base (Goldacre 2012; Ioannidis 2005).  
 Following my analysis, cancer screening decisions are characterised by 
multifarious complexities. These concern the information environment, such as 
in the case of a distorted medical evidence base and the probabilistic nature 
of cancer risk information, which renders such information not only problematic 
but also raises questions as to its usefulness at the individual level (Politi et al. 
2007). While medical decision support as part of shared medical decision-
making programmes has become increasingly popular, I have argued in 
chapter three that it fails to include significant elements relevant to preference-
sensitive care situations. As I argue in this thesis, this may be said to be 
because its design resembles more an information-retrieval model of 
interaction. With regard to the aims of shared decision-making, and as has also 
been argued by Kukla (2005, 35), patient autonomy may need to be 
reconsidered to include a patient’s larger healthcare situation as well as 
personal context. Thus, patients may be better seen as active inquirers and 
their autonomy supported and facilitated by medical professionals. For Kukla, 
patient autonomy may be less understood as deriving from pure autonomous 
learning and knowing in every detail, and more as a kind of collaborative 
practice.  
 With respect to patient preferences, Epstein and Peters (2009, 195) 
argue that, in medical situations characterised by substantial uncertainties and 
potential “outcomes that have previously not been considered or cannot be 
imagined,” preferences are constructed rather than simply elicited. Within the 
context of prostate cancer screening and concerning the design of decision 
aids, I argue that the absence of supporting preference construction and of 
highlighting the random character of pathology is problematic. This is because 
prostate cancer screening qualifies as a preference-sensitive care situation 
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and, thus, there is no single best medical outcome. However, the implications 
following preventive cancer interventions, such as potential impotency and 
incontinence, significantly affect a patient’s life and should be factored into the 
decision-making process. Typically, in the absence of previous experience or 
deliberation, this may prove very difficult, as the patient may simply not have 
an imagination of what it means to live with such implications. As stated in the 
introduction and developed in chapter four, the hypothesis for this research, 
then, was that an exploratory model of interaction is better suited to the context 
and challenges of redesigning and supporting shared decision-making for 
prostate cancer screening.  
 
 
Development of research-through-design work 
 
The design process constitutes the first of two significant elements for 
discussing the hypothesis. The second element concerns the research 
findings and implications, which will be discussed in the next part of the 
chapter.  
As I have documented and discussed in chapter six, the design process 
materialised in a number of prototypical ideas. These were sketched and 
evaluated for their merit based on an exploratory model of interaction. In 
contrast to the previously discussed information-retrieval model, an exploratory 
model of interaction is characterised by iterative, multi-faceted interactions 
involving incremental learning about the knowledge domain as well as, in some 
cases, successive clarification of the knowledge goal itself (White 2009). Such 
a model of interaction may also be said to be more closely aligned with 
Schön’s concept of reflection-in-action (1983). To recapitulate, instead of 
reflecting on the outcome after the fact, in some situations we reflect “in the 
midst of action without interrupting it” and, thus, make immediate changes 
(ibid.).  
In the design-process phase of the project I moved from an initially static 
representation of the false-positive issue in idea #1a stencil and idea #1b grid, 
to a mapping of an understanding in idea #2a Venn diagram (mapping), to the 
finally enactable prototype in idea #b Venn diagram (interaction). The 
exploratory interaction model supported making these steps by guiding the 
analysis and identification of multiple potentials for epistemic action. 
Simultaneously, it helped identify the limitations of the prototypical ideas as 
discussed in detail in chapter six. This successive prototype development, in 
turn, may also be seen as a reflexive use of the extended mind thesis as part of 
the research-through-design approach. That is to say, reflection-in-action 
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throughout the iterative design process was informed by and simultaneously 
analysed through the evaluative criteria of the prototype’s potential for 
epistemic action. This was achieved by an analysis of the detailed interactions 
designed and their potential meaningfulness.  
Clearly, such an approach is limited by the capacity to anticipate a variety 
of possible interpretations by other people. Despite this limitation, it seemed 
productive as, from the design development work, it has also become clear 
that an information-retrieval model may be seen as a more suitable model of 
interaction for information re-finding. That is to say, supposing that a person is 
already familiar with the meaning of a piece of information and, upon re-finding 
it, can easily identify and act upon it. Thus, the design goal following an 
information-retrieval approach may be argued to be finding an ideal 
representation chiefly supportive of one specific interpretation. Clearly, these 
are not the characteristics that apply to the preference-construction and 
decision-making context in prostate cancer screening. This is a key point I 
have argued above and in detail concerning the issues inherent in medical 
epistemology and evidence-based medicine (chapter two) as well as with 
regard to the presentation of probabilistic risk information, a reconsideration of 
the notion of patient autonomy and the need to support the preference-
construction process (chapter three).  
Following the RTD method, the insights I generated regarding how to 
redesign shared decision-making (SDM) successively consolidated in what I 
called a ‘minimal reserved approach.’ In summary, I characterised such an 
approach as follows: focusing on the hypothesised core aspects relevant for 
epistemic action and keeping additional explanatory embedding to a minimum. 
The latter concerns how the tools will be put to use in a particular context, and 
will be discussed in the next section. With regard to the former, and in the 
context of making sense of PSA test results, this means that the enactable 
visual form should - in principle - allow to simultaneously understand the 
possibility of a healthy and pathological state when viewed from a population 
perspective and as a binary between being healthy or pathological when 
viewed from an individual perspective. Furthermore, such an approach 
recognises the need to elicit an interpretation by medical professionals 
regarding the multiple possibilities of epistemic action hopefully designed into 
the tools.  
Understanding how the medical professionals would make sense of the tool 
and put it to use with patients as part of their consultation practice brings me to 
the discussion regarding explanatory embedding. This was sought by 
following an approach of underspecifying the design in terms of its explanatory 
embedding. Underspecification of the design was achieved by multiple 
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means. Firstly, in the design of the Venn interaction diagram tool, I left a variety 
of spaces unused. These could be used to add further explanatory or useful 
notes upon the evaluation of medical professionals or, for example, inviting 
users to take notes themselves. Secondly, I decided not to include a manual 
on how to use the tools. Rather, and as part of the evaluation process, I 
handed the tools to the medical professionals and asked them how they might 
put the tools to use. Only when asked how I envisioned the tools to be used did 
I discuss my thoughts on this. Such was the case when, for example, asked by 
Poyet, the urologist from the Prostate Carcinom Centre whom I had in mind as 
a potential user of the cards.  
By way of this minimal reserved approach, my tools came to act as probe-
like prototypes or ‘probotypes.’ Methodologically, probotypes occupy a middle 
ground between prototypes and cultural probes. As discussed in chapter 
seven, they may be best characterised as being semi-directed. While they are 
functionally directed to address a particular problem just like prototypes, 
processually they are underspecified, by which I mean the specific way in 
which they are to be put to work in a particular situation is intentionally left open 
for discussion and constitutes an important part of the RTD method. Thus, the 
probotypes uncovered a better understanding of how medical professionals 
interact with task and work environments, including social structures. In turn, 
researchers and designers will be able to take into account how professionals 
with different roles coordinate their interactions and the role tools may play in 
such an environment.  
Probotypes may, thus, tentatively be defined as a particular diagnostic 
approach of applying the RTD method in order to elicit (professional) practices 
and more precisely diagnose potentials for meaningful interactions within 
complex and multi-layered processes and environments. Since evaluating with 
patients will occur in a later research phase, it will be important and interesting 
to see in what ways the probotypes might also be useful in that regard. I 
speculate that they might in fact become productive as a catalyst to uncover 
opinionated medical professionals (Wennberg 1973). This, in turn, leads me to 
the discussion of the key findings.     
 
 
Key findings and their implications  
 
The tools were generally well received and, more importantly, led to interesting 
insights as noted in chapter seven. One key insight that emerged was the 
structurally different notion and relevance of time within the decision-making 
process that was at the heart of the reflection cards I had developed. As noted 
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by Cornuz and Auer from the University Hospital Lausanne, in contrast to 
current decision aids, my tools introduced a much longer time-frame for 
deliberating both the decision itself and the time-frame for which such 
decisions should be accounted for. This has potentially multiple implications: 
Firstly, from the perspective of the screening decision-making person, 
one immediate implication is viewing the screening decision with regard to 
such a long-term perspective may entail the need to anticipate a variety of 
experiences as part of the cancer screening process. As a consequence, this 
may occasion a shifting of personal tensions and values. In turn, the decision 
of whether or not to screen may be better viewed as one that may need to be 
open for reconsideration, hence not necessarily valid indefinitely. The 
implications this may have will be an interesting research focus for the patient 
evaluation.  
On the one hand, it might be liberating for patients as they could stop 
with the screening process, should they start to feel uncomfortable with it. On 
the other hand, I wonder whether people would really ‘abandon’ the screening 
process once the spectre of potentially being affected by cancer is eliminated. 
As commented on by Poyet, the urologist, some people find it difficult to 
accept that the conducting of a biopsy did not find any cancerous lesions, 
despite the (false-)positive PSA test results. Furthermore, how people stopping 
with the cancer screening process will account for it with regard to their social 
environment will be of interest (Sontag 1977). 
Secondly, not everyone may feel comfortable or capable of deliberating 
such questions solely by himself. Thus, it may be speculated that, without the 
availability of counseling, such as that for genetic testing, such an approach 
may be frightening, undesirable or even unacceptable to some (Politi et al. 
2007, 688). To some degree, the Cochrane systematic review of decision aids 
may indeed already have confirmed the discomfort with such deliberation in 
solitude - given the current decision aids’ inability to provide higher satisfaction 
concerning anxiety when compared to conventional care practices (Cochrane 
Collaboration 2009, 43).  
This aspect may point towards a further potential line of inquiry for the 
next phase of this research. I wonder whether a digital equivalent of the 
reflection cards and the notes and comments made by people using them may 
provide a valuable opportunity to share such deliberations via an online 
platform. One of the potential positive implications that may follow from such a 
platform may be that it renders the deliberation and decision process a less 
lonely one. Furthermore, opening up this process may indeed reveal that it is 
less linear than it might be thought of or, as I argue, reflected in the design of 
contemporary decision aids as discussed in chapter three and four. Practically 
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speaking, the exchange by people involved in or occupied with such 
screening decision-making on such a platform may show that some people 
either feel uncomfortable with or even stop the cancer screening process, and 
document the ways in which they account for it.  
Thirdly, from the perspective of medical professionals, two insights 
stood out. With regard to the reflection cards, all the medical professionals 
found them useful, but were unable to assess or speculate on the potential 
reactions that might ensue were they to use them with their patients. As noted 
in chapter seven, this may point to the absence of practicing preference 
diagnosis with patients and, importantly, involving patients when doing so. At 
this point, one may speculate as to whether medical professionals already 
have the relevant training to support people in the preference-construction 
process. While some argue that medical professionals “are in general not 
better placed to make good judgments about moral choices than patients are” 
(McLeod 2005, 5), Kukla (2007, 32) argues that experienced clinicians may 
indeed also have moral expertise special to their field of practice. Her 
argument is that, due to their specialism, they have significant opportunities to 
reflect on the moral complexities that concern treatment options and medical 
procedures they conduct on a daily basis. In contrast, and as discussed 
earlier, many people find themselves confronted with such questions for the 
first time. It would be my hope that the reflection cards stimulate people 
considering cancer screening to think about how this might affect them in their 
personal life and evoke questions and dilemmas they might want to discuss 
with their trusted GP so as to get their view and expertise on these aspects. 
Additionally, with regard to the digital platform just discussed, it is imaginable 
that such expertise may also manifest as part of the dialogue on such a 
platform. To this end, my design may be seen as hoping to initiate such 
deliberations and dialogues between people considering cancer screening 
and their GPs as well as among themselves, offline or online. 
The second insight from the perspective of medical professionals 
concerns the role my probotypes came to serve regarding the ways in which 
medical professionals with different roles (e.g. a GP or a urologist) see their 
roles and what is expected of them and their practice. Poyet as a urologist 
sees many people with an ‘elevated’ PSA test result being referred to him by 
GPs. His, and presumably that of other urologists, understanding of such 
referrals is that he is to conduct a prostate biopsy in order to verify whether 
such elevated levels are in fact due to cancerous lesions or, instead, yet 
another false-positive PSA test result. Specifically, he thought he could not use 
the reflection cards in the case of a referral patient, as this would question the 
medical authority of the referring GP and may negatively affect the trust the 
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patient has both in his GP as well as medicine more largely. Instead, Poyet 
suggested that the problem may lie in that PSA tests are conducted without 
prior thoughtful deliberation with a person concerning the harms and benefits 
of screening and, thus, preference diagnosis. This could be addressed by 
setting up a regular consultation hour, which could be attended both by 
potential prostate screening candidates as well as their GPs before any PSA 
test is conducted.  
One immediate question is why such consultations prior to conducting 
PSA tests are not yet available. Surprisingly, my suggestion to set up a meeting 
with Huber, the GP, and Poyet, the urologist, has been met with little interest by 
Huber yet. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Poyet, the urologist, proposed to 
set up a regular consultation hour prior to PSA testing and suggested that, 
were preference diagnosis to be conducted, many examinations could be 
spared. It is somewhat incomprehensible why Huber, would not see such 
suggestions made by a urologist in a management position of said institution 
as an opportunity to advance a shared matter of concern. Viewed from a 
distance, this seems a clear reminder of the strong limitations the tools I have 
developed may have. Unless there were to be a shared acceptance by 
medical professionals and an interest in reconsidering current clinical practice 
of launching cancer-screening processes without prior preference diagnosis, 
my tools may have limited impact.  
 
 
Conclusion, limitations and future research directions 
 
Looking at the evaluation sessions might indicate that there is little immediate 
feedback on whether extended cognitive processes would be supported by 
the tools I designed. However, in a less direct manner I infer that the medical 
professionals share the perceived potential of the extended cognitive 
approach. This is because: a) at the beginning of the evaluation sessions they 
confirmed to have understood the cognitive approach chosen for designing 
the tools and had no questions about it or why I had followed such an 
approach; b) the interactive elements and suggested epistemic action of the 
tools were easily explained and found useful; and c) consequently, and most 
importantly, they could easily see themselves using the tools with their patients 
in consultations. This was further confirmed when Cornuz and Auer highlighted 
and commended the fundamental reframing of the decision process and time-
frame in my tools, which is an important element in supporting extended 
cognitive processes. 
To clarify, the goal of this research was neither to convince medical 
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professionals nor patients of the veracity of philosophical arguments about 
extended cognitive processes. Rather, I raised the question of how we could 
design with EMT in mind within the context of exploratory health decision-
making processes. Having medical professionals recognise a potential in the 
approach taken and the tools designed by being willing to evaluate them in 
real consultation processes is a very positive sign for this research.  
At the same time, there are also clear limitations of what the cards may 
ultimately be capable of achieving. As Auer remarked, “the cards will not be 
able to unbias the doctor.” This comment touches on the issue of preference-
sensitive care situations and the relation between a doctor and a patient. With 
regard to “unbiasing doctors,” while this is something neither the reflection 
cards nor the Venn interaction tool aim to achieve, it is to be expected that a 
medical professional with a set opinion on the benefits of prostate cancer 
screening would likely be hesitant to use my tools in the consultation in the first 
place.  
Whether patients of such a medical professional would come across my 
tools by other means and how that would influence their relation with such a 
medical professional is an interesting and open question. Assuming a relatively 
low difficulty of understanding the tools I have developed, it seems easy to 
imagine complementing them with explanatory material for introducing people 
to them directly rather than via a medical professional. Hoping that my tools 
might also eventually be endorsed by relevant medical institutions, such as the 
Swiss Cancer League, this would likely make necessary for said skeptical 
medical professional to take a stand when confronted by a patient having used 
the tools. Potentially, such a moment of confrontation might also reveal a bit 
more clearly the degree to which the practice of defensive medicine114 
influences the behaviour and suggestions of medical professionals. 
In conclusion, and in reflection on my hypothesis, I argue that an 
exploratory model is indeed better suited to the purposes of supporting shared 
decision-making in prostate cancer screening. This is because such a model 
of interaction helps with identifying, understanding and addressing multiple 
potentials for epistemic action as demonstrated in the design and evaluation 
process (chapter six and seven). This is much needed in a complex 
information and decision environment, as I analysed and argued in detail with 
regard to medical epistemology (chapter two), shared medical decision-
making (chapter three) and the ontological politics underlying prostate cancer 
screening decisions (chapter four). An exploratory model of interaction 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
114!The practice of suggesting medical treatments that may not be necessary but reduce the risk 
of the medical professional being legally charged for not conducting them.!
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requires us to recognise multifarious trajectories of interaction; in turn, it is 
more open to analysing multiple ways in which an understanding of complex 
and multi-layered pieces of information may be supported by interacting, 
interrogating and learning about them successively.  
Throughout the development of the design work as well as when 
evaluating it with medical professionals, the problem and design space I have 
chosen to engage with has become clearer and much more concrete. In turn, I 
have come to realise and appreciate the complexity of the design and decision 
context within which I have aimed to start developing relevant interaction 
prototypes. The research, development and evaluation process has personally 
been a highly challenging and satisfactory learning experience.  
Following this, and as discussed in this concluding chapter, there are a 
number of promising lines of inquiry in which I can and will take this research 
project further. Firstly, I look forward to continuing to refine the research 
methodology by employing probotypes as a specific approach to the 
research–through-design method. I will do this by inventing and developing a 
variety of tools to support epistemic action and preference-construction 
processes. Secondly, and as suggested by the medical professionals, I may 
also start to do this for other types of cancer and affected people, such as 
breast cancer. Lastly, I am also considering taking the tools to the digital realm 
so as to be able to inquire into the possibilities this may have for opening up 
the deliberation and decision process beyond the decision-taking individual. 
All of this will happen in the next phases of this research project when planning 
and setting up patient evaluation projects with medical professionals. 
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This short decision aid is for men who are considering having a test to find out more about their risk of having
prostate cancer. The decision aid is not for people who have symptoms of prostate cancer and need a test to
diagnose cancer.
The prostate specific antigen (PSA) test can tell you if you have a raised chance of prostate cancer. The PSA
test cannot tell you for certain whether you have prostate cancer. If you decide to have a PSA test you can
discuss this with your GP, who can arrange for you to have a test.
Whether you decide to have a test will depend on many things, including whether there is a history of prostate
cancer in your family, whether you want to know about a raised risk of cancer, and what you think you would
do if you had a result that showed a raised chance of prostate cancer.
The options are:
• Have a blood test for prostate specific antigen
• Do not have a blood test for prostate specific antigen.
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Having the PSA test Not having the PSA test
What is the choice? The PSA blood test can help to diagnose
prostate cancer. It measures the amount
of a protein called prostate-specific
antigen (or PSA) in your blood. PSA is
made by the prostate gland. It is normally
found in semen, the fluid which contains
your sperm. If there is cancer in the
prostate, more PSA leaks into the blood.
The higher the level of PSA in the blood
sample, the more likely it is to be a sign of
cancer.
A PSA test on its own cannot tell you
for certain whether you have prostate
cancer. It can only tell you if you have a
raised risk of prostate cancer. PSA levels
can vary between men of the same age.
Other illnesses which are not cancer can
also cause a rise in PSA. If you have a
raised PSA level you will need to have
other tests to find out if this is caused by
prostate cancer.
If you choose not to have a PSA test, you
don't have a blood test to find out whether
you have a raised risk of prostate cancer.
Having the PSA test Not having the PSA test
What is the effect on how long you
live?
On average, men who have a PSA test
do not live longer or shorter lives than
men who do not have a test.[1]
This information comes from studies
looking at big groups of men who were
offered PSA testing. We don't know
whether having a PSA test will affect your
individual length of life.
On average, men who do not have a PSA
test do not live longer or shorter lives than
men who do have a test.[2]
This information comes from studies
looking at big groups of men who were
offered PSA testing. We don't know
whether not having a PSA test will affect
your individual length of life.
Having the PSA test Not having the PSA test
What is the effect on chances of
dying from prostate cancer?
Men who have prostate cancer are less
likely to die of prostate cancer if they
had a PSA test. Their chances of dying
of prostate cancer reduce by about 1 in
1000.[3]
We don't know if having a PSA test
means you're more likely to live longer if
you are diagnosed with prostate cancer.
[4] This is because having a PSA test
does not affect how likely you are to die
early of other causes.
When all men in a big group are
screened, studies show that 293 men
need to have a PSA test to prevent one
man dying from prostate cancer.[5]
Men who have prostate cancer are more
likely to die of prostate cancer if they
didn't have a PSA test, compared to men
who did have a test. Their chances of
dying of prostate cancer are about 1 in
1000 higher.[6]
We don't know if not having a PSA test
means you're more likely to live longer if
you are diagnosed with prostate cancer.
[7]
Not having a PSA test does not prevent
death from prostate cancer.[8]
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Having the PSA test Not having the PSA test
What is the effect on chances of
being diagnosed with prostate
cancer?
More men who have a PSA test find out
they have prostate cancer than those who
don't have a test. Between 6 and 7 in 100
men who have a PSA test are diagnosed
with prostate cancer. Between 4 and 5 in
100 men who don't have a PSA test are
diagnosed with prostate cancer.[9]
Fewer men who don't have a PSA test
find out they have prostate cancer than
those who do have a test. Between 4
and 5 in 100 men who don't have a PSA
test are diagnosed with prostate cancer.
Between 6 and 7 in 100 men who have
a PSA test are diagnosed with prostate
cancer.[10]
Having the PSA test Not having the PSA test
What is the effect on chances of
being diagnosed early?
Prostate cancer is diagnosed six to eight
years earlier in men who have a PSA
test.[11]
Prostate cancer is diagnosed six to eight
years later in men who don't have a PSA
test.[12]
Having the PSA test Not having the PSA test
What is the effect of being
diagnosed and treated early?
If you have the PSA test, you're more
likely to be diagnosed and treated early.
We're not sure if early diagnosis and
treatment makes a difference to how long
you are likely to live. Not many studies
have compared different treatments to no
treatment. It also depends on your type of
cancer and how advanced it is.
If you don't have the PSA test, you are
not likely to be diagnosed and treated
early. We're not sure if early diagnosis
and treatment makes a difference to
how long you are likely to live. Not
many studies have compared different
treatments to no treatment. It also
depends on your type of cancer and how
advanced it is.
Having the PSA test Not having the PSA test
What are the chances of having
a positive test result when you
donâ##t have cancer (a false
positive)?
The PSA test can suggest you have
cancer when you don't (overdiagnose
cancer). Most men who have a raised
PSA level don't have prostate cancer.
Between 65 in 100 [13] and 76 in 100 [14]
men who have a raised PSA result do not
have prostate cancer, when they have a
biopsy test to check. Doctors call this a
false positive result.
If you don't have a PSA test, you won't
get a false positive result.
Having the PSA test Not having the PSA test
What are the chances of having a
negative test result when you do
have cancer (a false negative)?
The PSA test can miss cases of cancer
(underdiagnose cancer). Around 15 in
100 men who have a normal PSA level
when they are tested will have prostate
cancer.[15] Doctors call this a false
negative result.
If you don't have a PSA test, you won't
get a false negative result.
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Having the PSA test Not having the PSA test
What is the effect on chances
of needing a biopsy and having
complications from biopsy or
treatment?
In one large group of men, between 16
and 17 in 100 men who had a PSA test
had a result showing a raised PSA level.
[16] If the results of your PSA test show
you have a raised PSA level, your doctor
is likely to suggest you have a biopsy.
About 86 in 100 men with a raised PSA
level after a PSA test will have a biopsy.
[17]
If you are diagnosed with prostate
cancer, you will need to decide about
treatment. Some men have problems or
complications after a biopsy or treatment
for prostate cancer. Problems from
prostate cancer treatment include urinary
incontinence and difficulty getting an
erection. These problems may not go
away.
If you don't have a PSA test, it's unlikely
you will need to have a biopsy unless
you get symptoms of prostate cancer.
This means you are unlikely to have
any complications from biopsies or
treatments.
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People have different views on the pros and cons of having a test for prostate specific antigen (PSA) to find
out more about their risk of having prostate cancer. Choosing the option that is best for you means considering
how the consequences of each option - having a blood test or not having a blood test - will affect your life.
Here are some questions people may want to consider before deciding whether have the PSA test.
• Do they only want to take the test if it will lower their chances of dying from prostate cancer?
• Do they want to know for sure whether or not they have prostate cancer?
• Are they willing to take the PSA test if it's likely they will need more tests afterwards?
• Are they willing to take the PSA test if it's likely they will need treatments afterwards?
• How important is it to them that the test is reliable?
• Are they willing to take the PSA test if there's a chance they will have side effects or problems?
!	"#$	
 
Go to http://sdm.rightcare.nhs.uk/pda/psa-testing/ for more detailed information about treatments for
Prostate Specific Antigen (PSA) Testing. People using this type of information say they understand the
health problem and treatment choices more clearly, and why one treatment is better for them than another.
They also say they can talk more confidently about their reasons for liking or not liking an option with health
professionals, friends and family.
You can call our Decision Support service on 0845 450 5851 to speak to a trained Health Coach. The Health
Coaches will assist you by:
• Providing you with information
• Helping you to understand your condition
• Recognise what is important to you regarding the outcome of treatment
• Identifying potential solutions
• Encourage you in discussing options with your family
• Transferring skills which will assist you in using the information and resources available to you
• Support you in building confidence in discussing your choice with your doctor
• You may find that this can be achieved in one telephone call with a Health Coach; however, if further calls
are required to support you in reaching your decision the Health Coach will schedule these with you.
%

References can be viewed online at http://sdm.rightcare.nhs.uk/pda/psa-testing/references/
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!Appendix 3: Prototype 2 – Reflection cards 
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!Prototype 2 - Translation of Reflection Cards 
 
S1_01 
You and your GP talk about next steps 
 
You just had a PSA blood test and the result was slightly above the recommended 
threshold. Your GP recommends conducting a tissue test (biopsy), just to be sure. 
You are considering doing it. 
 
How do you respond when you meet a friend in the evening and she says that PSA 
blood tests very often show false-positive test results? 
 
 
S1_02 
Concerning love 
 
You had a slightly positive PSA blood test and your GP recommends conducting a 
tissue test (biopsy). You are worried about conducting such an intervention. A friend 
has already conducted a few biopsies but no cancer was ever found. 
 
Your partner asks you whether you would not rather have certainty about this. How will 
you respond? 
 
 
S1_03 
How adaptable is your work place? 
 
You are worried that conducting a tissue test (biopsy) would find slow-growing 
prostate cancer. Preventive treatment can cause problems with urination.  
 
Are there work-related situations which you would need to modify as a result of having 
problems with controlling urination? How feasible would that be and how would you 
feel about it? 
 
 
S1_04 
Concerning love 
 
You had a positive PSA blood test. In a magazine, you read that preventive prostate 
cancer treatment may cause erection problems. 
 
You think about the role sex plays in your life. How would your partner feel like in case 
you had erection problems? 
! 
 
S2_05 
Among work colleagues 
 
You had a positive PSA blood test and decided to conduct a tissue test (biopsy). 
During lunch you hear someone talking about a false tissue test result.  
 
How do you feel about that? What will you do? 
 
 
S2_06 
Leisure activities with your partner 
 
In ten days you will conduct a tissue test. You are concerned that preventive prostate 
cancer treatment will be recommended, and this can cause problems controlling 
urination.  
 
Your partner is booking flights for the upcoming holidays. In what ways would a 
problem with controlling urination affect your leisure activities and holidays? What 
does your partner think about it? 
 
 
S3_07 
You and your GP talk about next steps 
 
You have anxiously awaited the result of your tissue test (biopsy). The result was 
negative, nevertheless your GP recommends following a watchful waiting approach 
with PSA blood tests every six months and further tissue tests if necessary. 
 
What is your reaction to this? Do you feel comfortable with such an approach? 
 
 
S3_08 
Among friends 
 
You are relieved. The result of your tissue test (biopsy) is negative. While drinking a 
beer with a friend in the evening, he mentions that such results can be incorrect.  
 
How do you respond and what will you do? 
 
 
S3_09 
Among friends 
! 
The result of your first tissue test (biopsy) is negative. Your trusted GP recommends 
continuing testing. A good friend discourages you from continuing testing. She 
mentions that, despite conducting periodic tissue testing, her father never had 
aggressive prostate cancer. 
 
How do you respond? Who will you talk to about this? 
 
 
S3_10 
Family 
 
You are relieved. You just had a tissue test (biopsy) and again a negative result. Your 
brother in law has slow-growing prostate cancer and recommends continuing testing. 
 
Will this affect your decision? Why, or why not? 
 
 
S3_11 
In conversation with your partner 
 
You are relieved. You just had a tissue test (biopsy) and again a negative result. Your 
partner is skeptical about the test result and recommends continuing testing.  
 
How do you feel about it? What will you do? 
 
 
S3_12 
Concerning love 
 
Your first tissue test (biopsy) two years ago was negative. Your GP recommends 
continuing testing, but you decline.  
 
Your new partner is asking you how you deal with this situation. How do you explain 
your decision on this? 
 
 
S3_13 
Among friends 
 
You just had your first tissue test (biopsy) with a negative result. However, you now 
suffer from slight pain when urinating. Your GP recommends continuing blood and 
tissue testing. 
 
!What will you recommend your friend who is about to decide whether or not to screen 
for prostate cancer? 
 
 
S3_14 
Among friends 
 
You just had your second negative tissue test (biopsy) but suffer from temporary side-
effects. You are thinking about the potential side-effects of a preventive prostate 
cancer treatment. 
 
In what ways would problems with controlling urination affect your sport activities? 
What does your best friend think about it? 
 
 
S3_15 
At work 
 
Your third tissue test (biopsy) is again negative. However, the intervention led to 
temporary pain. You are thinking about the potential side-effects of a preventive 
prostate cancer treatment. 
 
In what ways would problems with controlling urination affect your work? What does 
your colleague think about it? What about your boss? 
 
 
S3_16 
Family 
 
Your third tissue test (biopsy) is again negative. However, the intervention led to 
temporary pain. You are thinking about the potential side-effects of a preventive 
prostate cancer treatment. 
 
Can you talk about it openly with your family? What does your partner think about it?  
 
 
S3_17 
At work 
 
Your third tissue test (biopsy) is again negative. However, the intervention led to 
temporary pain. During a meeting at work, you are thinking about how problems with 
controlling urination (incontinence) would affect your work situation. Incontinence can 
be a potential side-effect of preventive prostate cancer treatment. 
 
!Is it possible to handle your concern openly shortly before your expected promotion? 
 
 
S4_18 
Talking about next steps with your partner 
 
You are waking up from anesthesia from having a tissue test (biopsy). Your urologist 
tells you that you have medium-aggressive prostate cancer. She recommends a 
complete removal of the prostate gland. This can cause problems having an erection. 
 
At home your partner is waiting for you. How do you feel about it? Have you already 
discussed sexual desires openly? 
 
 
S5_19 
Among football friends 
 
After a tissue test (biopsy) you suffer from temporary problems controlling urination. 
Your urologist tells you that you have aggressive prostate cancer and recommends 
swift treatment. You are also concerned that the problem with controlling urination will 
get worse.  
 
How would you adapt your weekly football workout to the situation? 
 
 
S6_20 
At the family dinner 
 
You just had a tissue test (biopsy) and been diagnosed with slow-growing prostate 
cancer. Your GP recommends watchful waiting with blood tests every six months. 
 
What will you tell your family over dinner tonight and how will you decide? Why? 
 
 
S6_21 
Among work colleagues 
 
After a tissue test (biopsy) and a slow-growing prostate cancer diagnosis, you decide 
to continue with watchful waiting. Your boss just had his prostate removed due to an 
aggressive prostate cancer diagnosis. 
 
How will you account for your decision with your colleagues at work? 
 
 
!S6_22 
Among friends 
 
After a tissue test (biopsy) and a slow-growing prostate cancer diagnosis, you decide 
to continue with watchful waiting. Your next PSA blood test is in 9 months. 
 
How will you describe the current situation to your friends when they ask you about 
your health and wellbeing? 
 
 
S7_23 
You and your family 
 
You had a positive PSA blood test and your urologist recommends conducting a 
tissue test (biopsy). After intense consideration you decide against it. Your uncle 
mentions that his neighbour could almost not be treated anymore as her breast 
cancer was found late. 
 
How do you account for your decision? 
 
 
S7_24 
Among friends 
 
You had a positive PSA blood test and your GP recommends conducting a tissue test 
(biopsy). You decline. 
 
Your family is concerned. How will you explain your decision? 
 
 
S7_25 
Concerning love 
 
You just had your second negative tissue test (biopsy) in three years. Your GP 
recommends continuing testing. Periodic testing and the potential side-effects worry 
you. 
 
How will you respond to your partner when she raises her wish to start a family? 
 
 
 
 
 
! 
